Managing untyped network traffic flows

ABSTRACT

An enterprise security system is improved by managing network flows based on an application type. When a network message having an unknown application type is received at a gateway, firewall, or other network device/service from an endpoint, the endpoint that originated the network message may be queried for identifying information for the source of the network message and the application type may be determined, or the endpoint may periodically communicate application type information to the network device in a heartbeat or other periodic communication or the like. The network message may be managed along with other network traffic according to the application type.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/795,747 filed on Oct. 27, 2017, which claims the benefit of U.S.Prov. App. No. 62/557,703 filed on Sep. 12, 2017, U.S. Prov. App. No.62/571,759 filed on Oct. 12, 2017, and U.S. Prov. App. No. 62/572,548filed on Oct. 15, 2017. The entire content of each of the foregoingapplications is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates to techniques for improving endpoint security.

BACKGROUND

Enterprise networks can contain valuable information that forms anincreasingly attractive target for malicious actors. Useful techniquesfor securing endpoints in a network against malicious activity aredescribed by way of example in commonly-owned U.S. Pat. No. 9,392,015issued on Jul. 12, 2016, U.S. Pat. No. 8,950,007 issued on Feb. 3, 2015,U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/485,759 filed on Sep. 14, 2014, U.S.patent application Ser. No. 15/042,862 filed on Feb. 12, 2016, U.S.patent application Ser. No. 15/099,524 filed on Apr. 14, 2017, and U.S.patent application Ser. No. 15/484,830 filed on Apr. 11, 2017, each ofwhich is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.

There remains a need for improved endpoint security techniques such asimproved network security network security based on monitoring networkflows or improved endpoint network security based on control ofinterprocess communications.

SUMMARY

In one aspect, a method for managing network flows for an enterprisedisclosed herein includes receiving a network message at a networkdevice from an endpoint within an enterprise network, when the networkmessage contains first identifying information providing an applicationtype for the network message, using the first identifying information inthe network message to determine the application type, when the networkmessage has an unknown application type, querying the endpoint toretrieve second identifying information for a process executing on theendpoint that was a source of the network message and determining theapplication type for the source of the network message based on thesecond identifying information retrieved from the endpoint, managing anetwork traffic flow including the network message at the network deviceaccording to the application type.

Managing the network traffic flow may include applying a security policyto the network traffic flow according to the application type. Managingthe network traffic flow may include associating the network trafficflow with the application type. Querying the endpoint may includequerying an endpoint security agent executing on the endpoint. Queryingthe endpoint may include querying the endpoint through a secureconnection between the network device and the endpoint. Querying theendpoint may include receiving a response at the network device from theendpoint in a secure heartbeat from the endpoint. The network device mayinclude a gateway for the enterprise network, a cloud-based networkdevice, or a firewall on the endpoint. The first identifying informationor second identifying information may include an application name forthe source of the network message. The first identifying information orsecond identifying information may include application data for thesource of the network message. Determining the application type mayinclude forwarding the first identifying information or the secondidentifying information to a threat management facility for analysis andreceiving an identification of the application type from the threatmanagement facility.

In another aspect, a method of managing flows at a network devicedisclosed herein includes determining an application type for each of anumber of network traffic flows at a network device that receives thenumber of network traffic flows from endpoints within an enterprisenetwork and managing the network traffic flows based on thecorresponding application types. The method may further includereceiving a network message in one of the network traffic flows at thenetwork device from an endpoint within the enterprise network, thenetwork message having an unknown application type and querying theendpoint to retrieve identifying information for the source on theendpoint of the network message. The method may include determining theapplication type for the source of the network message based on theidentifying information and managing the network message within thenetwork traffic according to the application type.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features.Managing the network traffic flows may include applying a securitypolicy to each of the network traffic flows according to the applicationtype. Managing the network traffic may also or instead includeassociating the network flow containing the message with the applicationtype. Querying the endpoint may include querying an endpoint securityagent executing on the endpoint. Querying the endpoint may also orinstead include querying the endpoint through a secure connectionbetween the network device and the endpoint. Querying the endpoint mayalso or instead include receiving a response at the network device fromthe endpoint in a secure heartbeat from the endpoint. The network devicemay include a gateway for the enterprise network. The identifyinginformation may include an application name for the source of thenetwork message. The identifying information includes application datafor the source of the network message. Determining the application typemay include forwarding the identifying information to a threatmanagement facility for analysis and receiving an identification of theapplication type from the threat management facility.

In one aspect, a computer program product for managing network flowscomprising computer executable code embodied on a non-transitorycomputer readable medium that, when executing on a network device, mayperform the steps of determining an application type for each of anumber of network traffic flows at a network device that receives thenumber of network traffic flows from endpoints within an enterprisenetwork and managing the network traffic flows based on thecorresponding application types. The code may also perform the steps ofreceiving a network message in one of the network traffic flows at thenetwork device from an endpoint within the enterprise network, thenetwork message having an unknown application type and querying theendpoint to retrieve identifying information for the source on theendpoint of the network message. The code may also perform the steps ofdetermining the application type for the source of the network messagebased on the identifying information and managing the network messagewithin the network traffic according to the application type.

In another aspect, a method for visualizing network usage disclosedherein includes providing a number of application types thatcharacterizing one or more applications sourcing network traffic withinan enterprise network, labeling each of a number of network trafficflows in the enterprise network with one of the application types byquerying endpoints for network type information when each new one of thenumber of network traffic flows is initiated, aggregating a number ofendpoints using each one of the application types on the enterprisenetwork at a cloud-based enterprise management facility, and configuringthe cloud-based enterprise management facility to present the number ofendpoints using each one of the application types to a user in aweb-based dashboard.

Each of the number of application types may include an application name.The number of application types may include electronic mail, wordprocessing, spread sheet, and web browser. Labeling may include labelingat one or more network devices within the enterprise network. Labelingmay include querying each endpoint that initiates one of the networktraffic flows to identify an associated application type. Labeling mayinclude extracting an explicit application type label from a networkmessage within one of the network traffic flows. The explicitapplication type label may be cryptographically signed. Labeling mayinclude extracting an explicit application type label from informationtransmitted in a heartbeat from an endpoint that originated a networkmessage within one of the network traffic flows. The heartbeat may be asecure heartbeat. The heartbeat may be a digitally signed heartbeat.Aggregating a number of endpoints using each one of the applicationtypes includes aggregating only the application types used by one ormore of the endpoints. The web-based dashboard may provide interactiveaccess to underlying data for one or more of network usage by eachapplication type, number of endpoints using each application type,duration of usage, and bandwidth usage.

In another aspect, a computer program product disclosed herein includescomputer executable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readablemedium that, when executing on one or more computing devices, performsthe steps of: providing a number of application types; labeling each ofa number of network traffic flows in an enterprise network with one ofthe application types; aggregating a number of endpoints using each oneof the application types on the enterprise network; and configuring aserver to present the number of endpoints using each one of theapplication types to a user in a web-based dashboard.

In another aspect, there is disclosed herein a system including aplurality of security agents executing on a plurality of endpoints in anenterprise network. The system may also include one or more networkdevice in the enterprise network, each one of the network devicesconfigured to label network traffic flows from the plurality ofendpoints according to an application type selected from a predeterminedgroup of application types. The system may also include a serverconfigured to aggregate usage data from each one of the network devicesto determine a number of instances of each one of the predeterminedgroup of application types associated with a network traffic flow withinthe enterprise network, and to present the usage data in a web-basedinterface.

Endpoint security is improved by monitoring and controlling interprocesscommunications through a kernel-based endpoint protection driver. A listof protected computing objects such as registry keys, files, processesand directories is stored in the kernel and secured with reference to atrust authority external to the kernel and the endpoint. Protectedprocesses are further controlled from unauthorized access and use bymonitoring all interprocess communications through the endpointprotection driver and preventing unprotected processes from passing(potentially unsafe) data to protected processes.

A computer program product for securing interprocess communications inan operating system of an endpoint that includes a kernel space foroperating system functions and a user space for user programs disclosedherein includes computer executable code embodied in a non-transitorycomputer-readable medium that, when executing on the endpoint, performsthe steps of storing a tamper protection cache in the kernel space onthe endpoint, the tamper protection cache identifying one or moreprotected processes for protection when executing in the user space,storing a digital signature in the tamper protection cache, the digitalsignature signed with a private key that provides a root of trust from atrust authority external to the operating system, monitoring executionof processes in the user space of the endpoint with an endpointprotection driver executing in the kernel space, directing aninterprocess communication from a first process in the user space to asecond process in the user space through the endpoint protection driver,and, when the second process is a first one of the protected processesidentified in the tamper protection cache, conditionally permitting thefirst process to provide data to the second process only when the firstprocess is a second one of the protected processes identified in thetamper protection cache.

In another aspect, a method for securing interprocess communications onan endpoint disclosed herein includes storing a tamper protection cachein a kernel space of an operating system on the endpoint, where a memoryof the endpoint includes the kernel space and a user space, and wherethe tamper protection cache identifies one or more protected processesfor protection when executing in the user space, monitoring execution ofprocesses in the user space of the endpoint with an endpoint protectiondriver executing in the kernel space, directing an interprocesscommunication from a first process in the user space to a second processin the user space through the endpoint protection driver, andconditionally managing the interprocess communication according to aprotected status of each of the first process and the second process inthe tamper protection cache.

Conditionally managing the interprocess communication may include, whenthe second process is a first one of the protected processes identifiedin the tamper protection cache, conditionally permitting the firstprocess to provide data to the second process only when the firstprocess is a second one of the protected processes identified in thetamper protection cache. The method may further include storing aprocess cache in the kernel space, the process cache including processproperties for one or more processes executing on the endpoint. The oneor more processes executing on the endpoint may include one of theprotected processes. The method may further include detecting a changeto one of the process properties with the endpoint protection driver andevaluating the change for possible malicious activity. The process cachemay store at least one of an application, an application family, anapplication path, and an application class for each of the one or moreprocesses executing on the endpoint. The method may further includeloading the endpoint protection driver before launching processes in theuser space. The method may further include retaining process data forthe first process in a process cache in the kernel space after the firstprocess is terminated in the user space. The method may further includeproviding the process data for the first process from the process cacheto an external security resource in response to a query from theexternal security resource. The tamper protection cache may be digitallysigned by a trust authority external to the operating system. The tamperprotection cache may be digitally signed using a private key, where apublic key for a key pair that includes the private key and the publickey is encoded into a binary representation of the endpoint protectiondriver stored in the kernel space. The trust authority may include aremote threat management facility. The tamper protection cache may bedigitally signed with a signature containing a signed hash of the tamperprotection cache. The tamper protection cache may include two or moreindependent data stores identifying different protected objects, each ofthe two or more independent data stores separately controllable by atrust authority external to the operating system. The tamper protectioncache may identify one or more protected computing objects selected froma group including of a directory, a registry key, and a file. At leastone of the first process and the second process may be executing in theuser space of the memory. At least one of the first process and thesecond process may be executing in the kernel space of the memory.

A method for securing interprocess communications on an endpointdisclosed herein includes storing a tamper protection cache in a kernelspace of an operating system on the endpoint, where a memory of theendpoint includes the kernel space and a user space, and where thetamper protection cache identifies one or more protected processes forprotection, monitoring execution of processes executing in the memory ofthe endpoint with an endpoint protection driver executing in the kernelspace, directing an interprocess communication from a first process inthe memory to a second process in the memory through the endpointprotection driver, and conditionally managing the interprocesscommunication according to a protected status of each of the firstprocess and the second process in the tamper protection cache.

At least one of the first process and the second process may beexecuting in the user space of the memory. At least one of the firstprocess and the second process may be executing in the kernel space ofthe memory.

A system disclosed herein includes an endpoint containing a memory, anoperating system executing on the endpoint, the operating systemdividing the memory into a kernel space for operating system functionsand a user space for execution of user programs, a tamper protectioncache stored in the kernel space of the memory and digitally signed by atrust authority external to the operating system, the tamper protectioncache identifying one or more protected processes for protection whenexecuting in the user space, and an endpoint protection driver executingin the kernel space of the memory, the endpoint protection driverconfigured to monitor execution of processes in the user space and todetect an interprocess communication from a first process in the userspace to a second process in the user space, the endpoint protectiondriver further configured to control the interprocess communication by,when the second process is a first one of the protected processesidentified in the tamper protection cache, conditionally permitting thefirst process to provide data to the second process only when the firstprocess is a second one of the protected processes identified in thetamper protection cache.

A kernel driver on an endpoint is configured to monitor processesexecuting on the endpoint that use network communications, and totransmit process information to a firewall for the endpoint. Thefirewall can, in turn, process this stream of information fromindividual endpoints or groups of endpoints as context for observednetwork activity in order to control secure network communications andotherwise manage network activity.

A computer program product for controlling a firewall disclosed hereinincludes computer executable code embodied in a non-transitory computerreadable medium that, when executing on an endpoint, performs the stepsof storing a process cache in a kernel space of an operating system onan endpoint, the endpoint having a memory that includes the kernel spaceand a user space and the process cache storing a name, a path and a typefor each of a number of processes executing in the user space,monitoring network traffic to and from the endpoint from a kernel driverexecuting in the kernel space, detecting a network communicationsbetween one of the processes and a remote resource with the kerneldriver, retrieving the path and the type for the one of the processesfrom the process cache, and transmitting the name, the path, and thetype for the one of the processes to a firewall for the endpoint.

The computer program product may further include code that performs thestep of generating a unique identifier for the one of the processes. Thecomputer program product may further include code that performs the stepof transmitting the unique identifier to the firewall for use inidentifying network traffic from the one of the processes. The firewallmay be a remote firewall at a gateway, and transmitting the name, thepath, and the type may include transmitting a secure heartbeat to theremote firewall.

A method disclosed herein includes storing a process cache in a kernelspace of an operating system on an endpoint, the endpoint having amemory that includes the kernel space and a user space and the processcache storing process data for a process executing in the user space,monitoring network traffic to and from the endpoint with a kerneldriver, detecting a network communication between the process and aremote resource with the kernel driver, retrieving the process data withthe kernel driver, and transmitting the process data to a firewall forthe endpoint.

The process data may include a path for the process that identifies alocation in a file system of the endpoint for executable code of theprocess. The process data may include a name for the process. Theprocess data may include an application class for the process. Themethod may further include applying a firewall rule to the networkcommunication based on the process data. The method may further includegenerating a unique identifier for the process. The method may furtherinclude transmitting the unique identifier to the firewall for use inidentifying network traffic from the process. The method may furtherinclude transmitting the unique identifier to the firewall instead ofthe process data with one or more subsequent network communications fromthe process. The method may further include identifying the process atthe firewall based upon the unique identifier and applying acorresponding firewall rule for the process. The firewall may include aremote firewall coupled to the endpoint through a data network. Thefirewall may include a local firewall executing on the endpoint.

A system disclosed herein may include an endpoint having a memory and anoperating system that organizes the memory into a user space and akernel space, a firewall disposed between the endpoint and a datanetwork, the firewall configured to control traffic between the endpointand the data network, a process cache in the kernel space of theoperating system, the process cache storing process data for a processexecuting in the user space, and a kernel driver in the kernel space ofthe operating system, the kernel driver configured to monitor networktraffic to and from the endpoint, to detect a network communicationbetween the process and a remote resource, to retrieve the process datafor the process, and to transmit the process data to the firewall.

The process cache may store process data for each of a plurality ofprocesses executing in the user space. The process data may include apath for the process that identifies a location in a file system of theendpoint for executable code of the process. The process data mayinclude a name for the process. The process data may include anapplication class for the process.

An endpoint has a tamper protection cache that identifies protectedcomputing objects, along with a process cache that stores informationfor processes executing on the endpoint. By securing the tamperprotection cache with reference to a trust authority external to theendpoint, or the operating system for the endpoint, computing objectslisted in the tamper protection cache can be protected againstunauthorized modifications from malware or other malicious or otherwisepotentially unsafe code.

A computer program product disclosed herein may include computerexecutable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readable mediumthat, when executing on an endpoint, performs the steps of storing aprocess cache in a kernel space of an operating system on the endpoint,the endpoint having a memory that includes the kernel space and a userspace and the process cache storing at least one property for a firstprocess executing in the user space, storing a tamper protection cachein the kernel space, the tamper protection cache identifying one or moreprotected computing objects on the endpoint including the first process,and the tamper protection cache secured with reference to a trustauthority external to the operating system, monitoring changes to theprocess cache with a kernel driver, detecting a requested change from asecond process executing on the endpoint to the at least one property ofthe first process with the kernel driver, and conditionally approvingthe requested change from the kernel driver only when the second processis included in the one or more protected computing objects identified inthe tamper protection cache.

In another aspect, a method for managing properties of processes on anendpoint disclosed herein may include storing a process cache in akernel space of an operating system on the endpoint, the endpoint havinga memory that includes the kernel space and a user space and the processcache storing at least one property for a first process executing in theuser space, storing a tamper protection cache in the kernel space, thetamper protection cache identifying one or more protected computingobjects on the endpoint, monitoring changes to the process cache with akernel driver, detecting a requested change from a second processexecuting on the endpoint to the at least one property of the firstprocess with the kernel driver, and conditionally approving therequested change from the kernel driver based on a security rule and thetamper protection cache.

The first process may be a software firewall executing on the endpoint.Conditionally approving the requested change may include reversing therequested change after the requested change is entered into the processcache. Conditionally approving the requested change may includeapproving the requested change when the second process is identified asone of the protected objects in the tamper protection cache.Conditionally approving the requested change may include approving therequested change when neither the first process nor the second processis identified as one of the protected objects in the tamper protectioncache. Conditionally approving the requested change may include, whenthe first process is identified as one of the protected computingobjects in the tamper protection cache, approving the requested changeonly when the second process is also identified as one of the protectedobjects in the tamper protection cache. The requested change may includea change to a registry key associated with the first process. Theregistry key may be identified as one of the protected objects in thetamper protection cache. The first process may execute from a directorylocation identified as one of the protected objects in the tamperprotection cache. The tamper protection cache may be secured by a trustauthority external to the operating system. The tamper protection cachemay be secured with a digital signature from a remote trust authority.The requested change may include a change in at least one of processprivileges or a user for the first process.

A system disclosed herein may include an endpoint having a memory and anoperating system that organizes the memory into a user space and akernel space, a process cache stored in the kernel space of theoperating system, the process cache storing at least one property for afirst process executing in the user space, a tamper protection cachestored in the kernel space of the operating system, the tamperprotection cache identifying one or more protected computing objects onthe endpoint, and a kernel driver in the kernel space of the operatingsystem, the kernel driver configured to monitor changes to the processcache, to detect a requested change by a second process executing on theendpoint to the at least one property of the first process, and toconditionally approve the requested change from the kernel driver basedon a security rule and the tamper protection cache.

The first process may be a software firewall executing on the endpoint.The kernel driver may be configured to undo an unapproved change byreversing the requested change after the requested change is enteredinto the process cache. The kernel driver may be configured toconditionally approve the requested change by approving the requestedchange only when the second process is identified as one of theprotected objects in the tamper protection cache. The kernel driver maybe configured to conditionally approve the requested change by approvingthe requested change when neither the first process nor the secondprocess is identified as one of the protected objects in the tamperprotection cache. The kernel driver may be configured to conditionallyapprove the requested change when the first process is identified as oneof the protected computing objects in the tamper protection cache byapproving the requested change only when the second process is alsoidentified as one of the protected objects in the tamper protectioncache. The tamper protection cache may be secured by a trust authorityexternal to the operating system.

The configuration of a firewall on an endpoint is secured to preventchanges by unauthorized processes, while permitting changes that arerequested by authorized processes. Authorized processes can be stored ina tamper protection cache within a kernel of the operating system of theendpoint and secured with reference to a trust authority external to theoperating system. When a process on the endpoint requests a change tothe firewall configuration, the requesting process can be checkedagainst the processes listed in the tamper protection cache, and anysuitable rules can be applied to limit or prevent changes to firewallconfiguration.

A computer program product for managing a firewall on an endpointdisclosed herein may include computer executable code embodied in anon-transitory computer-readable medium that, when executing on one ormore computing devices, performs the steps of storing a process cache ina kernel space of an operating system on the endpoint, the endpointhaving a memory that includes the kernel space and a user space and theprocess cache storing at least one property for a configuration of afirewall provided by a software firewall process executing in the userspace on the endpoint, storing a tamper protection cache in the kernelspace, the tamper protection cache identifying one or more protectedcomputing objects on the endpoint, where the tamper protection cachesecures the one or more computing objects with reference to a trustauthority external to the operating system, and where the one or moreprotected computing objects includes the software firewall process,receiving a request for a change to the configuration of the firewallfrom a second process with a kernel driver, and conditionallyauthorizing the change from the kernel driver only when the one or moreprotected computing objects also includes the second process thatrequests the change to the configuration of the firewall.

In another aspect, a method for managing a firewall on an endpointdisclosed herein may include storing a process cache in a kernel spaceof an operating system on the endpoint, the endpoint having a memorythat includes the kernel space and a user space and the process cachestoring at least one property for a software firewall process executingin the user space on the endpoint, storing a tamper protection cache inthe kernel space, the tamper protection cache identifying one or moreprotected computing objects on the endpoint, where the tamper protectioncache secures the one or more computing objects with reference to atrust authority external to the operating system, and where the one ormore protected computing objects includes the software firewall process,receiving a request for a change to a configuration of the softwarefirewall process from a second process with a kernel driver, andconditionally authorizing the change from the kernel driver only whenthe one or more protected computing objects also includes the secondprocess.

The request for the change to the configuration of the software firewallprocess may originate from a source external to the endpoint. Theconfiguration of the software firewall process may be stored in one ormore registry keys for the endpoint. The one or more registry keys maybe contained in the one or more protected computing objects stored inthe tamper protection cache. The trust authority may be external to theendpoint. The trust authority may include a remote trust authoritymaintained by a threat management facility for an enterprise networkthat includes the endpoint. The trust authority may include a remotethird-party trust authority. The configuration may specify one or morefirewall rules. The configuration may identify permitted or prohibitednetwork addresses. The configuration may identify permitted orprohibited applications executing on the endpoint. The second processmay be a remote process executing on a threat management facility for anenterprise network that includes the endpoint. The change to theconfiguration may include a request to allow traffic from an applicationexecuting on the endpoint. The second process may evaluate anapplication requesting network access through the software firewallprocess and responsively request the change to permit the application tocommunicate through the firewall. The second process may implement apolicy change for an enterprise network to permit network use by anapplication by configuring the software firewall process and a remotefirewall on a gateway for the enterprise network to allow traffic by theapplication.

A system disclosed herein may include an endpoint having a memory and anoperating system that organizes the memory into a user space forexecuting processes and a kernel space for the operating system, asoftware firewall process executing in the user space, a process cachestored in the kernel space, the process cache storing at least oneproperty for the software firewall process executing in the user space,a tamper protection cache stored in the kernel space, the tamperprotection cache secured with reference to a trust authority external tothe operating system and identifying one or more protected computingobjects on the endpoint, where the one or more protected computingobjects includes the software firewall process, and a kernel driverexecuting in the kernel space and configured to detect a request for achange to the at least one property of the software firewall processfrom a second process and to conditionally authorize the change onlywhen the one or more protected computing objects also includes thesecond process.

The at least one property of the software firewall process may be storedin one or more registry keys for the endpoint. The one or more registrykeys may be contained in the one or more protected computing objectsstored in the tamper protection cache. The trust authority may include aremote trust authority maintained by a threat management facility for anenterprise network that includes the endpoint. The trust authority mayinclude a remote third-party trust authority.

A computer program product disclosed herein may include computerexecutable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readable mediumthat, when executing on one or more computing devices, performs thesteps of storing a process cache in a kernel space of an operatingsystem on an endpoint, the endpoint having a memory that includes thekernel space and a user space and the process cache storing process datafor a number of processes executing in the user space, detecting anaction on the endpoint with a kernel driver, identifying a first processof the number of processes in the process cache associated with theaction, retrieving the process data for the first process with thekernel driver, transmitting the process data to a data recorder on afirewall; and applying a network security rule at the firewall based onthe process data to control network communications associated with thefirst process.

In another aspect, a method for monitoring process activity on anendpoint disclosed herein may include storing a process cache in akernel space of an operating system on an endpoint, the endpoint havinga memory that includes the kernel space and a user space and the processcache storing process data for a number of processes executing in theuser space, detecting an action on the endpoint with a kernel driver,identifying a first process of the number of processes in the processcache associated with the action, retrieving the process data for thefirst process with the kernel driver, and transmitting the process datato a data recorder.

The method may further include storing a tamper protection cache in thekernel space, the tamper protection cache identifying one or moreprotected computing objects on the endpoint, and further including aprotected status in the process data based on whether the first processis one of the one or more protected computing objects. The method mayfurther include filtering the process data based on a relevance of theaction and the first process to threat detection. The data recorder maybe a local data recorder on the endpoint. The data recorder may be aremote data recorder coupled to the endpoint through a data network. Themethod may further include aggregating a plurality of actions andassociated process data from a plurality of endpoints at a threatmanagement facility for an enterprise network that includes theplurality of endpoints. The process data may include a path for thefirst process that identifies a location in a file system of theendpoint for executable code of the first process. The process data mayinclude a name for the first process. The process data may include anapplication class for the first process. The process data may include areputation for the first process.

A method for monitoring protected computing objects on an endpointdisclosed herein may include storing a tamper protection cache in akernel space of an operating system on an endpoint, the endpoint havinga memory that includes the kernel space and a user space, the tamperprotection cache identifying one or more protected computing objects onthe endpoint and the tamper protection cache secured with reference to atrust authority external to the operating system, detecting a change toone of the one or more computing objects with a kernel driver, andtransmitting the change and an object identifier for the one of the oneor more computing objects to a data recorder.

The method may further include identifying a process executing on theendpoint and associated with the change, and transmitting informationfor the process to the data recorder. The data recorder may be a localdata recorder on the endpoint. The data recorder may be a remote datarecorder coupled to the endpoint through a data network. The method mayfurther include aggregating a plurality of changes and objectidentifiers from a plurality of endpoints at a threat managementfacility for an enterprise network that includes the plurality ofendpoints. The method may further include transmitting process data fora process associated with the one or more computing objects to the datarecorder. The process data may include at least one of a name for theprocess, an application class for the process, and a path for theprocess. The process data may include a reputation for the process.

A computer program product for monitoring protected computing objects onan endpoint disclosed herein may include computer executable codeembodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs the steps ofstoring a tamper protection cache in a kernel space of an operatingsystem on an endpoint, the endpoint having a memory that includes thekernel space and a user space, the tamper protection cache identifyingone or more protected computing objects on the endpoint and the tamperprotection cache secured with reference to a trust authority external tothe operating system, detecting a change to one of the one or morecomputing objects with a kernel driver, and transmitting the change andan object identifier for the one of the one or more computing objects toa data recorder.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the devices,systems, and methods described herein will be apparent from thefollowing description of particular embodiments thereof, as illustratedin the accompanying drawings. The drawings are not necessarily to scale,emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of thedevices, systems, and methods described herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs).

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system.

FIG. 8 shows a flowchart of a method for labeling network flows.

FIG. 9 illustrates an Internet Protocol packet.

FIG. 10 shows a flowchart of a method for secure labeling of networkflows.

FIG. 11 shows a flowchart of a method for managing network flows.

FIG. 12 shows a dashboard for visualizing network usage by applicationtypes.

FIG. 13 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type.

FIG. 14 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type.

FIG. 15 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type.

FIG. 16 shows a flowchart of a method for visualizing network usage byapplication types.

FIG. 17 shows a block diagram of an architecture for secure managementof endpoint resources.

FIG. 18 shows a method for securing interprocess communications using akernel-based endpoint protection driver.

FIG. 19 shows a method for controlling a firewall.

FIG. 20 shows a method for secure management of processes executing onan endpoint.

FIG. 21 shows a method for securing a firewall configuration on anendpoint.

FIG. 22 shows a method for data recording.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanyingfigures, in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may,however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construedas limited to the illustrated embodiments set forth herein.

All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference intheir entirety. References to items in the singular should be understoodto include items in the plural, and vice versa, unless explicitly statedotherwise or clear from the context. Grammatical conjunctions areintended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive combinationsof conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwisestated or clear from the context. Thus, the term “or” should generallybe understood to mean “and/or” and so forth.

Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,referring instead individually to any and all values falling within therange, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value withinsuch a range is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. The words “about,” “approximately,” or thelike, when accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed asindicating a deviation as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skillin the art to operate satisfactorily for an intended purpose. Ranges ofvalues and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only, anddo not constitute a limitation on the scope of the describedembodiments. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language(“e.g.,” “such as,” or the like) provided herein, is intended merely tobetter illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on thescope of the embodiments or the claims. No language in the specificationshould be construed as indicating any unclaimed element as essential tothe practice of the embodiments.

In the following description, it is understood that terms such as“first,” “second,” “third,” “above,” “below,” and the like, are words ofconvenience and are not to be construed as implying a chronologicalorder or otherwise limiting any corresponding element unless expresslystate otherwise.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats—a context inwhich the following techniques may usefully be deployed. One aspectrelates to corporate policy management and implementation through aunified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in moredetail below, a threat management facility 100 may be used to protectcomputer assets from many threats, both computer-generated threats anduser-generated threats. The threat management facility 100 may bemulti-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assetsfrom a variety of threats and it may be adapted to learn about threatsin one dimension (e.g. worm detection) and apply the knowledge inanother dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy management is one of thedimensions for which the threat management facility can provide acontrol capability. A corporation or other entity may institute a policythat prevents certain people (e.g. employees, groups of employees, typesof employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from accessing certaintypes of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect toprevent its accounting department from using a particular version of aninstant messaging service or all such services. In this example, thepolicy management facility 112 may be used to update the policies of allcorporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or itmay update a select few. By using the threat management facility 100 tofacilitate the setting, updating and control of such policies thecorporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threatmanagement facility 100 up to date on such policies. The threatmanagement facility 100 can take care of updating all of the othercorporate computing assets.

It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 mayprovide multiple services, and policy management may be offered as oneof the services. We will now turn to a description of certaincapabilities and components of the threat management system 100.

Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across theInternet 154. From both a technical perspective and a user perspective,the categorization of a specific threat type, whether as virus, worm,spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or the like, is becomingreduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,may need to be stopped at various points of a networked computingenvironment, such as one of an enterprise facility 102, including at oneor more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways, communication ports,handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, theremay be less and less benefit to the user in having different solutionsfor known and unknown threats. As such, a consolidated threat managementfacility 100 may need to apply a similar set of technologies andcapabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide a single agent on the desktop, and asingle scan of any suspect file. This approach may eliminate theinevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating virusesand spyware as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifyingadministration and minimizing desktop load. As the number and range oftypes of threats has increased, so may have the level of connectivityavailable to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase in thespeed at which threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected tothe Internet 154 may be infected quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes)which may require acceleration for the delivery of threat protection.Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threatmanagement facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update itsproduct set against spam and virus threats quickly, for instance, everyfive minutes, every minute, continuously, or the like. Analysis andtesting may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed morefrequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may doso without compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 mayalso extend techniques that may have been developed for virus andmalware protection, and provide them to enterprise facility 102 networkadministrators to better control their environments. In addition tostopping malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may providepolicy management that may be able to control legitimate applications,such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and thelike, that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102.

The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility102 protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware,adware, Trojans, intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, andthe like, where the enterprise facility 102 may be any entity with anetworked computer-based infrastructure. In an embodiment, FIG. 1 maydepict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats. Theenterprise facility 102 may be corporate, commercial, educational,governmental, or the like, and the enterprise facility's 102 computernetwork may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in aplurality of geographical locations, and may include administration 134,a firewall 138A, an appliance 140A, server 142A, network devices 148A-B,clients 144A-D, such as protected by computer security facilities 152,and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein to clientfacilities may include the clients 144A-D shown in FIG. 1 andvice-versa. The threat management facility 100 may include a pluralityof functions, such as security management facility 122, policymanagement facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,network access rules facility 124, remedial action facility 128,detection techniques facility 130, testing facility 118, threat researchfacility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat protectionprovided by the threat management facility 100 may extend beyond thenetwork boundaries of the enterprise facility 102 to include clients144D (or client facilities) that have moved into network connectivitynot directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility 102.Threats to client facilities may come from a plurality of sources, suchas from network threats 104, physical proximity threats 110, secondarylocation threats 108, and the like. Clients 144A-D may be protected fromthreats even when the client 144A-D is not located in association withthe enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E-F moves in and out of theenterprise facility 102, for example when interfacing with anunprotected server 142C through the Internet 154, when a client 144F ismoving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing withcomponents 140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide anenterprise facility 102 protection from a plurality of threats tomultiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and networkconfigurations, with an integrated system approach.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as astand-alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat managementfacility 100 may be integrated into a third-party product. Anapplication programming interface (e.g. a source code interface) may beprovided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.For instance, the threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone inthat it provides direct threat protection to an enterprise or computerresource, where protection is subscribed to directly 100. Alternatively,the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly,through a third-party product, where an enterprise may subscribe toservices through the third-party product, and threat protection to theenterprise may be provided by the threat management facility 100 throughthe third-party product.

The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of elementsthat provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computerresources, including endpoint security and control, email security andcontrol, web security and control, reputation-based filtering, controlof unauthorized users, control of guest and non-compliant computers, andthe like. The security management facility 122 may be a softwareapplication that may provide malicious code and malicious applicationprotection to a client facility computing resource. The securitymanagement facility 122 may have the ability to scan the client facilityfiles for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications andfiles, prevent certain actions, perform remedial actions and performother security measures. In embodiments, scanning the client facilitymay include scanning some or all of the files stored to the clientfacility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when theapplication is executed, scanning files as the files are transmitted toor from the client facility, or the like. The scanning of theapplications and files may be performed to detect known malicious codeor known unwanted applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code andunwanted applications may be continually developed and distributed, andupdates to the known code database may be provided on a periodic basis,on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide email security andcontrol, where security management may help to eliminate spam, viruses,spyware and phishing, control of email content, and the like. Thesecurity management facility's 122 email security and control mayprotect against inbound and outbound threats, protect emailinfrastructure, prevent data leakage, provide spam filtering, and thelike. In an embodiment, security management facility 122 may provide forweb security and control, where security management may help to detector block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help controlweb browsing, and the like, which may provide comprehensive web accesscontrol enabling safe, productive web browsing. Web security and controlmay provide Internet use policies, reporting on suspect devices,security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,URI filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, the security managementfacility 122 may provide for network access control, which may providecontrol over network connections. Network control may stop unauthorized,guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may controlnetwork traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. Inaddition, network access control may control access to virtual privatenetworks (VPN), where VPNs may be a communications network tunneledthrough another network, establishing a logical connection acting as avirtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same manneras a physical network.

The security management facility 122 may provide host intrusionprevention through behavioral based protection, which may guard againstunknown threats by analyzing behavior before software code executes.Behavioral based protection may monitor code when it runs and interveneif the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious. Advantages ofbehavioral based protection over runtime protection may include codebeing prevented from running. Whereas runtime protection may onlyinterrupt code that has already partly executed, behavioral protectioncan identify malicious code at the gateway or on the file servers anddelete the code before it can reach endpoint computers and the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide reputation filtering,which may target or identify sources of known malware. For instance,reputation filtering may include lists of URIs of known sources ofmalware or known suspicious IP addresses, or domains, say for spam, thatwhen detected may invoke an action by the threat management facility100, such as dropping them immediately. By dropping the source beforeany interaction can initiate, potential threat sources may be thwartedbefore any exchange of data can be made.

In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to athird party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improvedperformance of the threat management facility 100. For example, thetypes, times, and number of virus interactions that a client experiencesmay provide useful information for the preventions of future virusthreats. This type of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threatdetection. Feedback of information may also be associated with behaviorsof individuals within the enterprise, such as being associated with mostcommon violations of policy, network access, unauthorized applicationloading, unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments,this type of information feedback may enable the evaluation or profilingof client actions that are violations of policy that may provide apredictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.

The security management facility 122 may support overall security of theenterprise facility 102 network or set of enterprise facility 102networks, e.g., by providing updates of malicious code information tothe enterprise facility 102 network and associated client facilities.The updates may include a planned update, an update in reaction to athreat notice, an update in reaction to a request for an update, anupdate based on a search of known malicious code information, or thelike. The administration facility 134 may provide control over thesecurity management facility 122 when updates are performed. The updatesmay be automatically transmitted without an administration facility's134 direct control, manually transmitted by the administration facility134, or otherwise distributed. The security management facility 122 maymanage the receipt of malicious code descriptions from a provider,distribution of the malicious code descriptions to enterprise facility102 networks, distribution of the malicious code descriptions to clientfacilities, and so forth.

The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy managementfacility 112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, suchas VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like,that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102. The policy management facility 112 may be a setof rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 accesspermissions for the client facility, such as access permissionsassociated with the network, applications, external computer devices,and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a database,a text file, a combination of databases and text files, or the like. Inan embodiment, a policy database may be a block list, a black list, anallowed list, a white list, or the like that may provide a list ofenterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that mayor may not be accessed by the client facility. The policy managementfacility 112 may include rules that may be interpreted with respect toan enterprise facility 102 network access request to determine if therequest should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for thetype of access that may be granted. The rules may be related to thepolicies of an enterprise facility 102 for access rights for theenterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be arule that does not permit access to sporting websites. When a website isrequested by the client facility, a security facility may access therules within a policy facility to determine if the requested access isrelated to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facilitymay analyze the requested website to determine if the website matcheswith any of the policy facility rules.

The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the securitymanagement facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102wide access rules and policies that may be distributed to maintaincontrol of client facility access to enterprise facility 102 networkresources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset ofapplication capabilities, organization hierarchy, computer facilitytype, user type, network location, time of day, connection type, or thelike. Policies may be maintained by the administration facility 134,through the threat management facility 100, in association with a thirdparty, or the like. For example, a policy may restrict IM activity toonly support personnel for communicating with customers. This may allowcommunication for departments requiring access, but may maintain thenetwork bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM toonly the personnel that need access to instant messaging (IM) in supportof the enterprise facility 102. In an embodiment, the policy managementfacility 112 may be a stand-alone application, may be part of thenetwork server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102network, may be part of the client facility, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide configuration management,which may be similar to policy management, but may specifically examinethe configuration set of applications, operating systems, hardware, andthe like, and manage changes to their configurations. Assessment of aconfiguration may be made against a standard configuration policy,detection of configuration changes, remediation of improperconfiguration, application of new configurations, and the like. Anenterprise may keep a set of standard configuration rules and policieswhich may represent the desired state of the device. For example, aclient firewall may be running and installed, but in the disabled state,where remediation may be to enable the firewall. In another example, theenterprise may set a rule that disallows the use of USB disks, and sendsa configuration change to all clients, which turns off USB drive accessvia a registry.

The threat management facility 100 may also provide for the removal ofapplications that potentially interfere with the operation of the threatmanagement facility 100, such as competitor products that may also beattempting similar threat management functions. The removal of suchproducts may be initiated automatically whenever such products aredetected. In the case where such applications are services are providedindirectly through a third-party product, the application may besuspended until action is taken to remove or disable the third-partyproduct's protection facility.

Threat management against a quickly evolving malware environment mayrequire timely updates, and thus an update management facility 120 maybe provided by the threat management facility 100. In addition, a policymanagement facility 112 may also require update management (e.g., asprovided by the update facility 120 herein described). The updatemanagement for the security facility 122 and policy management facility112 may be provided directly by the threat management facility 100, suchas by a hosted system or in conjunction with the administration facility134. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide forpatch management, where a patch may be an update to an operating system,an application, a system tool, or the like, where one of the reasons forthe patch is to reduce vulnerability to threats.

The security facility 122 and policy management facility 112 may pushinformation to the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility. The enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility mayalso or instead pull information from the security facility 122 andpolicy management facility 112 network server facilities 142, or theremay be a combination of pushing and pulling of information between thesecurity facility 122 and the policy management facility 112 networkservers 142, enterprise facility 102 network, and client facilities, orthe like. For example, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility may pull information from the security facility 122 and policymanagement facility 112 network server facility 142 may request theinformation using the security facility 122 and policy managementfacility 112 update module; the request may be based on a certain timeperiod, by a certain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In anotherexample, the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112network servers 142 may push the information to the enterprisefacility's 102 network and/or client facility by providing notificationthat there are updates available for download and then transmitting theinformation. The combination of the security management 122 networkserver facility 142 and security update module may functionsubstantially the same as the policy management facility 112 networkserver and policy update module by providing information to theenterprise facility 102 network and the client facility in a push orpull method. In an embodiment, the policy management facility 112 andthe security facility 122 management update modules may work in concertto provide information to the enterprise facility's 102 network and/orclient facility for control of application execution. In an embodiment,the policy update module and security update module may be combined intoa single update module.

As threats are identified and characterized, the threat managementfacility 100 may create definition updates that may be used to allow thethreat management facility 100 to detect and remediate the latestmalicious software, unwanted applications, configuration and policychanges, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may containthreat identification updates, also referred to as definition files. Adefinition file may be a virus identity file that may includedefinitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity(IDE) definition files may provide information that may identifymalicious code within files, applications, or the like. The definitionfiles may be accessed by security management facility 122 when scanningfiles or applications within the client facility for the determinationof malicious code that may be within the file or application. Thedefinition files may contain a number of commands, definitions, orinstructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In embodiments,the client facility may be updated with new definition filesperiodically to provide the client facility with the most recentmalicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a set timeperiod, may be updated on demand from the client facility, may beupdated on demand from the network, may be updated on a receivedmalicious code alert, or the like. In an embodiment, the client facilitymay request an update to the definition files from an update facility120 within the network, may request updated definition files from acomputing facility external to the network, updated definition files maybe provided to the client facility 114 from within the network,definition files may be provided to the client facility from an externalcomputing facility from an external network, or the like.

A definition management facility 114 may provide timely updates ofdefinition files information to the network, client facilities, and thelike. New and altered malicious code and malicious applications may becontinually created and distributed to networks worldwide. Thedefinition files that maintain the definitions of the malicious code andmalicious application information for the protection of the networks andclient facilities may need continual updating to provide continualdefense of the network and client facility from the malicious code andmalicious applications. The definition files management may provide forautomatic and manual methods of updating the definition files. Inembodiments, the network may receive definition files and distribute thedefinition files to the network client facilities, the client facilitiesmay receive the definition files directly, or the network and clientfacilities may both receive the definition files, or the like. In anembodiment, the definition files may be updated on a fixed periodicbasis, on demand by the network and/or the client facility, as a resultof an alert of a new malicious code or malicious application, or thelike. In an embodiment, the definition files may be released as asupplemental file to an existing definition files to provide for rapidupdating of the definition files.

In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used toscan an outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted tobe transmitted per the enterprise facility 102 rules and policies. Bychecking outgoing files, the security management facility 122 may beable discover malicious code infected files that were not detected asincoming files as a result of the client facility having been updatedwith either new definition files or policy management facility 112information. The definition files may discover the malicious codeinfected file by having received updates of developing malicious codefrom the administration facility 134, updates from a definition filesprovider, or the like. The policy management facility 112 may discoverthe malicious code infected file by having received new updates from theadministration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide controlled access to theenterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, a manager of theenterprise facility 102 may want to restrict access to certainapplications, networks, files, printers, servers, databases, or thelike. In addition, the manager of the enterprise facility 102 may wantto restrict user access based on certain criteria, such as the user'slocation, usage history, need to know, job position, connection type,time of day, method of authentication, client-system configuration, orthe like. Network access rules may be developed for the enterprisefacility 102, or pre-packaged by a supplier, and managed by the threatmanagement facility 100 in conjunction with the administration facility134.

A network access rules facility 124 may be responsible for determiningif a client facility application should be granted access to a requestednetwork location. The network location may be on the same network as thefacility or may be on another network. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may verify access rights for client facilitiesfrom within the network or may verify access rights of computerfacilities from external networks. When network access for a clientfacility is denied, the network access rules facility 124 may send aninformation file to the client facility containing. For example, theinformation sent by the network access rules facility 124 may be a datafile. The data file may contain a number of commands, definitions,instructions, or the like to be parsed and acted upon through theremedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by thenetwork access facility rules facility 124 may be a command or commandfile that the remedial action facility 128 may access and take actionupon.

The network access rules facility 124 may include databases such as ablock list, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptablenetwork site database, an acceptable network site database, a networksite reputation database, or the like of network access locations thatmay or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, thenetwork access rules facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; therule evaluation may parse network access requests and apply the parsedinformation to network access rules. The network access rule facility124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of anenterprise facility's 102 network access policies, such as denyingaccess to certain types of websites, controlling instant messengeraccesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular expressionrule evaluation, or other rule evaluation method for interpreting thenetwork access request and comparing the interpretation to theestablished rules for network access. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request fromthe network access control and may return the rules evaluation to thenetwork access control.

Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rulefacility 124 may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprisefacility 102. The network access rules facility 124 may be maintained bythe network administration facility 134, using network access rulesfacility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administrationfacility 134 may be able to maintain a set of access rules manually byadding rules, changing rules, deleting rules, or the like. Additionally,the administration facility 134 may retrieve predefined rule sets from aremote provider of a set of rules to be applied to an entire enterprisefacility 102. The network administration facility 134 may be able tomodify the predefined rules as needed for a particular enterprisefacility 102 using the network access rules management facility 124.

When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat managementfacility 100, the threat management facility 100 may perform or initiatea remedial action facility 128. Remedial action may take a plurality offorms, such as terminating or modifying an ongoing process orinteraction, sending a warning to a client or administration facility134 of an ongoing process or interaction, executing a program orapplication to remediate against a threat or violation, recordinteractions for subsequent evaluation, or the like. Remedial action maybe associated with an application that responds to information that aclient facility network access request has been denied. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may parsethe data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and acton the parsed data file information to determine actions to be taken onan application requesting access to a denied network location. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may accessthe threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action tobe taken on an application requesting access to a denied networklocation. In an embodiment, the information received from the facilitymay be a command or a command file. The remedial action facility maycarry out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file fromthe facility without performing any interpretation of the commands. Inan embodiment, the remedial action facility may interact with thereceived information and may perform various actions on a clientrequesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one ormore of continuing to block all requests to a denied network location, amalicious code scan on the application, a malicious code scan on theclient facility, quarantine of the application, terminating theapplication, isolation of the application, isolation of the clientfacility to a location within the network that restricts network access,blocking a network access port from a client facility, reporting theapplication to an administration facility 134, or the like.

Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threator violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may includemonitoring the enterprise facility 102 network or endpoint devices, suchas by monitoring streaming data through the gateway, across the network,through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection techniquesfacility 130 may include monitoring activity and stored files oncomputing facilities, such as on server facilities 142, desktopcomputers, laptop computers, other mobile computing devices, and thelike. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files,may provide the capability of checking files for stored threats, eitherin the active or passive state. Detection techniques, such as streamingfile management, may provide the capability of checking files receivedat the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. Thismay provide the capability of not allowing a streaming file or portionsof the streaming file containing malicious code from entering the clientfacility, gateway facility, or network. In an embodiment, the streamingfile may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of virusidentities may be used to check each of the blocks of information formalicious code. In an embodiment, any blocks that are not determined tobe clear of malicious code may not be delivered to the client facility,gateway facility, or network.

Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threatsand violations to established policy, may require the ability to testthe system, either at the system level or for a particular computingcomponent. The testing facility 118 may allow the administrationfacility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security configurations ofclient facility computing facilities on a network. The administrationfacility 134 may be able to send test files to a set of client facilitycomputing facilities to test the ability of the client facility todetermine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has beentransmitted, a recording facility may record the actions taken by theclient facility in reaction to the test file. The recording facility mayaggregate the testing information from the client facility and reportthe testing information to the administration facility 134. Theadministration facility 134 may be able to determine the level ofpreparedness of the client facility computing facilities by the reportedinformation. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client facilitycomputing facilities as determined by the administration facility 134;remedial action may be taken by the administration facility 134 or bythe user of the client facility.

The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoingeffort to maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threatmanagement facility 100 in light of continuous generation of new orevolved forms of malware. Threat research may include researchers andanalysts working on known and emerging malware, such as viruses,rootkits a spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing,spam, scams, and the like. In embodiments, through threat research, thethreat management facility 100 may be able to provide swift, globalresponses to the latest threats.

The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include aplurality of networked components, such as client facility, serverfacility 142, administration facility 134, firewall 138, gateway, hubsand routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users, mobileusers, and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computersecurity facility 152, located on a computer's desktop, which mayprovide threat protection to a user, and associated enterprise facility102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer systemthat may source data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or thelike (such as a user's desktop computer as an endpoint computer), afirewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system, a laptop as amobile endpoint computer, a personal digital assistant or tablet as ahand-held endpoint computer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, orthe like. In embodiments, endpoint may refer to a source or destinationfor data, including such components where the destination ischaracterized by an evaluation point for data, and where the data may besent to a subsequent destination after evaluation. The endpoint computersecurity facility 152 may be an application loaded onto the computerplatform or computer support component, where the application mayaccommodate the plurality of computer platforms and/or functionalrequirements of the component. For instance, a client facility computermay be one of a plurality of computer platforms, such as Windows,Macintosh, Linux, and the like, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may be adapted to the specific platform, while maintaininga uniform product and product services across platforms. Additionally,components may have different functions to serve within the enterprisefacility's 102 networked computer-based infrastructure. For instance,computer support components provided as hubs and routers 148, serverfacility 142, firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique securityapplication software to protect their portion of the systeminfrastructure, while providing an element in an integrated threatmanagement system that extends out beyond the threat management facility100 to incorporate all computer resources under its protection.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facilitycomputing platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152is adapted. A client facility computing platform may be a computersystem that is able to access a service on another computer, such as aserver facility 142, via a network. This client facility server facility142 model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as aclient facility connecting to an enterprise facility 102 applicationserver facility 142, a web browser client facility connecting to a webserver facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from anInternet 154 service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like.In embodiments, traditional large client facility applications may beswitched to websites, which may increase the browser's role as a clientfacility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent towhich they perform their own processing. For instance, client facilitiesare sometimes classified as a fat client facility or thin clientfacility. The fat client facility, also known as a thick client facilityor rich client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulkof data processing operations itself, and does not necessarily rely onthe server facility 142. The fat client facility may be most common inthe form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may operateindependent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fatclients 144 may include CURT, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, andthe like. Thin clients 144 may offer minimal processing capabilities,for instance, the thin client facility may primarily provide a graphicaluser interface provided by an application server facility 142, which mayperform the bulk of any required data processing. Programmingenvironments for thin clients 144 may include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP,Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and the like. The client facilitymay also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally, butrelying on a server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, thishybrid client facility may provide benefits from both the fat clientfacility type, such as multimedia support and high performance, and thethin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100, and associatedendpoint computer security facility 152, may provide seamless threatprotection to the plurality of clients 144, and client facility types,across the enterprise facility 102.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server facilities142, such as application servers, communications servers, file servers,database servers, proxy servers, mail servers, fax servers, gameservers, web servers, and the like. A server facility 142, which mayalso be referred to as a server facility 142 application, serverfacility 142 operating system, server facility 142 computer, or thelike, may be an application program or operating system that acceptsclient facility connections in order to service requests from clients144. The server facility 142 application may run on the same computer asthe client facility using it, or the server facility 142 and the clientfacility may be running on different computers and communicating acrossthe network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided amongserver facility 142 computers, with the dividing depending upon theworkload. For instance, under light load conditions all server facility142 applications may run on a single computer and under heavy loadconditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiplecomputers. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 mayprovide threat protection to server facilities 142 within the enterprisefacility 102 as load conditions and application changes are made.

A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where theappliance facility 140 provides specific services onto the network.Though the appliance facility 140 is a server facility 142 computer,that may be loaded with a server facility 142 operating system andserver facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user maynot need to configure it, as the configuration may have been performedby a third party. In an embodiment, an enterprise facility 102 appliancemay be a server facility 142 appliance that has been configured andadapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and locatedwithin the facilities of the enterprise facility 102. The enterprisefacility's 102 threat management appliance may enable the enterprisefacility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat protectionconfiguration, where the administration facility 134 may access thethreat resources through an interface, such as a web portal. In analternate embodiment, the enterprise facility 102 may be managedremotely from a third party, vendor, or the like, without an appliancefacility 140 located within the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance, the appliance functionality may be a shared hardware productbetween pluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliancefacility 140 may be located at the enterprise facility 102, where theenterprise facility 102 maintains a degree of control. In embodiments, ahosted service may be provided, where the appliance 140 may still be anon-site black box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placedthere because of infrastructure requirements, but managed by a thirdparty, vendor, or the like.

Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across theenterprise facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches,routers, wireless routers, hubs and routers, gateways, print servers,net modems, and the like. These simple server facility appliances maynot require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but mayrequire protection from threats via an endpoint computer securityfacility 152. These appliances may provide interconnection serviceswithin the enterprise facility 102 network, and therefore may advancethe spread of a threat if not properly protected.

A client facility may be protected from threats from within theenterprise facility 102 network using a personal firewall, which may bea hardware firewall, software firewall, or combination of these, thatcontrols network traffic to and from a client. The personal firewall maypermit or deny communications based on a security policy. Personalfirewalls may be designed for use by end-users, which may result inprotection for only the computer on which it's installed. Personalfirewalls may be able to control network traffic by providing promptseach time a connection is attempted and adapting security policyaccordingly. Personal firewalls may also provide some level of intrusiondetection, which may allow the software to terminate or blockconnectivity where it suspects an intrusion is being attempted. Otherfeatures that may be provided by a personal firewall may include alertsabout outgoing connection attempts, control of program access tonetworks, hiding the client from port scans by not responding tounsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applications that may belistening for incoming connections, monitoring and regulation ofincoming and outgoing network traffic, prevention of unwanted networktraffic from installed applications, reporting applications that makeconnection attempts, reporting destination servers with whichapplications may be attempting communications, and the like. Inembodiments, the personal firewall may be provided by the threatmanagement facility 100.

Another important component that may be protected by an endpointcomputer security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, whichmay be a hardware or software device that may be configured to permit,deny, or proxy data through a computer network that has different levelsof trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal enterprisefacility 102 network may have a high level of trust, because the sourceof all data has been sourced from within the enterprise facility 102. Anexample of a low level of trust is the Internet 154, because the sourceof data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,situated between the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may bereferred to as a “perimeter network.” Since firewall facilities 138represent boundaries between threat levels, the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 mayprovide resources that may control the flow of threats at thisenterprise facility 102 network entry point. Firewall facilities 138,and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also beassociated with a network node that may be equipped for interfacingbetween networks that use different protocols. In embodiments, theendpoint computer security facility 152 may provide threat protection ina plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at theenterprise facility 102 network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility138 or gateway; at the server facility 142; at distribution pointswithin the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the desktop ofclient facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the mosteffective location for threat detection may be at the user's computerdesktop endpoint computer security facility 152.

The interface between the threat management facility 100 and theenterprise facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 toembedded endpoint computer security facilities, may include a set oftools that may be the same for all enterprise implementations, but alloweach enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, thesecontrols may include both automatic actions and managed actions.Automatic actions may include downloads of the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 to components of the enterprise facility 102,downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilitiesof the enterprise facility 102, uploaded network interaction requestsfrom enterprise facility 102 components to the threat managementfacility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactionsbetween the enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility100 may be configured by the threat management facility 100 and anadministration facility 134 in the enterprise facility 102. Theadministration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determineinteractions, such as developing rules for accessing applications, as inwho is authorized and when applications may be used; establishing rulesfor ethical behavior and activities; rules governing the use ofentertainment software such as games, or personal use software such asIM and VoIP; rules for determining access to enterprise facility 102computing resources, including authentication, levels of access, riskassessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when an action is notallowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or justmodified in its execution; and the like. The administration facility 134may also establish license management, which in turn may furtherdetermine interactions associated with a licensed application. Inembodiments, interactions between the threat management facility 100 andthe enterprise facility 102 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102 by managing the flow of network data into andout of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may beconfigured by the threat management facility 100 or the administrationfacility 134.

Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities148A or wireless network facilities 148B. Client facilities connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network via a wired facility 148A orwireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as bothconnection types are ultimately connected to the same enterprisefacility 102 network, with the same endpoint computer security facility152, and the same threat protected enterprise facility 102 environment.Mobile wireless facility clients 144B-F, because of their ability toconnect to any wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to theInternet 154 outside the enterprise facility 102, and therefore outsidethe threat-protected environment of the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance, the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144 B-F), if notfor the presence of the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayexperience a malware attack or perform actions counter to enterprisefacility 102 established policies. In addition, there may be a pluralityof ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect theout-of-enterprise facility 102 mobile client facility (e.g., the clients144 D-F) that has an embedded endpoint computer security facility 152,such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a webappliance as a DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that arecomponents of the enterprise facility 102 but temporarily outsideconnectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network may be providedwith the same threat protection and policy control as client facilitiesinside the enterprise facility 102. In addition, mobile the clientfacilities may receive the same interactions to and from the threatmanagement facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprisefacility 102, where the mobile client facilities may be considered avirtual extension of the enterprise facility 102, receiving all the sameservices via their embedded endpoint computer security facility 152.

Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and thecomponents of the enterprise facility 102, including mobile clientfacility extensions of the enterprise facility 102, may ultimately beconnected through the Internet 154. Threat management facility 100downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed fromthe firewalled networks of the threat management facility 100 through tothe endpoint computer security facility 152 equipped components of theenterprise facility 102. In turn, the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload policyand access requests back across the Internet 154 and through to thethreat management facility 100. The Internet 154 however, is also thepath through which threats may be transmitted from their source. Thesenetwork threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of sources,including without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, applicationsoftware, and the like. These threats may attempt to attack a mobileenterprise client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F) equipped with anendpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long asthe mobile client facility is embedded with an endpoint computersecurity facility 152, as described above, threats may have no bettersuccess than if the mobile client facility were inside the enterprisefacility 102.

However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect intoan unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108that is not a part of the enterprise facility 102, the mobile clientfacility may be required to request network interactions through thethreat management facility 100, where contacting the threat managementfacility 100 may be performed prior to any other network action. Inembodiments, the client facility's 144 endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may manage actions in unprotected network environments suchas when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a secondarylocation 108 or connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102wireless Internet connection, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed, blocked, modified, orthe like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint computersecurity facility 152 is unable to establish a secured connection to thethreat management facility 100, the endpoint computer security facility152 may inform the user of such, and recommend that the connection notbe made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect despite therecommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may performspecific actions during or after the unprotected connection is made,including running scans during the connection period, running scansafter the connection is terminated, storing interactions for subsequentthreat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management facility100 upon first instance of a secured connection for further actions andor scanning, restricting access to network and local resources, or thelike. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayperform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions orpolicy violations during or after the unprotected connection.

The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer securityfacilities 152 as a part of its computer components, such as itsfirewalls 138B, servers 142B, clients 144G, hubs and routers 148C-D, andthe like. As a result, the computer components of the secondary location108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential sources ofthreats, as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B-F thatmay be connected to the secondary location's 108 network. In thisinstance, these computer components may now unknowingly spread a threatto other components connected to the network.

Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as fromnon-enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physicallybrought into the enterprise facility 102 and connected to the enterprisefacility 102 client facilities. The connection may be made from directconnection with the enterprise facility's 102 client facility, such asthrough a USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprisefacility's 102 client facility such that a wireless facility connectioncan be established, such as through a Bluetooth connection. Thesephysical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, aportable memory storage device, a mobile communications device, or thelike, such as CDs and DVDs, memory sticks, flash drives, external harddrives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, digital cameras, point-to-pointdevices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation devices,tablets, appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 mayhave been previously infiltrated by network threats while connected toan unprotected network connection outside the enterprise facility 102,and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facility, posea threat. Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110may infiltrate computing resources in any location, such as beingphysically brought into the enterprise facility 102 site, connected toan enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client facility ismobile, plugged into an unprotected client facility at a secondarylocation 108, and the like. A mobile device, once connected to anunprotected computer resource, may become a physical proximity threat110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayprovide enterprise facility 102 computing resources with threatprotection against physical proximity threats 110, for instance, throughscanning the device prior to allowing data transfers, through securityvalidation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within theenterprise facility 102 computing resource to transfer data into forevaluation, and the like.

Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the descriptionnow turns to a brief discussion of an example of a computer system thatmay be used for any of the entities and facilities described above.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system. In general, the computer system200 may include a computing device 210 connected to a network 202, e.g.,through an external device 204. The computing device 210 may be orinclude any type of network endpoint or endpoints as described herein,e.g., with reference to FIG. 1 above. For example, the computing device210 may include a desktop computer workstation. The computing device 210may also or instead be any suitable device that has processes andcommunicates over a network 202, including without limitation a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet, amobile phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g.,watch, jewelry, or clothing), a home device (e.g., a thermostat or ahome appliance controller), just as some examples. The computing device210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be disposed on aserver.

The computing device 210 may be used for any of the entities describedin the threat management environment described above with reference toFIG. 1. For example, the computing device 210 may be a server, a clientan enterprise facility, a threat management facility, or any of theother facilities or computing devices described therein. In certainaspects, the computing device 210 may be implemented using hardware or acombination of software and hardware, and the computing device 210 maybe a standalone device, a device integrated into another entity ordevice, a platform distributed across multiple entities, or avirtualized device executing in a virtualization environment.

The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., datanetwork(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data andcontrol information among participants in the computer system 200. Thismay include public networks such as the Internet, private networks, andtelecommunications networks such as the Public Switched TelephoneNetwork or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology(e.g., 3G or IMT-2000), fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G,LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA, etc.) or WiMax-Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/orother technologies, as well as any of a variety of corporate area,metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprisenetworks, along with any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the likethat might be used to carry data among participants in the computersystem 200. The network 202 may also include a combination of datanetworks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or privatenetwork.

The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resourcethat connects to the computing device 210 through the network 202. Thismay include threat management resources such as any of thosecontemplated above, gateways or other network devices, remote servers orthe like containing content requested by the computing device 210, anetwork storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content,or any other resource or device that might connect to the computingdevice 210 through the network 202.

The computing device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, anetwork interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/outputdevices 220. The computing device 210 may further include or be incommunication with peripherals 222 and other external input/outputdevices 224.

The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general becapable of processing instructions for execution within the computingdevice 210 or computer system 200. The processor 212 may include asingle-threaded processor or a multi-threaded processor. The processor212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory 214or on the data store 218.

The memory 214 may store information within the computing device 210 orcomputer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile ornon-volatile memory or other computer-readable medium, including withoutlimitation a Random-Access Memory (RAM), a flash memory, a Read OnlyMemory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only Memory (PROM), an Erasable PROM(EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may store programinstructions, program data, executables, and other software and datauseful for controlling operation of the computing device 200 andconfiguring the computing device 200 to perform functions for a user.The memory 214 may include a number of different stages and types fordifferent aspects of operation of the computing device 210. For example,a processor may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster accessto certain data or instructions, and a separate, main memory or the likemay be included to expand memory capacity as desired.

The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer readablemedium containing computer code that, when executed by the computingdevice 200 creates an execution environment for a computer program inquestion, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocolstack, a database management system, an operating system, or acombination of the foregoing, and that performs some or all of the stepsset forth in the various flow charts and other algorithmic descriptionsset forth herein. While a single memory 214 is depicted, it will beunderstood that any number of memories may be usefully incorporated intothe computing device 210. For example, a first memory may providenon-volatile storage such as a disk drive for permanent or long-termstorage of files and code even when the computing device 210 is powereddown. A second memory such as a random-access memory may providevolatile (but higher speed) memory for storing instructions and data forexecuting processes. A third memory may be used to improve performanceby providing even higher speed memory physically adjacent to theprocessor 212 for registers, caching and so forth.

The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software forconnecting the computing device 210 in a communicating relationship withother resources through the network 202. This may include remoteresources accessible through the Internet, as well as local resourcesavailable using short range communications protocols using, e.g.,physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications(e.g., WiFi), optical communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, orthe like), ultrasonic communications, or any combination of these orother media that might be used to carry data between the computingdevice 210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, forexample, include a router, a modem, a network card, an infraredtransceiver, a radio frequency (RF) transceiver, a near fieldcommunications interface, a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagreader, or any other data reading or writing resource or the like.

More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination ofhardware and software suitable for coupling the components of thecomputing device 210 to other computing or communications resources. Byway of example and not limitation, this may include electronics for awired or wireless Ethernet connection operating according to the IEEE802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or longrange wireless networking components or the like. This may includehardware for short range data communications such as Bluetooth or aninfrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other localdevices, or to connect to a local area network or the like that is inturn coupled to a data network 202 such as the Internet. This may alsoor instead include hardware/software for a WiMax connection or acellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any othersuitable protocol or combination of protocols). The network interface216 may be included as part of the input/output devices 220 orvice-versa.

The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing acomputer-readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a flash drive, or other device capable of providing massstorage for the computing device 210. The data store 218 may storecomputer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, andother data for the computing device 210 or computer system 200 in anon-volatile form for subsequent retrieval and use. For example, thedata store 218 may store without limitation one or more of the operatingsystem, application programs, program data, databases, files, and otherprogram modules or other software objects and the like.

The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output toother devices that might couple to the computing device 210. This may,for example, include serial ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serialbus (USB) ports, optical ports, Ethernet ports, telephone ports, audiojacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so forth, any ofwhich might be used to form wired connections to other local devices.This may also or instead include an infrared interface, RF interface,magnetic card reader, or other input/output system for coupling in acommunicating relationship with other local devices. It will beunderstood that, while the network interface 216 for networkcommunications is described separately from the input/output interface220 for local device communications, these two interfaces may be thesame, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used toattach to a WiFi accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used tocouple to a local network attached storage.

A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information toor receive information from the computing device 200. This may includehuman input/output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mousepad, a track ball, a joystick, a microphone, a foot pedal, a camera, atouch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be employed by theuser 230 to provide input to the computing device 210. This may also orinstead include a display, a speaker, a printer, a projector, a headsetor any other audiovisual device for presenting information to a user.The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a digital signalprocessing device, an actuator, or other device to support control orcommunication to other devices or components. Other I/O devices suitablefor use as a peripheral 222 include haptic devices, three-dimensionalrendering systems, augmented-reality displays, and so forth. In oneaspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the network interface 216, suchas with a USB device configured to provide communications via shortrange (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi, Infrared, RF, or the like) or long range(e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communications protocols. In anotheraspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device to augment operation ofthe computing device 210, such as a global positioning system (GPS)device, a security dongle, or the like. In another aspect, theperipheral may be a storage device such as a flash card, USB drive, orother solid-state device, or an optical drive, a magnetic drive, a diskdrive, or other device or combination of devices suitable for bulkstorage. More generally, any device or combination of devices suitablefor use with the computing device 200 may be used as a peripheral 222 ascontemplated herein.

Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200such as a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a mathco-processor, a graphics engine, a video driver, and so forth. The otherhardware 226 may also or instead include expanded input/output ports,extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or other accessory),and so forth.

A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanicalplatform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 suchas the processor 212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware226, data store 218, and input/output interface. As shown in the figure,each of the components of the computing device 210 may be interconnectedusing a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism forcommunicating information.

Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the processor212 of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences ofinstructions contained in the memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks.In embodiments, the computing device 200 may be deployed as a number ofparallel processors synchronized to execute code together for improvedperformance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in avirtualized environment where software on a hypervisor or othervirtualization management facility emulates components of the computingdevice 200 as appropriate to reproduce some or all of the functions of ahardware instantiation of the computing device 200.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system as contemplated herein. Ingeneral, the system may include an endpoint 302, a firewall 304, aserver 306 and a threat management facility 308 coupled to one anotherdirectly or indirectly through a data network 305, all as generallydescribed above. Each of the entities depicted in FIG. 3 may, forexample, be implemented on one or more computing devices such as thecomputing device described above with reference to FIG. 2. A number ofsystems may be distributed across these various components to supportthreat detection, such as a coloring system 310, a key management system312 and a heartbeat system 314, each of which may include softwarecomponents executing on any of the foregoing system components, and eachof which may communicate with the threat management facility 308 and anendpoint threat detection agent 320 executing on the endpoint 302 tosupport improved threat detection and remediation.

The coloring system 310 may be used to label or ‘color’ software objectsfor improved tracking and detection of potentially harmful activity. Thecoloring system 310 may, for example, label files, executables,processes, network communications, data sources and so forth with anysuitable. A variety of techniques may be used to select static and/ordynamic labels for any of these various software objects, and to managethe mechanics of applying and propagating coloring information asappropriate. For example, a process may inherit a color from anapplication that launches the process. Similarly, a file may inherit acolor from a process when it is created or opened by a process, and/or aprocess may inherit a color from a file that the process has opened.More generally, any type of labeling, as well as rules for propagating,inheriting, changing, or otherwise manipulating such labels, may be usedby the coloring system 310 as contemplated herein. A suitable coloringsystem is described in greater detail below with reference to FIG. 4.

The key management system 312 may support management of keys for theendpoint 302 in order to selectively permit or prevent access to contenton the endpoint 302 on a file-specific basis, a process-specific basis,an application-specific basis, a user-specific basis, or any othersuitable basis in order to prevent data leakage, and in order to supportmore fine-grained and immediate control over access to content on theendpoint 302 when a security compromise is detected. Thus, for example,if a particular process executing on the endpoint is compromised, orpotentially compromised or otherwise under suspicion, keys to thatprocess may be revoked in order to prevent, e.g., data leakage or othermalicious activity. A suitable key management system useful in thiscontext is described in greater detail below with reference to FIG. 5.

The heartbeat system 314 may be used to provide periodic or aperiodicinformation from the endpoint 302 or other system components aboutsystem health, security, status, and so forth. A heartbeat may beencrypted or plaintext, or some combination of these, and may becommunicated unidirectionally (e.g., from the endpoint 308 to the threatmanagement facility 308) or bidirectionally (e.g., between the endpoint302 and the server 306, or any other pair of system components) on anyuseful schedule. A suitable heartbeat system is described in greaterdetail below with reference to FIG. 6.

In general, these various monitoring and management systems maycooperate to provide improved threat detection and response. Forexample, the coloring system 310 may be used to evaluate when aparticular process is potentially opening inappropriate files, and apotential threat may be confirmed based on an interrupted heartbeat fromthe heartbeat system 314. The key management system 312 may then bedeployed to revoke keys to the process so that no further files can beopened, deleted or otherwise modified. More generally, the cooperationof these systems enables a wide variety of reactive measures that canimprove detection and remediation of potential threats to an endpoint.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs). In general, the system400 may include a number of entities participating in a threatmanagement process such as any of the entities and threat managementprocesses described herein. The threat management process may forexample employ techniques such as behavioral tracking, encryption,endpoint recording, reputation-based threat detection, behavioral-basedthreat detection, signature-based threat detection, and combinations ofthe foregoing, or any other suitable techniques for detecting threats toendpoints in an enterprise.

In general, the system 400 may include a number of endpoints 402, 412and a threat management facility 404 in an enterprise 410, such as anyof the enterprises described above. An external analysis facility 406may analyze threat data and provide rules and the like for use by thethreat management facility 404 and endpoints 402, 412 in managingthreats to the enterprise 410. The threat management facility 404 mayreside in a local appliance (e.g., embedded within, or locally coupledto the endpoint 402), a virtual appliance (e.g., which could be run by aprotected set of systems on their own network systems), a private cloud,a public cloud, and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may storelocally-derived threat information. The analysis facility 406 may alsoor instead receive threat information from a third-party source 416 suchas MITRE Corporation or any other public, private, educational or otherorganization that gathers information on network threats and providesanalysis and threat detection information for use by others. Each ofthese components may be configured with suitable programming toparticipate in the various threat detection and management techniquescontemplated herein. The threat management facility 404 may monitor anystream of data from an endpoint 402 exclusively, or use the full contextof intelligence from the stream of all protected endpoints 402, 412 orsome combination of these.

The endpoint 402 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in theenterprise 410 or otherwise operate on an enterprise network. This may,for example, include a server, a client such as a desktop computer or amobile computing device (e.g., a laptop computer or a tablet), acellular phone, a smart phone, or other computing device suitable forparticipating in the enterprise 410.

In general, the endpoint 402 may include any number of computing objectssuch as an object 418 labeled with a descriptor 420. While the termobject has a number of specific meanings in the art, and in particularin object-oriented programming, it will be understood that the term‘object’ as used herein is intended to be significantly broader, and mayinclude any data, process, file or combination of these includingwithout limitation any process, application, executable, script, dynamiclinked library, file, data, database, data source, data structure,function, resource locator (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) orother uniform resource identifier (URI)), or the like that might bemanipulated by one of the computing devices described herein.

An object 418 may also or instead include a remote resource, such as aresource identified in a URL. That is, while the objects 418 in FIG. 4are depicted as residing on the endpoint 402, an object 418 may alsoreside elsewhere in the system 400, while still being labeled with adescriptor 420 and tracked by the monitor 421 of the endpoint 402. Theobject 418 may be an item that is performing an action or causing anevent, or the object 418 may be an item that is receiving the action orresult of an event (i.e., the item in the system 400 being acted upon).

Where the object 418 is data or includes data, the object 418 may beencrypted or otherwise protected, or the object 418 may be unencryptedor otherwise unprotected. The object 418 may be a process or othercomputing object that performs an action, which may include a singleevent or a collection or sequence of events taken by a process. Theobject 418 may also or instead include an item such as a file or linesof code that are executable to perform such actions. The object 418 mayalso or instead include a computing component upon which an action istaken, e.g., a system setting (e.g., a registry key or the like), a datafile, a URL, or the like. The object 418 may exhibit a behavior such asan interaction with another object or component of the system 400.

In one aspect, objects 418 may be described in terms of persistence. Theobject 418 may, for example, be a part of a process, and remainpersistent as long as that process is alive. The object 418 may insteadbe persistent across an endpoint 402 and remain persistent as long as anendpoint 402 is active or alive. The object 418 may instead be a globalobject having persistence outside of an endpoint 418, such as a URL or adata store. In other words, the object 418 may be a persistent objectwith persistence outside of the endpoint.

Although many if not most objects 418 will typically be benign objectsforming a part of a normal, operating endpoint, an object 418 maycontain software associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) orother malware that resides partially or entirely on the endpoint 402.The associated software may have reached the endpoint 402 in a varietyof ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically on theendpoint 402 by a malicious source. It will be understood that theassociated software may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the associated software may include anexecutable file that can execute independently, or the associatedsoftware may be a macro, plug-in, or the like that executes withinanother application. Similarly, the associated software may manifest asone or more processes or threads executing on the endpoint 402. Further,the associated software may install from a file on the endpoint 402 (ora file remote from the endpoint 402), and the associated software maycreate one or more files such as data files or the like while executing.Associated software should be understood to generally include all suchfiles and processes except where a specific file or process is morespecifically noted.

A threat such as an APT may also take the form of an attack where noaltered or additional software is directly added or modified on theendpoint 402. Instead, an adversary may reuse existing software on thesystem 400 to perform the attacks. It is for this reason that simplyscanning for associated software may be insufficient for the detectionof APTs and it may be preferably to detect APTs based on the behavior ofthe software and associated objects 418 that are used by, for, and withthat software.

An object coloring system 414 may apply descriptors 420 to objects 418on the endpoint 402. This may be performed continuously by a backgroundprocess on the endpoint 402, or it may occur whenever an object 418 isinvolved in an action, such as when a process makes a call to anapplication programming interface (API) or takes some other action, orwhen a URL is used to initiate a network request, or when a read or awrite is performed on data in a file. This may also or instead include acombination of these approaches as well as other approaches, such as bypre-labeling a file or application when it is moved to the endpoint 402,or when the endpoint 402 is started up or instantiated. In general, theobject coloring system 414 may add, remove or change a color at anylocation and at any moment that can be practicably instrumented on acomputer system.

As noted above, the term ‘object’ as used herein is intended to includea wide range of computing objects and as such, the manner in whichparticular objects 418 are labeled or ‘colored’ with descriptors 420 mayvary significantly. Any object 418 that is performing an action (such asa process or application) may be colored at the time of and/or with alabel corresponding to the action, or likewise any object 418 that isthe target of the action (such as a file or other data) may be coloredat the time that it is used and/or with a label corresponding to aprocess or the like using the object 418. Furthermore, the operatingsystem runtime representation of the object 418 may be colored, or thepersistent object outside of the operating system may be colored (as isthe case for a File Handle or File Object within the operating system orthe actual file as stored in a file system), such as within anencryption header or other header applied to the file, or as part of adirectory attribute or any other persistent location within the file orfile system. A former coloring may be ephemerally tracked while theoperating system maintains the representation and the latter may persistlong after any reboots of the same operating system and likewise havemeaning when read or used by other endpoints 402. For processes, eachfile handle may be supplemented with a pointer or other mechanism forlocating a descriptor 420 for a particular object 420 that is a process.More specifically, each object 418 may be colored in any manner suitablefor appending information to that object 418 so that the correspondingdescriptor 420 can be retrieved and, where appropriate, updated.

The coloring system 414 may apply any suitable rules for adding andchanging descriptors 420 for objects 418. For example, when a processwith a certain descriptor accesses data with a different descriptor, thedescriptor for the process may be updated to correspond to the data, orthe descriptor for the data may be updated to correspond to the process,or some combination of these. Any action by or upon an object 418 maytrigger a coloring rule so that descriptors 420 can be revised at anyrelevant time(s) during processing.

In one aspect, colors will not explicitly indicate a compromisedsecurity state or other good/bad types of distinctions (although theymay be adapted to this use). Instead, colors may record some knowninformation or understanding about an object 418, such as a source, apurpose, and so forth. In this context, colors will not be used to labelactual or potential security compromises, but to identifyinconsistencies among interacting objects 418, and to restrict orcontrol access and use accordingly. For example, where an endpoint usesfile-system-based encryption as described herein, a process that iscolored as exposed to external resources (e.g., the Internet) may beprohibited from accessing cleartext data for protected files. Colors canalso be used in other contexts such as intrusion prevention, routingrules, and detection of odd or questionable behavior.

In one aspect, colors may be implemented as flags associated withobjects 418 that provide a short hand cache of potentially relevantinformation. While this information could also be obtained for an object418 through a careful inspection of related activity logs or other datarecording activities, the use of a cache of flags for coloringinformation makes the coloring information directly available andimmediately actionable, as distinguished from post hoc forensicactivities that are otherwise supported by data logging.

In one aspect, colors as contemplated herein may fall into two differentcategories: static colors and dynamic colors. Static colors may beexplicitly applied based on, e.g., a controlling application. Forexample, a static color may specify a status of an application or data,or an associated type of application (e.g., productivity, mail client,messaging, browser, word processing, financial, spreadsheet, etc.). Inthis context, a process will generally inherit static colors from asource executable, and will permit inferences for appropriate behaviorand related processes. Dynamic colors may be assigned based on directobservation of executing processes, and may not be inherited ortransferred among processes (although the presence of a dynamic colormay be used to draw another coloring inference upon interaction withanother process). Thus, the inheritance of colors may depend in partupon the type of color that is applied, or upon explicit inheritancerules provided for a particular color.

A descriptor 420 used for coloring as contemplated herein may take avariety of forms, and may in general include any information selectedfor relevance to threat detection. This may, for example, be a simplecategorization of data or processes such as trusted or untrusted. Forexample, in one embodiment described herein, data and processes arelabeled as either ‘IN’ (e.g., trusted) or ‘OUT’ (e.g., untrusted). Thespecific content of the label is unimportant, and this may be a binaryflag, text string, encrypted data or other human-readable and/ormachine-readable identifier, provided that the descriptor 420 canfacilitate discrimination among labeled files—in this example, betweentrusted objects 418 and untrusted objects 418 so that, e.g., trusteddata can be selectively decrypted or encrypted for use with trustedprocesses. Similarly, data may be labeled as corporate data or privatedata, with similar type-dependent processing provided. For example,private data may be encrypted with a key exclusively controlled by thedata owner, while corporate data may be encrypted using a remotelymanaged key ring for an enterprise operated by the corporation.

In another aspect, the descriptor 420 may provide a multi-tiered orhierarchical description of the object 418 including any informationuseful for characterizing the object 418 in a threat management context.For example, in one useful configuration the descriptor 420 may includea type or category, static threat detection attributes, and an explicitidentification. The type or category for the object 418 may be anycategory or the like that characterizes a general nature or use of theobject 418 as inferred from behavior and other characteristics. Thismay, for example, include categories such as ‘game,’ ‘financial,’‘application,’ ‘electronic mail,’ ‘image,’ ‘video,’ ‘browser,’‘antivirus,’ and so forth. The category may be more granular, or mayinclude hierarchical categories such as ‘application:spreadsheet,’‘application:word_processing,’ and so forth. Such colors may be directlyinferred from a single action, a sequence of actions, or a combinationof actions and other colors, including, e.g., colors of processes andfiles related to a particular action, or other objects 418 that providecontext for a particular action or group of actions. One or more colorsmay also or instead be explicitly provided by a user or a process, orotherwise automatically or manually attributed to computer objects ascontemplated herein.

The static threat detection attributes may be any readily ascertainablecharacteristics of the object 418 useful in threat detection. This may,for example, include an antivirus signature, a hash, a file size, fileprivileges, a process user, a path or director, and so forth. Staticthreat detection attributes may also include attributes that are derivedby or supplied from other sources. For example, static threat detectionattributes may include a reputation for an object 418, which may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (trusted/untrusted/unknown) or with a numericalscore or other quantitative indicator. The explicit identification may,in general, be what an object 418 calls itself, e.g., a file name orprocess name.

Some actions may transfer colors from the subject of the action to thetarget of the action. For example, when a process creates sub-processes,the sub-processes may inherit the colors of its parent(s). By way ofanother example, when a process is initially loaded from an executable,it may inherit the color(s) stored in the file system for or with theexecutable.

In general, the descriptor 420 may be provided in any suitable format.The descriptor 420 may for example be formed as a vector of binary flagsor other attributes that form the ‘color’ or description of an object418. The descriptor 420 may also, where appropriate, include scalarquantities for certain properties. For example, it may be relevant howmany times a system file was accessed, how many file handles a processhas opened, how many times a remote resource was requested or how long aremote resource is connected, and this information may be suitablyencoded in the descriptor 420 for use in coloring objects with thecoloring system 414 and applying rules for IOC detection by the IOCmonitor 421.

An indication of compromise (IOC) monitor 421 may be provided toinstrument the endpoint 402 so that any observable actions by orinvolving various objects 418 can be detected. As with the coloringsystem 414, it will be understood that the types of observable actionswill vary significantly, and the manner in which the endpoint 402 isinstrumented to detect such actions will depend on the particular typeof object 418. For example, for files or the like, an API for a filesystem may be used to detect reads, writes, and other access (e.g.,open, read, write, move, copy, delete, etc.), and may be configured toreport to or otherwise initiate monitoring of the action taken with thefile through the file system. As another example, kernel objects may beinstrumented at the corresponding object handle or in some other manner.As a further example, a kernel driver may be used for intercepting aprocess startup. While a wide variety of objects are contemplatedherein, one of ordinary skill in the art may readily create suitableinstrumentation for any computing object so that it may be monitored bythe IOC monitor 421.

It will be noted that suitable instrumentation may be coded for avariety of functions and circumstances. For example, instrumentation mayusefully track requests for network access or other actions back to aparticular application or process, or data payloads back to a particularfile or data location. One of ordinary skill in the art can readilyimplement suitable traces and/or logging for any such information thatmight be useful in a particular IOC monitoring operation.

In general, the IOC monitor 421 applies rules to determine when there isan IOC 422 suitable for reporting to a threat management facility 404.It will be understood that an endpoint 402 may, in suitablecircumstances and with appropriate information, take immediate localaction to remediate a threat. However, the monitor 421 mayadvantageously accumulate a sequence of actions, and still moreadvantageously may identify inconsistencies or unexpected behaviorwithin a group of actions with improved sensitivity by comparingdescriptors 420 for various objects 418 involved in relevant actions andevents. In this manner, rules may be applied based upon the descriptors420 that better discriminate malicious activity while reducing thequantity and frequency of information that must be communicated to aremote threat management facility 404. At the same time, all of therelevant information provided by the descriptors 420 can be sent in anIOC 422 when communicating a potential issue to the threat managementfacility 404. For example, during the course of execution, a specificprocess (as evidenced by its observed actions) may be assigned colordescriptors indicating that it is a browser process. Further, thespecific process may be assigned an attribute indicating that it hasexposed itself to external URLs or other external data. Subsequently,the same process may be observed to be taking an action suitable for aninternal or system process, such as opening up shared memory to anotherprocess that has coloring descriptions indicating that it is a systemprocess. When this last action is observed, an inconsistency in thevarious color descriptors between the subject of the action—theexternally exposed browser process—and the target of the action mayresult in a well-defined IOC, which may be directly processed withimmediate local action taken. The IOC may also or instead be reportedexternally as appropriate.

Thus, an endpoint 402 in an enterprise 410 may be instrumented with acoloring system 414 and monitor 421 to better detect potentiallymalicious activity using descriptors 420 that have been selected forrelevance to threat detection along with a corresponding set of rulesdeveloped for the particular descriptors 420 that are being used tolabel or color various objects 418. By way of example, the object 418may be a web browser that starts off being colored as a ‘browser’ and an‘internet facing’ application. Based on this descriptor 420, a range ofbehaviors or actions may be considered normal, such as accessing remotenetwork resources. However, if an object 418 colored with thisdescriptor 420 attempted to elevate privileges for a process, or toaccess a registry or system files, then this inconsistency in action maytrigger a rule violation and result in an IOC 422.

In general, any action or series of actions that cumulatively invoke aparticular reporting or action rule may be combined into an IOC 422 andcommunicated to the threat management facility 404. For example, an IOC422 may include a malicious or strange behavior, or an indication of amalicious or strange behavior. The IOC 422 may be a normalized IOC thatexpresses one or more actions in a platform independent manner. That is,the IOC 422 may express a malicious behavior or suspected maliciousbehavior without reference to platform-specific information such asdetails of an operating system (e.g., iOS, MacOS, Windows, Android,Linux, and so forth), hardware, applications, naming conventions, and soforth. Thus, a normalized IOC may be suitable for identifying aparticular threat across multiple platforms, and may include platformindependent processes, actions, or behaviors, or may express suchprocess, actions, or behaviors in a platform independent manner. Thenormalized IOC may be generated from the IOC 422, e.g., it may be aconverted version of the IOC 422 suitable for use with multipleplatforms, or it may simply be any IOC 422 that has been created in aplatform independent form. Process colorization (i.e., using thecoloring system 414) as described herein may be used to create anormalized IOC.

In general, a threat management facility 404 for the enterprise 410 mayinclude an IOC collector 426 that receives the IOC 422 from the endpoint402 and determines an appropriate action. This may include any suitableremedial action, or where one or more IOCs 422 are inconclusive,continued monitoring or increased monitoring as appropriate.

The threat management facility 404 may provide a variety of threatmanagement or monitoring tools 424, any of which may be deployed inresponse IOCs 422 collected by the IOC collector 426. These tools 424may include without limitation a scanning engine,whitelisting/blacklisting, reputation analysis, web filtering, anemulator, protection architecture, live protection, runtime detection,APT detection, network antivirus products, IOC detection, access logs, aheartbeat, a sandbox or quarantine system, and so forth.

The analysis facility 406 may provide a remote processing resource foranalyzing malicious activities and creating rules 434 suitable fordetecting IOCs 422 based on objects 420 and descriptors 420. It isgenerally contemplated that suitable attributes of certain descriptors418 and one or more rules 434 may be developed together so that objects418 can be appropriately labeled with descriptors 420 that permitinvocation of rules 434 and creation of IOCs 422 at appropriate times.The analysis facility 406 may include a variety of analysis tools 428including, without limitation, tools for regular expression,whitelisting/blacklisting, crowd sourcing, identifiers, and so forth.The analysis tools 428 may also or instead include information and toolssuch as URL look-ups, genotypes, identities, file look-up, reputations,and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may also provide numerousrelated functions such as an interface for receiving information on new,unknown files or processes, and for testing of such code or content in asandbox on the analysis facility 406.

The analysis facility 406 may also or instead include a compromisedetector 430, where the compromise detector 430 is configured to receivenew threat information for analysis and creation of new rules anddescriptors as appropriate, as well as corresponding remedial actions.The compromise detector 430 may include any tools described herein orotherwise known in the art for detecting compromises or evaluating newthreats in an enterprise 410.

In general, a rule 434 may be manually created with correspondinghuman-readable semantics, e.g., where a process is labeled as a browserprocess or other category or type that can be interpreted by a human. Itshould, however, be appreciated that the compromise detector 430 mayalso be configured to automatically generate descriptors 420 and rules434 suitable for distribution to a threat management facility 404 and anendpoint 402. In this latter mode, the meaning of a particulardescriptor 420 may not have a readily expressible human-readablemeaning. Thus, it will be understood that attributes selected forrelevance to threat detection may include conventional attributes, aswell as attributes without conventional labels or meaning except in thecontext of a particular, computer-generated rule for threat detection.

In general, the analysis facility 406 may be within an enterprise 410,or the analysis facility 406 may be external to the enterprise 410 andadministered, for example, by a trusted third party. Further, athird-party source 416 may provide additional threat data 438 oranalyses for use by the analysis facility 406 and the threat managementfacility 404. The third-party resource 416 may be a data resource thatprovides threat data 438 and analyses, where the threat data 438 is anydata that is useful in detecting, monitoring, or analyzing threats. Forexample, the threat data 438 may include a database of threats,signatures, and the like. By way of example, the third-party resource416 may be a resource provided by The MITRE Corporation.

The system 400 may include a reputation engine 440 storing a pluralityof reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may include a reputationmanagement system for the generation, analysis, identification, editing,storing, etc., of reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may includereputation-based filtering, which may be similar to the reputationfiltering discussed above with reference to FIG. 1. The reputationengine 440 may be located on the threat management facility 404 or theendpoint 402 as shown in FIG. 4, or the reputation engine 440 may belocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputation engine 440 mayreceive an IOC 422 or a stream of IOCs 422, and may generate or utilizereputations 442 for the IOCs 422. The reputation engine 440 may also orinstead receive actions, behaviors, events, interactions, and so forth,and may generate or utilize reputations 442 for any of the foregoing.The reputation engine 440 may generate or revise a reputation 442 basedon behaviors, actions, events, interactions, IOCs 422, other reputations442, a history of events, data, rules, state of encryption, colors, andso forth. The reputation engine 440 may utilize a third-party resource,e.g., for the third-party resource's reputation data.

The reputations 442 may include reputations for any of the objects 418as described herein. In general, the reputations 442 may relate to thetrustworthiness of the objects 418 or an attribute thereof (e.g., thesource of the object 418, a behavior of the object 418, another objectinteracting with the object 418, and so forth). The reputations 442 mayinclude lists of known sources of malware or known suspicious objects418. The reputations 442 may also or instead include lists of known safeor trusted resources or objects 418. The reputations 442 may be storedin a reputations database included on the reputation engine 440 orlocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputations 442 may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (e.g., trusted, untrusted, unknown, malicious, safe,etc.) or with a numerical score or other quantitative indicator. Thereputations 442 may also be scaled.

In general, in the system 400 of FIG. 4, a malicious activity on theendpoint 402 may be detected by the IOC monitor 421, and a correspondingIOC 422 may be transmitted to the threat management facility 404 forremedial action as appropriate. The threat management facility 404 mayfurther communicate one or more IOCs 422 to the analysis facility 406for additional analyses and/or resolution of inconclusive results. Otherdetails and variations are provided below. While the use of coloring andIOCs as contemplated herein can improve threat detection and remediationin a number of ways, the system 400 can be further improved withgranular control over access to endpoint data using an encryptionsystem. A system for key-based management of processes and files on anendpoint is now discussed in greater detail.

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management. Generally, thesystem 500 may include endpoints 502, an administration host 504, and athreat management facility 506, which may include policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. The system 500 may provide for the management of users512, policies 514, keys 516 (e.g., disposed on key rings 518), andendpoints 502 (e.g., from the administration host 504). The system 500may utilize various storage and processing resources, which may bedisposed in a cloud or the like.

The endpoints 502 may be any of the endpoints as described herein, e.g.,with reference to the other figures. The endpoints 502 may also orinstead include other end user devices and other devices to be managed.The endpoints 502 may include a web browser for use by the users 512,with supporting cryptographic functions implemented using cryptographiclibraries in the web browser. The endpoints 502 may communicate with theother components of the system 500 using any suitable communicationinterface, which may include Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption,Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), and so forth for additionalsecurity.

The endpoints 502 may include objects as described herein. For example,the endpoints 502 may include processes 520 and files 522. The processes520 may be labeled (e.g., by a coloring system using descriptors asdescribed above) in such a manner that the process is ‘IN,’ where theprocess 520 is in compliance with policies 514 administered for theendpoint 502 from a remote threat management facility 506, or theprocess is ‘OUT,’ where the process 520 is out of compliance with apolicy (or a number of policies) in the policies 514 for an enterprise.This may provide IN processes 520A and OUT processes 520B as shown inFIG. 5. The files 522 may be similarly labeled by a coloring system withdescriptors that identify each file 522 as IN, where the file 522complies with the policies 514 and is accordingly encrypted using, e.g.,a remotely managed key ring 518, or the file is OUT, where the file 522does not conform to the policies 514 and is accordingly not encryptedusing the remotely managed key ring 518. This may provide IN files 522Aand OUT files 522B as shown in FIG. 5. One skilled in the art willrecognize that other objects of the endpoint 502 or other components ofthe system 500 may be labeled in a similar manner where they are eitherIN or OUT. By coloring objects in this manner and basing key access onthe corresponding color, the “IN” software objects may operate in aprotected environment that objectively appears to be in compliance withthe policies 514. Other files and processes may still be used on theendpoint 502, but they will operate in an “OUT” or unprotectedenvironment that cannot obtain access to any of the “IN” content orfunctionality.

In an implementation, the system 500 may include determining whether anendpoint 502 is IN or OUT or whether a component of the endpoint 502 isIN or OUT, which may be based upon a set of rules (e.g., the rulesoutlined herein) or policies such as the policies 514 described herein.In some aspects, if the entire endpoint 502 is OUT—that is, out ofcompliance with one or more policies 514, the endpoint 502 will not havekey access or access to any protected content. Conversely, if theendpoint 502 is IN, the endpoint 502 may have access to protectedcontent. Thus, in one aspect, the notion of IN/OUT may be applied at anendpoint level, and data protection may be a consequence of endpointprotection. Endpoint protection may also or instead be applied at a moregranular level, e.g., by determining whether executables, processes 520,files 522, etc., on the endpoint 502 are IN or OUT, which may be basedupon rules or policies 514 as described herein.

The administration host 504 may include a web browser, which may includea cryptography library 524 and a web user interface (e.g., HTML,JavaScript, etc.). An administrator may utilize the web user interfaceto administer a key management system and perform administrativefunctions such as creating and distributing keys 516, establishingsecurity policies, creating key hierarchies and rules, and so forth. Theendpoint 502 may also include a cryptographic library 524 implementingcryptographic protocols for using key material in the key ring 518 toencrypt and decrypt data as needed.

The threat management facility 506 may include any of the threatmanagement facilities or similar systems described herein. In general,the threat management facility 506 may include a policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. Alternatively, one or more of the policy manager 508and key manager 510 may be located elsewhere on a network.

The policy manager 508 may implement one or more policies 514, andmaintain, distribute, and monitor the policies for devices in anenterprise. The policies 514 may include any policies 514 relating tosecure operation of endpoints 502 in an enterprise. This may, forexample, include hardware configuration policies, software configurationpolicies, communication policies, update policies, or any other policiesrelating to, e.g., the configuration of an endpoint 502, communicationsby an endpoint 502, software executing on an endpoint 502 and so forth.Policies 514 may include usage criteria based on, e.g., signatures,indications of compromise, reputation, user identity, and so forth. Withrespect to the key management system contemplated herein, the policies514 may include a cryptographic protocol design, key servers, userprocedures, and other relevant protocols, or these cryptographicprotocols may be provided elsewhere for use by the policy manager 508.The policies 514 may also include any rules for compliance includingthose mentioned above or any other suitable rules or algorithms that canbe applied to determine whether objects and components are ‘IN’ or ‘OUT’as contemplated herein.

The key manager 510 may be part of the threat management facility 506,or it may be remotely managed elsewhere, e.g., in a remote cloudresource or the like. The key manager 510 may also or instead bedisposed on the administration host 504 and one or more endpoints 502 ina manner independent of the threat management facility 506. In thismanner, all cryptographic operations may be isolated from the threatmanagement facility 506 and instead may be performed by a web browser orthe like executing on the administration host 504 or an endpoint 502.The key manager 510 may manage the keys 516, including managing thegeneration, exchange, storage, use, and replacement of keys 516. The keymanager 510 may include a key ring 518, where the keys 516 are disposedon the key ring 518 using one root key 526. The key manager 510 may alsoor instead include a variety of key management and other secureprocesses, including without limitation, administrator registration,establishing trust to endpoints 502, key distribution to endpoints 502,policy deployment, endpoint status reporting, and local key backup.

The users 512 may have full access to encrypted data. Alternatively, theusers 512 may have limited access to encrypted data, or no access toencrypted data. Access may be limited to users 512 using endpoints 502that are deemed ‘IN’ by the system, as well as to processes 520 that areIN, as further described herein.

The keys 210 may include cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem, i.e.,decryption keys. In one aspect, the keys 210 may be disposed on one keyring 218 using one root key 220. In general, the keys 210 may be createdand managed using, e.g., symmetric key technology, asymmetric keytechnology, or any other key technology or combination of keytechnologies suitable for securing data in an enterprise including, forexample the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), and so forth. The cryptosystem may also orinstead include any suitable public key infrastructure or the likesupporting the distribution and use of keys for encryption, digitalsignatures, and so forth.

The key ring 518 may facilitate simplified management of the system 500.For example, by reducing the data protection system down to a single keyring 518, the system can eliminate or reduce the overhead for managementof keys 516. In one aspect, all of the data on a key ring 518 isprotected by one root key 526. By reducing the data protection systemdown to a single key ring 518 protected by one root key 526, allprivileged users 512 on uncompromised platforms can have access to allprotected data. In this embodiment, data is either ‘IN’ (i.e.,encrypted), or it's ‘OUT’ (i.e., not encrypted). In one aspect, thedefault system does not include any additional shade of access control.

The cryptography library 524 may be disposed on the administration host504 as shown in FIG. 5. The cryptography library 524 may also bedisposed on the endpoint 502, e.g., in a web browser, or it may bedisposed on another component of the system 500, or any combination ofthese. The cryptographic library 524 may be installed by anadministrator. In general, key material 530 from the key ring 518 may bestored in a cache 532 on the endpoint 502 within any suitable memory onthe endpoint 502 for use in encryption and decryption as contemplatedherein. As noted above, an enterprise that systematically uses coloringand indications of compromise can be improved through the use of a keymanagement system as contemplated herein. This system may be stillfurther improved with the addition of a heartbeat system thatcommunicates heartbeats from an endpoint containing health and statusinformation about the endpoint. A suitable heartbeat system is nowdescribed in greater detail.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats. Ingeneral, a system 600 may include an endpoint 602, a gateway 604, athreat management system 606, and an enterprise management system 608that manages an enterprise including the endpoint 602, the gateway 604,and one or more additional endpoints 610. Each of these components maybe configured with suitable programming to participate in the detectionand remediation of an advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malwarethreat as contemplated herein.

The endpoint 602 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in anenterprise network. The endpoint 602 may contain a threat 612 such as anadvanced persistent threat, virus, or similar malware that resides onthe endpoint 602. The threat 612 may have reached the endpoint 602 in avariety of ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically onthe endpoint 602 by a malicious source. It will be understood that thethreat 612 may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the threat 612 may include an executable filethat can execute independently, or the threat 612 may be a macro,plug-in, or the like that executes within another application.Similarly, the threat 612 may manifest as one or more processes orthreads executing on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may install from afile on the endpoint 602 or a file remote from the endpoint 602, and thethreat 612 may create one or more other files such as data files or thelike while executing. Advanced persistent threats can be particularlydifficult to detect and remediate, and the systems and methodscontemplated herein can advantageously provide improved sensitivity tosuch threats, as well as enabling improved remediation strategies.However, the systems and methods contemplated herein may also or insteadbe used to detect and remediate other types of malware threats. As such,in this context references to a particular type of threat (e.g., anadvanced persistent threat) should be understood to generally includeany type of malware or other threat to an endpoint or enterprise unlessa more specific threat or threat type is explicitly provided orotherwise clear from the context.

The threat 612 may be analyzed by one or more threat countermeasures onthe endpoint 602 such as a whitelisting filter 614 that approves eachitem of code before executing on the endpoint 602 and prevents executionof non-whitelisted code. The endpoint 602 may also include an antivirusengine 616 or other malware detection software that uses any of avariety of techniques to identify malicious code by reputation or othercharacteristics. A runtime detection engine 618 may also monitorexecuting code to identify possible threats. More generally, any of avariety of threat detection techniques may be applied to the threat 612before and during execution. In general, a threat 612 may evade theseand other security measures and begin executing as a process 620 on theendpoint 602.

Network traffic 622 from the process 620 may be monitored and logged bya traffic monitor 624 on the endpoint 602. The traffic monitor 624 may,for example, logs a time and a source of each network request from theendpoint 602. Where the endpoint 602 is within an enterprise network,the network traffic 622 may pass through the gateway 604 in transit to adata network such as the Internet. While the gateway 604 may belogically or physically positioned between the endpoint 602 and anexternal data network, it will be understood that other configurationsare possible. For example, where the endpoint 602 is associated with anenterprise network but operating remotely, the endpoint 602 may form aVPN or other secure tunnel or the like to the gateway 604 for use of athreat management system 606, enterprise management system 608, and anyother enterprise resources.

The endpoint 602 may use a heartbeat 626 to periodically and securelycommunicate status to the gateway 604. The heartbeat 626 may be createdby a health monitor 628 within the endpoint 602, and may be transmittedto a remote health monitor 630 at the gateway 604. The health monitor628 may monitor system health in a variety of ways, such as by checkingthe status of individual software items executing on the endpoint 602,checking that antivirus and other security software is up to date (e.g.,with current virus definition files and so forth) and running correctly,checking the integrity of cryptographic key stores, checking forcompliance with enterprise security policies, and checking any otherhardware or software components of the endpoint 602 as necessary orhelpful for health monitoring. The health monitor 628 may thus conditionthe issuance of a heartbeat 626 on a satisfactory status of the endpoint602 according to any suitable criteria, enterprise policies, and otherevaluation techniques.

The heartbeat 626 may be secured in any suitable manner so that thehealth monitor 630 can reliably confirm the source of the heartbeat 626and the status of the endpoint 602. To this end, the heartbeat 626 maybe cryptographically signed or secured using a private key so that themonitor 630 can authenticate the origin of the heartbeat 626 using acorresponding public key. In one aspect, the heartbeat 626 may include acombination of plaintext information and encrypted information, such aswhere the status information for the endpoint is provided in plaintextwhile a digital signature for authentication is cryptographicallysecured. In another aspect, all of the information in the heartbeat 626may be encrypted.

In one aspect, a key vault 632 may be provided on the endpoint tosupport cryptographic functions associated with a secure heartbeat. Anobfuscated key vault 632 may support numerous useful functions,including without limitation, private key decryption, asymmetricsigning, and validation with a chain of trust to a specific rootvalidation certificate. A variety of suitable key management andcryptographic systems are known in the art and may be usefully employedto a support the use of a secure heartbeat as contemplated herein. Thesystem may support a secure heartbeat in numerous ways. For example, thesystem may ensure that signing and decryption keys can only be used inauthorized ways and inside an intended Access Control mechanism. Thesystem may use “anti-lifting” techniques to ensure that a signing keycan only be used when the endpoint is healthy. The system may ensurethat attacking software cannot, without first reverse-engineering thekey vault 632, extract the original key material. The system may alsousefully ensure that an attacker cannot undetectably replace the publickeys in a root certificate store, either directly or indirectly, such asin an attack that tries to cause the code to validate against adifferent set of root keys without directly replacing any keys in theroot store.

A robust heartbeat 626 may usefully provide defensive mechanisms againstreverse engineering of obfuscated content (e.g., the private keymaterial stored in key vault 632, the code used to validate the correctrunning of the remainder of the systems as part of the heartbeat 626code itself) and any anti-lifting protections to prevent malware fromdirectly using the endpoint 602 (or the health monitor 628 on theendpoint 602) to continue to send out signed heartbeat packets (e.g.stating that “all is well” with the endpoint) after security mechanismshave been impaired, disabled, or otherwise compromised in any way.Lifting in this manner by malicious code can be materially mitigated byproviding statistical validation (e.g., with checksums of code) of callstacks, calling processes, and core processes. Likewise, statisticalchecks as well as checksum integrations into the cryptographiccalculations may protect against code changes in the heartbeat 626 codeitself.

A variety of useful techniques may be employed to improve security ofthe key vault 632 and the heartbeat 626. For example, the system may usedomain shifting so that original key material is inferred based onhardware and software properties readily available to the key vault 632,and to ensure that key material uses non-standard algorithms. Softwareproperties may, for example, include readily determined system valuessuch as hashes of nearby code. In another aspect, the keys may be domainshifted in a manner unique to the endpoint 602 so that the manner ofstatistical validation of call stacks and core software is unique to theendpoint 602. Further the key vault may be provisioned so that a publickey stored in the key vault 632 is signed with a certificate (or into acertificate chain) that can be externally validated by a networkappliance or other trusted third party or directly by the healthmonitor.

The heartbeat 626 may encode any useful status information, and may betransmitted from the endpoint 602 on any desired schedule including anyperiodic, aperiodic, random, deterministic, or other schedule.Configured in this manner, the heartbeat 626 can provide secure,tamper-resistant instrumentation for status of the endpoint 602, and inparticular an indication that the endpoint 602 is online anduncompromised. A disappearance of the heartbeat 626 from the endpoint602 may indicate that the endpoint 602 has been compromised; however,this may also simply indicate that the endpoint 602 has been powered offor intentionally disconnected from the network. Thus, other criteria maybe used in addition to the disappearance or interruption of theheartbeat 626 to more accurately detect malicious software. Some suchtechniques are described below, but it will be understood that this mayinclude any supplemental information that might tend to make an attackon the endpoint 602 more or less likely. For example, if the heartbeat626 is interrupted but the endpoint 602 is still sourcing networktraffic, then an inference might suitably be made that the endpoint 602is compromised.

The threat management system 606 may, in general, be any of the threatmanagement systems described herein. The enterprise management system608 generally provides tools and interfaces for administration of theenterprise and various endpoints 610 and other resources or assetsattached thereto. It will be understood that, the functions of thethreat management system 606 and the enterprise management system 608may vary, and general threat management and administration functions maybe distributed in a variety of ways between and among these and othercomponents. This is generally indicated in FIG. 6 as a threat managementfacility 650 that includes the threat management system 606 and theenterprise management system 608. It will be understood that either orboth of these systems may be administered by third parties on behalf ofthe enterprise, or managed completely within the enterprise, or somecombination of these, all without departing from the scope of thisdisclosure. It will similarly be understood that a reference herein to athreat management facility 650 is not intended to imply any particularcombination of functions or components, and shall only be understood toinclude such functions or components as explicitly stated in aparticular context, or as necessary to provide countermeasures foradvanced persistent threats as contemplated herein.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system. In general, an endpoint may include aprocessing environment 702, a file system 706, a threat monitor 720 anda key wrapper 730.

The processing environment 702 may, for example, be any environment suchas an operating system or the like suitable for executing one or moreprocesses 704.

Each process 704 may be an instance of a computer program, portion of acomputer program or other code executing within the processingenvironment 702. A process 704 may execute, e.g., on a processor, groupof processors, or other processing circuitry or platform for executingcomputer-executable code. A process 704 may include executable computercode, as well as an allocation of memory, file descriptors or handlesfor data sources and sinks, security attributes such as an owner and anyassociated permissions, and a context including the content of physicalmemory used by the process 704. More generally, a process 704 mayinclude any code executing on an endpoint such as any of the endpointsdescribed herein.

The file system 706 is generally associated with an operating systemthat provides the processing environment 702, and serves as anintermediary between processes 704 executing in the processingenvironment 702 and one or more files 708 stored on the endpoint. Thefile system 706 may provide a directory structure or other construct tofacilitate organization of the files 708, and the file system 706generally supports file functions such as creating, deleting, opening,closing, reading, writing, and so forth.

An extension 710 may be included in the file system 706 by modifying theoperating system kernel. While other programming techniques may beemployed to perform the functions of an extension 710 as contemplatedherein, direct modifications to the operating system permit theextension 710 to operate transparently to the processing environment 702and the processes 704 without requiring any modifications oradaptations. The extension 710 may, for example, be implemented as afile system filter (in a MICROSOFT WINDOWS environment) or a mount pointto a directory (in an APPLE iOS environment). The extension 710 to thefiles system as contemplated herein performs two concurrent functions.First, the extension 710 communicates with a threat monitor 720 in orderto receive updates on the security status and exposure status of theprocesses 704 or the endpoint. Second the extension 710 communicateswith a key wrapper 730 that provides key material for encrypting anddecrypting data in the files 708. Finally, the extension 710 operates toconditionally provide encryption and decryption of the files 708 for theprocesses 704 based on a current security or exposure state, asdescribed in greater detail below.

The threat monitor 720 may include any suitable threat monitoring,malware detection, antivirus program or the like suitable for monitoringand reporting on a security state of an endpoint or individual processes704 executing thereon. This may include local threat monitoring using,e.g., behavioral analysis or static analysis. The threat monitor 720 mayalso or instead use reputation to evaluate the security state ofprocesses 704 based on the processes 704 themselves, source files orexecutable code for the processes 704, or network activity initiated bythe processes 704. For example, if a process 704 requests data from aremote URL that is known to have a bad reputation, this information maybe used to infer a compromised security state of the endpoint. While athreat monitor 720 may operate locally, the threat monitor 720 may alsoor instead use remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic toand from the endpoint, or a remote threat management facility thatprovides reputation information, malware signatures, policy informationand the like for the endpoint and other devices within an enterprisesuch as the enterprise described above.

In general, the threat monitor 720 provides monitoring of a securitystate and an exposure state of the endpoint. The security state may, forexample, be ‘compromised’, ‘secure’, or some other state or combinationof states. This may be based on detections of known malware, suspiciousactivity, policy violations and so forth. The exposure state may be‘exposed’ or ‘unexposed’, reflecting whether or not a particular process704 or file 708 has been exposed to potentially unsafe content. Thus,exposure does not necessarily represent a specific threat, but thepotential for exposure to unsafe content. This may be tracked in avariety of ways, such as by using the coloring system described abovewith reference to FIG. 5.

The key wrapper 730 may contain a key ring 732 with one or more keys 734for encrypting and decrypting files 708. The key ring 732 may becryptographically protected within the key wrapper 730 in order toprevent malicious access thereto, and the key wrapper 730 maycommunicate with the extension 710 to provide keys 734 for accessing thefiles 708 at appropriate times, depending, for example, on whetherprocesses 704 are secure or exposed. In one aspect, the files 708 arestored in a non-volatile memory such as a disk drive, or in arandom-access memory that provides a cache for the disk drive, and thekey wrapper 730 may be stored in a separate physical memory such as avolatile memory accessible to the operating system and the extension 710but not to processes 704 executing in the user space of the processingenvironment 702.

In one aspect, every document or file on the endpoint may have aseparate key. This may be, for example, a unique, symmetric key that canbe used for encryption and decryption of the corresponding file. The keywrapper 730 may control access to the key material for encrypting anddecrypting individual files, and may be used by the extension 710 tocontrol access by individual processes 704 executing on the endpoint. Asdescribed herein, the extension 710 may generally control access tofiles 708 based on an exposure state, a security state, or other contextsuch as the user of a calling process or the like. In the event of asevere compromise, or a detection of a compromise independent ofparticular processes, a key shredding procedure may be invoked todestroy the entire key wrapper 730 immediately and prevent any furtheraccess to the files 708. In such circumstances, the keys can only berecovered by the endpoint when a remediation is confirmed.Alternatively, the files may be accessed directly and decrypted from asecure, remote resource that can access the keys 734.

FIG. 8 shows a method for labeling network flows. In general, networkflows may be explicitly labeled according to source applications (orsource processes or the like) to permit tracking and managementaccording to a source after a network flow leaves an endpoint.

As shown in step 802, the process 800 may include executing a process onan endpoint, such as any of the endpoints described herein. The process800 may, for example, be associated with an application on the endpoint.

As shown in step 804, the process 800 may, at some point during itsexecution, create a network message. In general, a network message mayinclude a header containing, e.g., a source address, a destinationaddress, and other information necessary or helpful for supporting datanetwork communications between the endpoint and an intended destination.The network message may, for example, be in response to an explicit userinput such as directing a browser to a web address, or in response to animplicit user input such as requesting a software update or performingan online backup. This may also or instead be fully automated under anyof a variety of normal circumstances. This may also, however, beoutbound traffic from malware, and by labeling the network traffic,malicious activity may be more easily detected after the network messagehas left the endpoint.

As shown in step 806, the process 800 may include adding a label to thenetwork message. This may, for example, include generating a label thatincludes context information related to the network message, such as anidentifier for an application or process. This identifier may becryptographically signed or encrypted to protect the contents thereof,and may include additional information about, e.g., the status of theendpoint, the reputation of the application or the destination address,or any other information necessary or helpful for making improvedrouting or processing decisions about network traffic. Thus, the process800 may include cryptographically signing the label, encrypting thecontents of the label, or any other suitable cryptographic steps. Packetstructures for network communication are generally known, and may forexample include a header with control and routing information, alongwith a payload of data for communication to a recipient. The header mayinclude various items of information useful for network communicationssuch as a preamble that identifies a beginning of the packet, a sourceaddress, a destination address, a sequence number (e.g., for spreading alarge file or the like across multiple packets/payload), a packetlength, a packet type, a cyclic redundancy check or other checksum orthe like, and any other useful information. A label as contemplatedherein may be usefully incorporated into the header of such a packet inany suitable format and any suitable location. For example, internetprotocol version ‘4’ and version ‘6’ both permit optional information tobe included in a packet, and the label may be included as optionalinformation. For example, the label may be included by encapsulating apacket within another packet that includes label information. Forexample, a label may be included by repurposing a portion of a packetheader. For example, a label may be included by injecting additionallabel data into the packet, or for example, at the start of the dataportion of the packet.

As shown in step 808, the process 800 may include transmitting thenetwork message from the endpoint, e.g., through a network interface orthe like to a data network.

According to the foregoing, in one aspect there is disclosed herein anendpoint configured as described above to label outbound networkmessages to identify a source process or application. Thus, there isdisclosed herein a system comprising an endpoint including a networkinterface configured to couple the endpoint in a communicatingrelationship with a data network. The endpoint may include a memory anda processor such as any of the memories, processors, or processingcircuitry described herein. In general, the processor may be configuredto execute instructions stored in the memory to perform the steps ofgenerating a label for a network message created by a process executingon the endpoint and associated with an application, where the networkmessage includes a payload and a header and where the label includes anidentifier for the application, adding the label to the header of thenetwork message, and transmitting the network message through thenetwork interface to a remote location on the data network. At the sametime, a network device or the like may be configured to receive thenetwork message and process it in a variety of ways, as furtherdiscussed herein.

As shown in step 810, the process 800 may include receiving a networkmessage from an endpoint at a network device. The network message may bethe network message described above, or any other packet or other datastructure including a payload of data and header information such as asource address for the endpoint and a destination address for anintended recipient of the network message. The network message may alsoinclude a label that identifies an application that generated thenetwork message on the endpoint. This may for example, be determined byexamining the properties of a process associated with the application,or otherwise relating a process or other source of the network messagewith a particular application.

It should be understood that this receiving step may be performed at awide range of network devices. In one aspect, this may include a router,a gateway, a firewall, a threat management facility for an enterprise,or any other network device for handling network communications toand/or from the endpoint. This may include a network device on a localnetwork used by the endpoint, a cloud-based network device used in anenterprise network security system, a physical gateway between anenterprise network and an external network, or some combination ofthese. In one aspect, the firewall may be a local firewall for theendpoint that is configured to locally enforce routing rules based oninformation obtained in the label.

While a source application may be a useful item of information to beincluded in the label, it will be understood that other contextinformation may also or instead be included. For example, this mayinclude the identity of a process of an application that created thenetwork message, a user of the process that created the network message,or other identity or source information, such as a name or otheridentity of the endpoint. For the endpoint name this may include a fullyqualified name such as a device identifier that is unique within thedomain of the endpoint. This may also or instead include a reputation ofthe application or process that created the network message if this islocally available to or determined by the endpoint. In this context, thereputation may specify a particular reputation (e.g., known good, knownbad, suspected bad, or the like) or the reputation may specify anabsence of specific information (e.g., unknown). This may also orinstead include health information about the endpoint or a process,coloring information for the process that identifies exposure of theprocess to other processes or data on the endpoint, reputation orexposure information for data used by the process, and so forth. Thelabel may include status information related to the endpoint, such as anactivity level of the endpoint, a status of software installed on theendpoint, a security condition of the endpoint (e.g., anti-malwaresoftware installed, a warning state of control software, and so forth),or other useful status indications in evaluating context of the networktraffic and the like.

It should also be understood that, while the process 800 describedherein may involve proactive labeling of network flows, or labeling ofall network flows from an endpoint, the process 800 may also or insteadbe adapted to be responsive to detection and query by a network device,such as a threat management facility, a firewall, a gateway, a server,or the like. For example, a malware attack that exfiltrates data maybegin with a file upload using a file transfer protocol (FTP) request oran HTTP PUT. When upload activity from the endpoint is detected at anetwork device, this may cause the network device to actively query theendpoint to request information about the application that requested theupload, such as an identifier of the application, a reputation of theapplication, or the like. For example, the network device may direct theendpoint to label all traffic from a user, from an application, from aprocess, or from a device. For example, the network device may directthe endpoint to label all traffic from processes that are currentlyactive. For example, the network device may direct the endpoint to labelall traffic from users that are currently active. For example, thenetwork device may direct the endpoint to label all traffic from a userassociated with a process. For example, the network device may firstdirect the endpoint to label all network traffic to identify a process.The network device may then identify a process of interest, and directthe endpoint to label all traffic associated with the process ofinterest, or associated with a user associated with the process ofinterest. These and other similar adaptations are intended to fallwithin the scope of this disclosure.

The process may also or instead be adapted to be responsive to detectingsuspicious activity at the endpoint. Upon detecting suspicious activity,the endpoint may begin to label network traffic associated with thesuspicious activity. The label may indicate that the labeled networktraffic is associated with suspicious activity. The label may provideadditional context for the network traffic and associated application orprocess. A network device receiving labeled network traffic from anendpoint may then take additional measures, such as observing andrecording the content of the network traffic, inspecting the content ofthe network traffic, verifying the reputation of the destination(s) ofthe network traffic, verifying the reputations of the application(s)generating the network traffic, determining whether there is othernetwork traffic from other devices on the network directed to thedestination, notifying an administrator, and so on.

The process may also or instead be adapted to be responsive to detectingsuspicious activity at an endpoint that hosts one or more virtualmachines. Upon detecting suspicious activity, the endpoint may labelnetwork traffic with context associated with the virtual machine. Forexample, the label may include an identifier for the virtual machine,e.g., if the virtual machine is not using a unique network address. Thelabel may indicate that the labeled network traffic is associated withsuspicious activity. The label may provide additional context for thenetwork traffic and associated application or process. A network device,or a virtual machine host, or another virtual machine on the same hostthat is receiving labeled network traffic from the virtual machine, maythen take additional measures.

The process may also or instead be adapted to be responsive to detectingsuspicious activity at a network device. Upon detecting suspiciousactivity, the first network device may begin to label network trafficassociated with the suspicious activity. The label may indicate that thelabeled network traffic is associated with suspicious activity. Thelabel may provide additional context for the labeled network trafficthat may be available at the network device, for example, that thetraffic transited the network device, or came from a particular subnet,or was recorded by the network device. The label may provide a referenceto additional information collected by the network device about thesuspicious network traffic. For example, the reference may be to arecording of the content of the network traffic. A network devicereceiving labeled network traffic from an endpoint may then takeadditional measures, such as observing and recording the content of thenetwork traffic, inspecting the content of the network traffic,verifying the reputation of the destination(s) of the network traffic,verifying the endpoint(s) generating the network traffic, determiningwhether there is other network traffic from other devices on the networkdirected to the destination, notifying an administrator, and so forth.

As shown in step 812, the process 800 may include processing the networkmessage on a network device that receives the network message to extractthe label. This may, for example, include cryptographically verifying anauthenticity of the label or a source of the label, decrypting the labelto extract encoded information, or any other form of processing.

As shown in step 814, the process 800 may include processing the networkmessage at a network device based on the label. While routing isgenerally contemplated as described below, a number of additionalprocessing steps may usefully be performed. For example, the process 800may include caching the label, for example associated with theapplication and a reputation of the application on the network device.

As shown in step 816, the process 800 may include routing the networkmessage based on the application (or process or other source on theendpoint) that generated the network message. The routing may be aconditional routing based on the information in the label, orinformation determined from the information in the label. This mayinclude routing rules or combinations of rules that may be based, forexample, on user identity, process/application, reputation, and soforth. For example, the processor may be further configured to performthe steps of determining a reputation of the application and routing thenetwork message to the destination address conditionally based on thereputation of the application that generated the network message. Thatis, if the reputation of the application is known and good, then thetraffic may be routed as requested by the endpoint according to therouting information in the network traffic. However, if the reputationof the application is known and bad, then the traffic may be sequesteredin any suitable manner. For example, the traffic may be dropped.Additional steps may be taken. For example, when the reputation of theapplication is uncertain, or other information is collectivelyinconclusive, a sandbox based on the endpoint may be created and used tocommunicate with the destination address to test for malicious activity.In another aspect, where information is inconclusive, the networktraffic may be permitted, but more aggressive monitoring may beinitiated until a conclusive evaluation of the source application can beobtained. For example, the network device may observe and record thenetwork traffic, inspect the content of the network traffic, verify thereputation of the destination(s) of the network traffic, verify thereputations of the application(s) generating the network traffic,determine whether there is other network traffic from other devices onthe network directed to the destination, notify an administrator, and soforth. In another aspect, an indication of malware or other compromiseon the endpoint may be used as a basis for initiating remediation of theendpoint.

Likewise, in the case of uncertain application reputation, some usersmay have additional permissions with respect to network traffic routingdecisions. For example, a user designated as an accounting user, who mayhave access to more sensitive information may have traffic blocked,while a user in sales or customer support may be permitted withadditional monitoring or safeguards.

In this context, it will be appreciated that an application or processidentifier in the label may be used as a single item of information in abroader context for the network message. For example, the label mayinclude a health status of the endpoint, other status information of theendpoint, a user identifier for a user of the application or a relatedprocess (e.g., automated machine activity—e.g., daemon, backupservice—might be treated differently from human activity, categories ofusers may be treated differently than others, and the like), a name ofthe endpoint, reputation information for the source application, and soforth. Thus, the application identifier may be useful by itself, but theaccuracy of attack detection may be improved still further by usingadditional context for the network message, which may include variouspieces of contextual information inserted directly into the label forthe network message, as well as other information available to a networkdevice called upon to make a routing decision for a particular networkmessage (e.g., allowing, blocking, rerouting, and so forth). The routingdecision may include blocking the message. All such variations thatwould be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art are intended tofall within the scope of this disclosure.

According to the foregoing, there is disclosed herein a system thatincludes a network device that may use labels provided by endpoints thatidentify source applications or processes and the like for networkmessages. In one aspect, a system disclosed herein includes a networkdevice including a network interface configured to couple the networkdevice in a communicating relationship with a data network that includesan endpoint, a memory on the network device, and a processor on thenetwork device. The processor may be configured to execute instructionsstored in the memory to perform the steps of receiving a network messagefrom an endpoint through the network interface, where the networkmessage includes a source address for the endpoint, a destinationaddress for an intended recipient of the network message, a label thatidentifies an application that generated the network message on theendpoint, and a payload of data. The processor may be further configuredto execute instructions stored in the memory to perform the steps ofprocessing the network message to extract the label, and routing thenetwork message based on the application that generated the networkmessage.

In one use of this system, the processor may be configured to determinea reputation of the application and to route the network message to thedestination address conditionally based on the reputation of theapplication that generated the network message, for example as describedabove. Where information such as user information is available, theprocessor may be further configured to extract a user identifier fromthe label that identifies a user of the application on the endpoint,which may also be usefully employed for various intelligent routingprocesses as contemplated herein.

FIG. 9 illustrates an Internet Protocol (IP) packet format. In general,the packet 900 may include preamble information 902, a source address904, a destination address 906, option information 908, and a payload ofdata 910. As described herein, the source address 904 may generallyspecify a network location that originated the packet 900, but may notprovide any more specific information about a source user, a sourcemachine, a source application, and other information as contemplatedherein.

In one aspect, this information may be usefully added to the packet 900by inserting relevant information into the option information 908, or inany other suitable location within the packet 900 or packet header. Forexample, the Internet Protocol version ‘4’ (IPv4) packet may beconfigured such that additional information may be included in thepacket header, which may be specified by the internet header length(IHL) data and an option type field. This field is identified in FIG. 9as option information 908. In ordinary use, the option type field issub-divided into a one-bit copied flag, a two-bit class field, and afive-bit option number. These taken together form an eight-bit value forthe option type field. In one aspect, this field may be used to specifyadditional source information, or to identify a link or pointer to alocation where such information can be obtained. For example, up to 60bytes of optional, additional data may be included in the header, and alabel may be included in this additional data. For example, where thepacket is used within an enterprise domain, a portion of the header maybe used by any source-aware networking components to identify a source,or to provide a pointer to source information which may, for example, bewithin the data 910 of the packet 900, within a separate packet, orstored at a network-accessible location such as a gateway, firewall, orthreat management facility. An internet protocol version ‘6’ (IPv6)packet may include a 20-bit flow label field, as well as theavailability to provide extension headers to indicate optionalinformation. For example, the flow label field may be used to include a20-bit label. For example, a ‘Destination Options’ extension header maybe used to include label information that is not required to be examinedby intermediate networking devices, but may be examined by a gateway ora final destination.

In one aspect, the option information 908 of an IPv4 packet may be usedto designate the packet as containing source information 912 within thedata 910 of the packet 900. Thus, for example, the first byte or bytesof the data 910 may be used to specify source information at any desiredlevel of granularity including a user, a machine, an application, aprocess, and so forth, as well as combinations of these. The sourceinformation 912 within the data 910 may also or instead provide a linkto a resource within the enterprise network where source information forthe packet 900 can be retrieved. It will be understood that sourceinformation, whether stored within source information 912 in the packet900, within the option information 908 in the packet header 914, orstored in some remote resource, may in general be encrypted to securesource information against unauthorized access, and/or the sourceinformation may be digitally signed to permit verification ofauthenticity with reference to a trusted third party or internal trustauthority.

In one aspect, source information 912 may include a reference to aprocess or other context information for an endpoint. The endpoint maycommunicate context information to a network device through a separatechannel, for example using the heartbeat 314 channel (see, e.g., FIG.3). The context information may be stored on the endpoint, and thesource information 912 in the packet 902 may include a reference to thecontext information. Thus, context information may be provided via afirst channel, and a reference to the context information may beprovided in a packet label. For example, each process on an endpoint maybe assigned an identifier, and the identifier communicated to thenetwork device with the operating system process information when theprocess is detected. The identifier may be included in the label. Inthis way, machine-specific information may not be included in thepacket, but only a reference to the information. In someimplementations, the identifier is changed periodically.

A flag within the packet header 914 may also or instead be used toidentify when (and where) source labeling information is present for apacket 900.

In one aspect, the packet 900 may be configured to be compatible withother IP network traffic, so that packets can move into and out of theenterprise network without additional handling, such as by insertingsource information 912 into the data 910 of the packet payload asillustrated in FIG. 9. In another aspect, packets may be processed atthe perimeter of the enterprise network, e.g., at a VPN gateway,enterprise network gateway, or any other perimeter network device, orother suitable router, switch, or other network device inside theenterprise network, with non-IP compliant packet data and/or structuresbeing removed for outbound traffic, and where possible or applicable,reinserted for inbound traffic. In another aspect, traffic from outsidethe enterprise network may use a predetermined flag or the like toindicate that a packet contains source information compliant with aformat for source information used within the enterprise network. Moregenerally, any suitable techniques may be used to permit communicationof source context information with network traffic within a network,while ensuring compatibility with an external network architecture suchas TCP/IP or the like, and all such techniques that would be apparent toone of ordinary skill in the art are intended to fall within the scopeof this disclosure.

FIG. 10 shows a method for secure labeling of network flows. A systemfor labeling network flows is generally described herein (e.g., above).A network enterprise security system may be improved by instrumentingendpoints to explicitly label network flows with cryptographicallysecure labels that identify an application or other source of eachnetwork flow. Cryptographic techniques may be used, for example, toprotect the encoded information in the label from interception by thirdparties or to support cryptographic authentication of a source of eachlabel. As discussed above, a label may provide health, status, or otherheartbeat information for the endpoint, and may be used to identifycompromised endpoints, to make routing decisions for network traffic(e.g., allowing, blocking, or re-rerouting), to more generally evaluatethe health of an endpoint that is sourcing network traffic, or for anyother useful purpose.

As shown in step 1002, the method 1000 may include receiving a networkmessage from a process executing on the endpoint. In general, theprocess may be based on an application on the endpoint. As describedherein, the network message may be a packet or the like that includes apayload and a header, and that is addressed to a remote location (e.g.,using an Internet Protocol address, Uniform Resource Locator (URL), orother address) accessible from the endpoint through a data network.

As shown in step 1004, the method 1000 may include generating a labelfor the network message. As described herein, the label may includeinformation about a source of the network message on the endpoint, e.g.,an application, a process, a user or the like on the endpoint thatoriginated the network message, or an identity of the endpoint itself,such as by reference to a globally unique name of the endpoint within anenterprise domain. Thus, for example, the label may include anidentifier for the application that generated the network message, anidentifier for the endpoint that generated the network message, theidentifier of a user of the process on the endpoint that generated thenetwork message, or any other useful source identifier. The label mayalso or instead encode useful information about the status of theendpoint. For example, the label may include a health status of theendpoint or any other useful information.

As shown in step 1005, the method 1000 may include cryptographicallyprocessing the label information. This may, for example, includecryptographically signing the label to provide a signed labelinformation. This signed label may be used, for example, to verify anidentity of the endpoint, an identity of an application on the endpoint,an identity of a process executing on the endpoint, or any combinationof these that is useful for identifying a source of the network message.This signed label may be verified, for example, using a public key forthe source that is signing the label, or through any other suitablerelationship with a trusted third party capable of cryptographicallyauthenticating the source. Cryptographically processing the networkmessage may also or instead include encrypting the label with acryptographic key to provide an encrypted label that is secured againstinterception by third parties.

As shown in step 1006, the method 1000 may include adding thecryptographically process label (e.g., the signed label and/or encryptedlabel) to the header of the network message.

As shown in step 1008, the method 1000 may include transmitting thenetwork message from the endpoint to the remote location through thedata network.

As shown in step 1010, the method may include receiving the networkmessage from the endpoint at a network device such as a gateway, afirewall, a router, a switch, or a threat management facility, any ofwhich may be a hardware device physically positioned between theendpoint and an external data network, or a cloud-based deviceaccessible to the enterprise network for the endpoint through a remoteservice or resource. The network message may be any of the networkmessages described herein, and may include an encrypted label thatidentifies an application that generated the network message, and/or asigned label that can be used to verify a source or the security of thelabel.

As shown in step 1011, the method 1000 may include processing thenetwork message on the network device to extract the label.

As shown in step 1012, the method may include cryptographicallyprocessing the label. This may, for example, include verifying a sourceof the label or decrypting the label with a cryptographic key to providea decrypted label.

As shown in step 1014, the method 1000 may include processing thenetwork message based on the label, for example, by caching label orpayload contents on the network device, requesting a scan or remediationof the endpoint that provided the message, or any other responsiveprocessing. This may, for example, include receiving an indication thatthe endpoint is compromised, e.g., either embedded within the label orthrough another communication channel. For example, the network devicemay receive a heartbeat from the endpoint, and the indication ofcompromise may be inferred from an absence of the heartbeat whenexpected, or the indication of compromise may be explicitly added by theendpoint (e.g., by a security agent executing on the agent) into theheartbeat. This indication of compromise may be used as a basis forpreventing routing of additional network traffic from the compromisedapplication through the network device. This routing or forwardingrestriction may be maintained, for example, until the expected heartbeatresumes from the endpoint/application, or until an explicit remediationmeasure is completed.

By labeling network flows by application in this manner, the networkdevice that is handling the network flow can advantageously make routingor blocking decisions on an application-by-application basis rather thanfor an entire endpoint, thus limiting network restrictions to particularapplications that are compromised while permitting other applications onan endpoint to continue normal network communications, or optionallynetwork communications with some heightened level of scrutiny orsecurity.

As shown in step 1016, the method 1000 may include routing the networkmessage based on the decrypted label, for example using any of thetechniques described herein.

According to the foregoing, there is disclosed herein a system forsecure labeling of network flows. The system may include an endpointincluding a network interface configured to couple the endpoint in acommunicating relationship with a data network, a memory on theendpoint, and a processor on the endpoint. The processor may beconfigured as described herein to execute instructions stored in thememory to perform the steps of receiving a network message from aprocess executing on the endpoint, where the process is based on anapplication and where the network message includes a payload and aheader. The network message may be addressed to a remote locationaccessible from the endpoint through a data network. The processor mayfurther be configured to execute instructions stored in the memory toperform the steps of generating a label for the network message, wherethe label includes information about a source of the network message onthe endpoint, encrypting the label with a cryptographic key, therebyproviding an encrypted label, adding the encrypted label to the headerof the network message, and transmitting the network message from theendpoint to the remote location through the data network. Encrypting thelabel may include cryptographically signing the label or otherwisecryptographically processing the label as described herein.

FIG. 11 illustrates a method 1100 for managing network flows. Anenterprise network security system for managing network flows isgenerally described herein (e.g., above). Such a network enterprisesecurity system may be improved by managing network traffic based on theapplication types corresponding to the network traffic flows.

Traditional application control mechanisms, such as unified threatmanagement (UTM), Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), and secure webgateways, may be insufficient at identifying application traffic as ittraverses a network device. Traditional methods are reactive, usingnetwork signatures, inferences based on network-level metadata, or thelike to identify traffic. Additionally, traffic is increasinglytraversing network gateways in an encrypted form such as HTTPS, whichmay require a gateway with corresponding cryptographic capabilities andkeys in order to decrypt and interpret this traffic. Technologies suchas certificate pinning can also interfere with decryption atintermediate network devices such as gateways. At the same time, bespokecorporate applications, database systems, and networking configurationscreate corporate-specific environments that defy globalcharacterization. With network traffic becoming increasinglyunrecognizable in transit, policies aimed at managing network trafficbecome increasingly ineffective.

Against this backdrop, an enterprise gateway or other network device mayusefully employ a secure connection between the device and an endpointto communicate information to assist in managing network traffic andconnections. In particular, an endpoint can be configured to trackapplications associated with network traffic, and to report relatedinformation, e.g., through a secure out-of-band channel such as aheartbeat, to a gateway or other network device responsible for managingnetwork traffic. Through a secure communication channel, the networkdevice, such as a gateway, may, for example, directly query an endpointsecurity agent of the internal traffic source and collect theapplication name and additional application data required to make apositive application identification. In another aspect, the endpoint mayperiodically communicate this information to the network device in aheartbeat or other periodic communication. With this information, thenetwork device may enforce security policies. If the application isunknown, a snapshot of the traffic may be collected and sent to a threatmanagement facility where the application can be identified throughsignatures and application lists published to the network device. Thisapplication identification method may be particularly effective becausethe method is resilient to encrypted traffic, and it is uncommon andundesirable for an application provider to change application names,path names, file names, installation dates, uninstallers, applicationIDs and so forth.

In one aspect, upon receiving a network message with an unknownapplication type from an endpoint, a network device may make a requestto the endpoint to send additional information about the application toallow the network device to identify the unknown application, e.g., toidentify a type of the application that can be used for managing networktraffic. The information about the application may be used by thenetwork device to determine an application type upon an initial networkmessage or connection from the application, or to change acategorization or characterization of the application on the networkdevice. For example, if an application or a specific connection changesits packet communications and the network device is unable to determinethe originating application or application type, the network device mayrespond in a separate channel and query the endpoint for identifyinginformation, identify the application type, and classify or manage thenetwork message appropriately.

The classification at the network device may be used to allow thetraffic if it is a known application, for example with valid signature,or to block, quarantine, remove, delete, or otherwise preventtransmission of the message. The classification at the network devicealso may be used to tie that communication stream to that application,so that the application may be controlled or managed at the networkdevice, such as limiting the application's bandwidth, assigning theapplication to a priority for VOIP, or to otherwise control the routingand transmission of the application's network messages.

It will be appreciated that the classification into a particular networktype may occur automatically, e.g., based on information within thenetwork traffic flow or information received from the endpoint inresponse to an explicit query. In another aspect, a notification ofunknown type may be transmitted using any suitable communication medium(e.g., through a text message, electronic mail, or within the dashboarddescribed herein) to an administrator so that a manual classificationcan be provided from currently known application types, or so that a newapplication type can be created as necessary or desired.

As shown in step 1102, the method 1100 may include determining anapplication type for each traffic flow at or received by a networkdevice, such as each of a number of network traffic flows at the networkdevice that receives the number of network traffic flows from endpointswithin an enterprise network. This may include, for example, determiningan application type using any of the techniques described herein, orotherwise extracting inferences based on communication protocols,traffic content, and so forth.

The network device may be any logical or physical device positionedbetween an endpoint (or group of endpoints such as within an enterprisenetwork) and a network. For example, the network device may be a gatewaysuch as an enterprise gateway positioned between a collection ofendpoints in an enterprise and an external network such as the Internetor other wide area network(s). The network device may also or insteadinclude any switch, router, bridge, gateway, firewall, or the like thatmanages network traffic between a source and destination within anetwork. Other devices such as physical interface hardware (e.g.,network interface cards, wireless networking devices, and so forth) arealso sometimes referred to as network devices, and are considered to benetwork devices wherever such devices provide a useful intermediatepoint for managing network traffic as contemplated herein. A networkdevice may also or instead include a cloud-based gateway or othercloud-based device or platform that remotely manages traffic for anenterprise or other network or collection of endpoints. A network devicemay also or instead include a logical or physical device local to theendpoint, such as a software firewall on the endpoint that controlstraffic to and from programs executing on the endpoint.

In general, determining an application type may include querying anendpoint to receive identifying information as described herein.However, other techniques may also or instead be employed. For example,an endpoint may usefully label network messages with explicitapplication identifiers that can be extracted and used at the networkdevice, such as using IP v.6 flow labels or any other suitable in-bandor out-of-band labeling techniques. In another aspect, an endpoint mayexplicitly report application usage or application type usage, e.g., ona socket-by-socket or other basis so that each network message (e.g.,packet or other discrete data item) can be allocated to an applicationtype based on information previously received from an endpoint. Inanother aspect, the network device may store historical information fornetwork flows so that each IP address and socket has an application typeallocated to it, at least until that allocation is explicitly changed orthe connection is terminated. In another aspect, an application type maybe inferred. For example, for unencrypted network messages, it may bepossible to extract useful information from the payload or packet headerthat can be used to identify a type of an originating application. Inanother aspect, the type may be inferred from other information aboutthe traffic flow, such as the identity of a source endpoint or aprotocol for the payload. Other information from the endpoint and/orapplication, such as an install date, the presence or location ofuninstall routines, certificates associated with the application, and soforth, may also or instead be usefully employed to aid in theidentification of traffic types, as well as the detection of potentiallysuspicious network traffic. More generally, any technique fordetermining an application type for a network flow, based on eitherexplicit labels or implicit message characteristics, may be usefullyemployed with the techniques described herein.

It will also be understood that the application types may be organizedin any hierarchical or other fashion, and may include any number ofdifferent separate, overlapping, inclusive, or exclusive types. Forexample, application types may be allocated along functional ororganizational boundaries. Thus, types such as engineering, financial,management, personnel, and the like may be used to organize applicationsthat might engage in network communications. Other attributes, such assoftware vendors or providers may also or instead be used to categorizesoftware. In another aspect, the application types may be allocatedamong broad, commonly used categories of software. Thus, for example,the types may include word processing, presentation, spreadsheet,computer automated design, accounting, calendar, electronic mail,messaging, web browsing, media rendering, and so forth. These types maybe further organized into more general categories such as productivitytools (email, browser, word processing, etc.), design tools (CADprograms, simulation programs, etc.), database tools, financial tools,and so forth, or these application types may be divided into moregranular categories such as specific application names or file formats.As noted herein, applications may also usefully be categorized accordingto communication protocols or any other metadata or the like. Moregenerally, the application types may include any of the categories orlabels described herein, or any other group of categories or the likeuseful for managing network traffic flows as contemplated herein.

In another aspect, an application may be unrecognized, and/or may haveno known application type. In this case, an administrator may assign anexisting category or create a new category, e.g., using a dashboarddescribed herein.

As shown in step 1104, the method 1100 may include managing the networkflows based on the corresponding application types. In one aspect,network traffic flows may be managed by applying a security policy toeach of the network traffic flows according to the application type,which may provide for message handling such as blocking traffic,decrypting traffic, encrypting traffic, or creating alerts to anadministrator when certain traffic is detected. More generally, asecurity policy may specify the manner in which the network devicetreats and processes messages having known, or unknown, applicationtypes. This may, for example, include enterprise or other policiesregarding allowable network usage. This may also or instead includelocal rules for the network device that control whether to forward ordrop packets according to rules for specific application types. This mayalso or instead include enterprise or other policies for allocating orregulating bandwidth, quality of service, prioritization, encryption,decryption, and so forth.

It will be appreciated that other management operations may be usefullyperformed in this context. For example, a response to an endpoint querymay yield additional information that assists in a detection ofmalicious software. For example, the query may identify a suspiciouspath or filename, an unknown file source, or other suspicious contextsuch as the absence of an uninstaller for a new application or othersoftware object. This information may be used alone or in combinationwith other context or information to initiate further investigation orremediation at the endpoint that sourced the network message with anunknown application type.

In another aspect, managing the network traffic flows may includeselectively decrypting content at the network device. Where the traffictype is unknown, or where information received from the endpoint queryor other context or information, as well as combinations thereof,suggests suspicious activity, contents of a network message or networktraffic flow may be decrypted as needed. In one aspect, the networkdevice may use a man-in-the-middle technique to decrypt and re-encryptcontents of the network traffic flow in transit. In another aspect, thenetwork device may retrieve the needed key material from the endpoint,e.g., using a secure communication channel and trusted resources on theendpoint, where these resources permit access to the requiredinformation on the endpoint, or access to the information on a remoteresource such as a cloud-based key management system.

It will also be appreciated that any combination of the foregoingtechniques may be used to manage network traffic as contemplated herein.This may include rule-based management of network traffic. This may alsoor instead include the use of thresholds for quantitative metrics, aswell as multi-factor scoring of different criteria or characteristics ofnetwork traffic, so that policy outcomes for a particular networktraffic flow are the result of many different factors combined in aweighted or filtered manner.

It will be understood that the phrase ‘network traffic flow’ is intendedto refer to a particular flow of data (e.g., in packets or other networkmessages) from a particular application on a particular endpoint. Thus,an endpoint may be a source (and/or recipient) of multiple networktraffic flows, and multiple endpoints may each have one or more networktraffic flows passing through a network device. The term ‘networktraffic flow’ is also used herein in the generic sense of all networktraffic flowing in a network, or to and through a network device, andall such meanings are generally intended except where a more specificmeaning is explicitly stated or otherwise clear from the context.

As shown in step 1106, the method 1100 may include receiving a networkmessage from an endpoint. The network message may be received from theendpoint at a network device such as a gateway, a firewall, a router, aswitch, an access point, or a threat management facility, any of whichmay be a hardware device physically positioned between the endpoint andan external data network, or a cloud-based device accessible to theenterprise network for the endpoint through a remote service orresource. In another aspect, the network device may be a tap fromanother network stream or connection. For example, a network flowthrough a router or other network device may be duplicated (in itsentirety, or filtered according to user-defined criteria) in a parallelpath that permits inspection, analysis, and so forth at a location thatis not strictly between a source and a destination, but that isnonetheless exposed to the corresponding network traffic in a mannerthat permits the analyses and management contemplated herein. In oneaspect, the network device may include a firewall such as a localfirewall for the endpoint that is configured to locally enforce trafficor connectivity rules for the endpoint. The network message may be anyof the network messages described herein, such as the network messagesdescribed above or any other packet or other data structure including apayload of data and header information such as a source address for theendpoint and a destination address for an intended recipient of thenetwork message. It should also be understood that the network messagemay be received directly from the endpoint, e.g., through a single-hopphysical or logical connection between the endpoint and the networkdevice, or the network message may be received indirectly from theendpoint, e.g., through one or more routers, access points, switches,interface devices, short-range communication devices, or other networkelements, or any combination of the foregoing.

As shown in step 1108, the method 1100 may include determining whether asource application type for the network message is known, e.g., bydetecting a network message that is not explicitly labeled or that istransmitted over a physical and/or logical connection that has notpreviously been associated with an application type. The receipt of anetwork message with an unknown application type may, for example, beindicative of a new connection from a legitimate application, or it maybe indicative of an unauthorized application or suspicious networkactivity.

In general, when an application type is known, the method may proceed tostep 1114, where the network message can be managed according to thisapplication type. For example, this may occur when the network messagecontains identifying information that includes an application type foran application associated with the network message, and this identifyinginformation can be used to manage the network message. In this context,identifying information may, for example, include information containedin an explicit label for each network message, or received from theendpoint and stored at the network device as an implicit label fortraffic associated with a network flow, which may be uniquelyidentified, e.g., by machine name, MAC address, IP address, socket orany other information, alone or in combination with other information.

When the application type is unknown, e.g., because a network message isunlabeled or because no application type has been determined for theassociated connection, then the method may proceed to step 1110, wherethe endpoint can be queried to determine the application type. Thus,when the network message has an unknown application type, the method1100 may include querying the endpoint to retrieve second identifyinginformation for a process executing on the endpoint that was a source ofthe network message, and determining the application type for the sourceof the network message based on the second identifying informationretrieved from the endpoint.

It will be understood that the identifying information may be providedin a variety of forms. For example, the identifying information mayinclude an explicit label such as an application name for the source ofthe network message, or other application data such as a product numberor other identifier for the application, a publisher, a serial number, atag, or the like that provides a unique global identifier for theapplication, or that the endpoint and the network device have agreed toshare as an identifier for an application, application type, networkconnection, or other item that can be used to unambiguously associatethe network message with a particular application type. The identifyinginformation may be included in the network message as a secure (e.g.,signed or encrypted) label or as an unsecure label. In another aspect,the identifying information may be provided in an out-of-bandcommunication such as a secure heartbeat or the like from an endpointthat identifies the network message or network traffic flow (e.g., byconnection or other identifier(s)) and provides an associatedapplication type. In another aspect, the identifying information may bestored at the network device, e.g., from a prior or initial networkmessage, or from an endpoint heartbeat or the like, and associated witha network traffic flow that carries the network message. In one aspect,identifying information may be forwarded by the network device to athreat management facility or other enterprise and/or cloud-basedresource, and the network device may responsively receive anidentification of the application type from the threat managementfacility.

Thus, as shown in step 1110, upon receipt of a network message having anunknown application type, the method 1100 may include querying anendpoint for identifying information. This may occur, for example, whena network message is received that is unlabeled or otherwise has anunknown application type. In one aspect, querying the endpoint mayinclude querying a security agent executing on the endpoint. Queryingthe endpoint may also or instead include querying the endpoint through asecure connection between the network device and the endpoint. Queryingthe endpoint may also or instead include querying the endpoint through asecure heartbeat protocol or other secure, out-of-band communicationlink between the endpoint and the network device. Querying the endpointmay also or instead include receiving a response at the network devicein a secure heartbeat from the endpoint. It will be understood that inthis context, querying the endpoint may include querying the endpointdirectly, e.g., through a secure communication channel or the likebetween the endpoint and the network device, or querying the endpointthrough a broker that intermediates specific communications betweenendpoints and network devices, or that generally gathers endpointinformation on any suitable schedule or basis, and responds to queriesabout endpoints, e.g., using a secure communication channel to anauthenticated device or user.

As generally discussed herein, identifying information for anapplication or application type may include any data contained in themessage that includes, suggests, or otherwise indicates a source of thenetwork message. In one aspect, the identifying information soughtduring the query of the endpoint may include an application name for thesource of the network message. The identifying information may also orinstead include application data for the source of the network messagesuch as an application name, an application path, or an endpointapplication type or other classification. The identifying informationmay also or instead include additional information such as a signatureor other verifiable assertion about the source or accuracy of theidentifying information. Any other identifying information may also orinstead be used, including, for example, a file name, a process name, aninstallation date, an application source, an uninstaller location (orexistence), and so forth.

In another aspect, a new application type may be created or provided,e.g., using the dashboard described herein, in order to supportinternally developed or proprietary applications or application types ofa particular user or enterprise.

In one aspect, querying the endpoint may include querying an endpointdefense driver or other driver operating in a kernel space of one of theendpoints. As described below, this may permit the source information tobe securely accessed by the kernel driver in a manner that preventstampering (e.g., based on a tamper protection cache or the like used bythe driver) and permits authentication or verification of the reply bythe recipient by securing the reply communication in a secure heartbeator other secure communication.

As shown in step 1112, the method 1100 may include determining anapplication type of the network message source. Where the applicationtype is explicitly asserted, either in the network message or inmetadata for a network traffic flow stored at the network device, thismay be determined by directly reading the corresponding information.Where the application type is implied, e.g., by explicit information(such as an application name or the like) that is similarly availablebut does not directly assert an application type, the application typemay then be explicitly determined by reading the correspondinginformation and determining the application type using locally availablerules or external resources that can correlate the explicit informationto an application type. In another aspect, where the identifyinginformation is implicit information such as a communication protocol orconnection port, the application type may be similarly determined usingappropriate rules or processing. For example, the Internet AssignedNumbers Authority (IANA) maintains an assignment of ports to particularuses. For example, port number 143 is assigned to Internet MessageAccess Protocol communications and dedicated to management of electronicmail messages on a server. While these assignments are not strictlybinding, a reasonable inference can be made that communications overport number 143 are associated with an electronic mail client. This typeof information can be used in combination with other information toassists in the explicit identification and labeling of network trafficflows with application types as contemplated herein. In instances wherean inference of application type is made, the inference may becommunicated to an administrator or the like who may apply a conclusiveclassification for use in labeling and further processing.

In one aspect, the application type may be determined based on theidentifying information obtained while querying the endpoint. Thenetwork device may include memory and be adapted or configured to storeand process the identifying information from the endpoint against a datastore of potential sources, applications, application types, andapplication data. In this regard, the network device may be able toassociate the identifying information with an application type.Determining the application type of the network message source may alsoor instead include forwarding the identifying information to a threatmanagement facility for analysis. The threat management facility mayhave greater (or more comprehensive or current) data stores to assist inidentifying the application, should the network device be unable to makean identification based on the identifying information sent from theendpoint. The network device may receive an identification of theapplication type from the threat management facility. The threatmanagement facility may also be used to confirm the network device'sidentification and store the identifying information (and its associatedapplication's identity) in its data stores for future comparisons oridentifications.

In one aspect, an application type lookup service may usefully beprovided. This may include a remotely accessible resource, and may beprovided, e.g., within a threat management facility or other enterprisenetwork tool or resource. The application type lookup service mayreceive information about an application, and provide an explicit typein response, which can be used for labeling network traffic flows ascontemplated herein. The lookup service may usefully provide additionalservices such as deep inspection, traffic redirection, detonation, andso forth. This may, for example, include higher latency or moreprocessing-intensive operations, which can be selectively deployed basedon context (or the absence of sufficient context) as needed. Thus, inone aspect there is disclosed herein a sandbox for network traffic thatis selectively deployed from a network device based on application typeinformation (including, e.g., the absence of application typeinformation) associated with a network traffic flow.

As shown in step 1114, the method 1100 may include managing a networktraffic flow including the network message at the network deviceaccording to the application type. Managing the network traffic flow mayinclude associating the network traffic flow containing the networkmessage with the identified application type, or more generallyassociating each network traffic flow through the network device with aparticular application type. Managing the network traffic flow may alsoor instead include routing the network message based on the application,or application type that generated the network message. The routing maybe a conditional routing based on the identifying information, orinformation determined from the identifying information. This mayinclude routing rules or combinations of rules that may be based, forexample, on user identity, process/application, reputation, and so forthas described herein. Managing the network traffic flow may also orinstead include applying a security policy to each of the networktraffic flows according to the application type. If the identifiedapplication type is indicative of suspicious or malicious activity, orif the application type cannot be identified, the network device mayroute, remove, quarantine, or take other remedial action on the networkmessage as previously described herein.

Other techniques may also or instead be used, as generally describedherein. For example, managing network traffic flows may includeselectively deploying traffic decryption or encryption, or forwardingnetwork traffic streams to an application type lookup server or otherresource configured to identify an application type for the networktraffic flow and/or provide deep inspection and extended processing,analysis, and so forth.

More generally, a platform such as the dashboard described herein may beused to manage network traffic flows in a variety of ways, and mayprovide tools for operations such as prioritizing review of networktraffic, auditing network traffic, setting new policies based onobserved network traffic, prioritizing traffic, rate-limiting traffic,creating alarms, and so forth.

According to the foregoing, there is disclosed herein a system thatincludes a network device that manages network flows. In one aspect, asystem disclosed herein includes a network device including a networkinterface configured to couple the network device in a communicatingrelationship with a data network that includes an endpoint, a memory onthe network device, and a processor on the network device. The processormay be configured to execute instructions stored in the memory toperform the step of determining an application type for each of a numberof network traffic flows at a network device that receives the number ofnetwork traffic flows from endpoints within an enterprise network andmanaging the network traffic flows based on the correspondingapplication types. The processor may be further configured to executeinstructions stored in the memory to perform the steps of receiving anetwork message in one of the network traffic flows at the networkdevice from an endpoint within the enterprise network, the networkmessage having an unknown application type, querying the endpoint toretrieve identifying information for the source on the endpoint of thenetwork message, determining the application type for the source of thenetwork message based on the identifying information, and managing thenetwork message within the network traffic according to the applicationtype.

The network device may also or instead communicate with other networkdevices or resources to coordinate management of network traffic flows.For example, the network device may provide suitable notifications to anadministrator, and may proactively suggest possible actions associatedwith a network traffic flow. The network device may also or insteadprovide notifications to a threat management facility, an endpointsecurity agent, or a malware remediation system or the like to takeappropriate action. The network device may also or instead initiateprocedures such as quarantining, endpoint isolation or termination,sandboxing, and so forth, or may instruct other network devices orresources to do any of the foregoing.

In another aspect, any of the foregoing network-level operations may berealized in network processors or other communications hardware, or in acentral processing unit or other processor that administers traffic on anetwork device.

FIG. 12 shows a dashboard for visualizing network usage by applicationtypes. In general, the dashboard 1200 may be any web-based dashboardsuitable for displaying network usage information as contemplatedherein, e.g., the number of applications (or number of each applicationtype) using network traffic flows in a network such as an enterprisenetwork. For example, while an application may be installed on a numberof endpoints, only a smaller number of endpoints may be using theapplication to generate network traffic. The dashboard may thereforeprovide information about actual usage of network resources by one ormore applications that each may be provisioned on a number of endpointsin a network. In general, the underlying usage data may be obtainedusing the techniques described herein, and aggregated from one or morenetwork devices and presented by a server such as a web server in aninteractive dashboard or similar interface that permits users to view,filter, organize, investigate, or otherwise interact with usage data.For example, the dashboard 1200 may display an indicator of prevalencesuch as a relative or absolute occurrence of an application type, or therelative or absolute number of instances of an application type that areusing network resources. This permits easy user identification ofcommonly-used application types across an enterprise network or the likewithin the dashboard 1200 along with other related information aboutnetwork usage.

In general, the dashboard 1200 may provide any number of controls 1202such as menus, hyperlinks, buttons, checkboxes, text entry fields,drop-down menus, and so forth for interacting with data displayed in thedashboard 1200, and managing network traffic as contemplated hereinusing the dashboard 1200. In one aspect, a firewall or other networkdevice or resource that is monitoring network traffic may facilitatecapture of individual packets or network streams from an applicationendpoint, and the forwarding of raw data or metadata to a remoteanalysis facility for processing. The dashboard 1200 may access thisinformation from a central resource such as a threat management facilityor other enterprise or administrative resource and display theinformation in any suitable manner. The dashboard 1200 or a back end forthe dashboard 1200 may also usefully request specific or generalinformation from various other resources within the network. A server orother resource that provides the dashboard 1200 may, in certaincircumstances, have an aggregated view of network traffic that is notavailable elsewhere within the network. In this case, the server mayusefully facilitate capture of application data (or the full applicationor related processes, etc.) from an endpoint, where this information isunknown, or the server may identify a network traffic flow as anappropriate candidate for forwarding to a remote analysis facility forinspection, analysis, sandboxing, characterization, and so forth.Similarly, analysis may also or instead be performed by other networkresources such as any of the resources described above, any of which mayusefully draw inferences based on application types associated withnetwork traffic flows, and allocate traffic flows to further networkresources for various types of further processing or analysis.

In another aspect, the dashboard 1200 may usefully provide time-basedinformation about application-specific or application-type-specificnetwork traffic. For example, the dashboard may be used to monitorchanges in application traffic, and to identify specific instances wherenetwork traffic of a particular type or associated with a particularapplication is increasing or decreasing in an unexpected manner. Thus,for example, where a particular application or application type exhibitsan increase of several orders of magnitude within a day or a week, thismay suggest malicious activity. Of course, this may also be a result oflegitimate, purposeful behavior such as a roll-out of a new applicationwithin an enterprise, but in either instance the dashboard canfacilitate detection of, and responses to, such a change. A baseline ofnetwork usage of an application may be determined, and significantdeviations from the baseline may indicate potentially maliciousactivity. Where actual or potential malicious activity is identified inthis manner, visual alerts or other notifications may be provided, e.g.,to an administrator within the dashboard 1200 or through any othersuitable communication medium, and may be accompanied by controls forinitiating suitable responses, e.g., to uninstall an application, blocknetwork traffic from an application, ignore an alert, forward anapplication or network stream to a remote resource for further analysis,and so forth.

The controls 1202 in the dashboard 1200 may usefully provide access toany number of administrative or network management tools. This may, forexample, include controls 1202 to investigate data interactively,generate reports, and so forth. This may also or instead includecontrols 1202 permitting an administrator or other user to label unknowntraffic types, (e.g., by selecting from drop-down lists of known traffictypes), re-classify network streams that already have application typesassigned, or to create and manage new application types. The controls1202 may also facilitate viewing, filtering, organizing, andinvestigating data for network traffic, e.g., based on application typeor any other useful criteria. The controls 1202 may also facilitateintegration with third-party resources or software, e.g., throughsuitably configured application programming interfaces, databaseinterfaces, and so forth. In another aspect, the controls 1202 canfacilitate management of network traffic, e.g., by supporting blockingparticular network traffic flows, decrypting or encrypting networktraffic flows, diverting network traffic flows to deep analysisresources, or any of the other actions contemplated herein.

In one aspect, the system may support collaborative or social networkingtechniques for threat management. For example, if a user permits sharingof information with third parties, classifications applied or created bythe user may be shared with those third parties to assist in furtherclassifications. Furthermore, data from multiple enterprises may, againwhere sharing is permitted, be aggregated to assists in the creation ofidentification rules, tools for automated classification, and so forth.These crowd-sourced or social-networking based rules may be presented inthe dashboard 1200 for use by participating users or enterprises, andmay be intermingled with other classification categories or rules, oruniquely identified and separately presented from an otherwise globallymanaged category set.

In one aspect, there is disclosed herein a system including a pluralityof security agents executing on a plurality of endpoints in anenterprise network such as any of the endpoints and enterprise networksdescribed herein. The system may include one or more network devices inthe enterprise network, each one of the network devices configured tolabel network traffic flows from the plurality of endpoints according toan application type selected from a predetermined group of applicationtypes. The system may further include a server configured to aggregateusage data from each one of the network devices to determine a number ofinstances of each one of the predetermined group of application typesassociated with a network traffic flow within the enterprise network,and to present the usage data in a web-based interface.

FIG. 13 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type. In particular, the user interface 1302, which may,e.g., be accessed through a control in the dashboard described above inFIG. 12, may show a list of applications currently using a network asdetected, e.g., at a gateway, firewall, or other network device, or acombination of network devices, e.g., within an enterprise network. Thelist may also or instead include applications executing on endpointswithin an enterprise regardless of network traffic flow, such asapplications identified by the endpoint defense driver described hereinand reported to a network device in a secure heartbeat or other suitablecommunication. For each application, the user interface 1302 may providea row of related data. This may, for example, include an applicationname, which may optionally specify a full path and filename for therelated executable, or some other name recognized by the endpoint or thenetwork device and useful for uniquely identifying the application. Eachrow of information may also include additional information such as thenumber of endpoints that contain the application, or the number ofendpoints with network traffic flows belonging to the application.Another column of information may be provided such as an applicationfilter to uniquely identify a filter for monitoring the network trafficflow from that application. Another column may be provided for trafficshaping control, which may optionally include an icon or other indicatorto show whether the application or filter is new (e.g., not yetrecognized or categorized), along with a control 1304 for qualifying anapplication according to type or any other suitable criteria, e.g., asillustrated below in FIG. 14.

FIG. 14 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type. In particular, FIG. 14 shows a user interface 1402 forqualifying an application, accessible through the dashboard and userinterface described above, such as an application with a related networktraffic flow or an application reported to a network device in a secureheartbeat or other communication. The user interface 1402 may show anapplication name, which may initially be, for example, a filename for anexecutable of the application, or a user-provided or system-providedname for the application. In the interface, the user may provide anyname useful for identifying the application within network flows ascontemplated herein. The user interface 1402 may also display a pathshowing where on an endpoint the application is located. The userinterface 1402 may also display an interactive application categoryselection control 1404, which may be used to identify an applicationcategory as illustrated below. The user interface 1402 may also orinstead include an application filter control for adding a filter thatcan be used to restrict, label, prioritize, or otherwise shape networktraffic flows to and from the application.

FIG. 15 shows a user interface for managing network usage according toapplication type. In particular, FIG. 15 shows a user interface 1502with a control 1504 such as a drop-down list for providing anapplication category or application type for the application associatedwith a network traffic flow. As described above, this may include anyhierarchical or other categorization scheme useful for organizing andmanaging network traffic flows. By way of non-limiting examples, thismay include categories such as file transfer, gaming, general Internet,instant messaging, infrastructure, network services peer-to-peer, proxyand tunnel, remote access, streaming media, VoIP, mobile applications,software update, download applications, general business, web mail,conferencing, social networking, storage and backup, desktop mail,industrial control system, and electronic commerce.

Using the foregoing user interfaces, a user may usefully identify andmanage applications within an enterprise network according to type, andmay similarly manage new applications when they appear within thedashboard, or in response to alerts or other notifications to anadministrator or the like of a new application with a network trafficflow detected on a network device within (or associated with) theenterprise network.

FIG. 16 shows a flowchart of a method for visualizing network usage byapplication types. In general, the method 1600 may be executed on anetwork device, a threat management facility, or any other server orcombination of devices or platforms used within an enterprise network orother network in which application or application-type monitoring mightbe usefully employed.

As shown in step 1602, the method 1600 may begin with providing a numberof application types such as a number of application typescharacterizing one or more applications sourcing network traffic withinan enterprise network. This may include application types at anysuitable level of granularity from very narrow (e.g., specific versionsof specific applications) to very broad (e.g., with a small group oftypes or functions). For example, the application types may be organizedaccording to an application name or an application suite name, or theapplication types may be organized at a functional level, and mayinclude categories such as electronic mail, word processing,spreadsheet, web browser, and so forth. Application types may also orinstead include broader functional classifications such as productivitysoftware (including any of the foregoing), design or engineeringsoftware (e.g., computer automated design platforms, simulation ormathematical modeling tools and so forth), accounting applications,management tools, information management tools and so forth. Applicationtypes may also or instead be organized according to authorized users,permitted network communications, or any other objective criteria usefulfor organizing and differentiating among applications. Numerous possibleapplication types are discussed herein, and these or any other typesthat usefully categorize applications that might be used on endpoints inan enterprise network may be adapted for use as the application typescontemplated herein.

As shown in step 1604, the method 1600 may include labeling each of anumber of network traffic flows in the enterprise network. This mayinclude applying labels using any of the techniques described herein,such as labeling each of the network traffic flows with one of theapplication types by querying endpoints for application type informationwhen each new one of the number of network traffic flows is initiated.Labeling may include labeling at one or more network devices within theenterprise network. Labeling may also or instead include querying eachendpoint that initiates one of the network traffic flows to identify anassociated application or an associated application type. Labeling mayalso or instead include extracting an explicit application type labelfrom a network message within one of the network traffic flows. Anexplicit application type label may be cryptographically signed orotherwise encoded to ensure accuracy and authenticity. This may beparticularly useful where, for example, a network management system suchas that described below applies labels to outbound network traffic basedon verified identity of applications executing on an endpoint. Inanother aspect, labeling may include extracting an explicit applicationtype label from information transmitted in a heartbeat from an endpointthat originated a network message within one of the network trafficflows. The heartbeat may, for example, include a secure heartbeat thatis encrypted to prevent tampering or inspection, or that is digitallysigned to provide a verifiable indicator of authenticity or source.

In one aspect, labeling at least one of the network traffic flows mayinclude querying an endpoint defense driver or other driver operating ina kernel space of one of the endpoints. As described below, this maypermit the source information to be securely accessed by the kerneldriver in a manner that prevents tampering (e.g., based on a tamperprotection cache or the like used by the driver) and permitsauthentication or verification of the reply by the recipient by securingthe reply communication in a secure heartbeat or other securecommunication.

As shown in step 1606, the method 1600 may include aggregating data fornetwork traffic flows based on the application types. This may, forexample, include aggregating data to indicate a number of endpoints,network traffic flows, users, endpoints or the like that are using eachone of the application types on the enterprise network. The data may beaggregated to any suitable central data location such as a cloud-basedenterprise management facility. The data may be usefully filtered ororganized in a number of ways. For example, aggregating a number ofendpoints using each one of the application types may include removingapplication types with zero instances and aggregating only theapplication types currently in use by one or more of the endpoints.

A number of techniques for providing information about network flowsfrom a kernel driver on an endpoint, such as an application name, anapplication classification or type, an application path (e.g., includinga directory location within the file system of the endpoint) and soforth, are described herein. This may include, for example, informationavailable for a process (or a related file or application) within aprocess cache maintained in the kernel, or information maintained in aseparate tamper protection cache that identifies protected files,directories, registry keys, applications, and so forth in a manner thatprevents changes without authorization from an appropriate trustauthority. Any of this information may be usefully retrieved for aprocess and forwarded to a suitable location for aggregation andpresentation within a dashboard or the like as contemplated herein.

As shown in step 1608, the method 1600 may include configuring thecloud-based enterprise management facility (or other server or the like)to present the number of endpoints using each one of the applicationtypes to a user in a web-based dashboard. The web-based dashboard mayprovide any tools or controls known in the art to facilitateinvestigation of the aggregated and source data by a user. For example,the web-based dashboard may provide interactive access to underlyingdata for network usage by each application type, number of endpointsusing each application type, duration of usage, bandwidth usage, and soforth.

FIG. 17 shows a block diagram of an architecture for secure managementof endpoint resources. In general, the system 1700 may include anendpoint having a kernel space 1702 and a user space 1704, whichconnects with a network space 1708 outside the endpoint through, e.g., afirewall 1706 and any other network hardware, software, protocols and soforth. Software that protects the endpoint against malicious activitymay execute in the user space 1702, such as an antivirus system 1710, anetwork management system 1720, a file protection system 1730, and aremediation system 1740. An endpoint defense driver 1750 that securesthese anti-malware systems against intrusion, intervention, othertampering, or the like may execute partially or wholly in the kernelspace 1702. The firewall 1706 may be a hardware firewall, a softwarefirewall, or some combination of these, and the firewall 1706 may be onthe endpoint, on a gateway between the endpoint and an external network,or at any other physical or logical location where the firewall 1706 canmonitor and control network traffic to and from the endpoint.

In general, a memory for a physical or virtual endpoint may be dividedinto at least two distinct areas: the kernel space 1702 and the userspace 1704. The user space 1704 is where normal user processes run, suchas user applications, database management systems, communicationssoftware, and so forth. Processes executing in the user space 1704 willtypically have access to limited areas of memory that specificallyexclude the kernel space 1702. The kernel, by contrast, executes in thekernel space 1702 and has access to all of the memory for a device, aswell as access to machine hardware, hardware interfaces, and the like.In general, the kernel manages applications running in the user space1704, and ensures that they do not interfere with, or conflict with, oneanother. In this architecture, the processes executing in the user space1704 have very limited access to the kernel space 1702, e.g., throughsystem calls that send an interrupt from the user space 1704 to thekernel space 1702 for handling. By installing the endpoint defensedriver 1750 in the kernel space 1702, e.g., before the user space 1704is populated with executable applications and the like, improved controlof endpoint security can be obtained, for example, by managinginterprocess communications and modifications to files or applicationsfrom a secure component within the kernel space 1702 that is protectedagainst manipulation by malicious processes executing in the user space1704.

The antivirus system 1710 may operate to detect malware executing on theendpoint 1702. This may, for example, include any suitable combinationof static detection (e.g., based on signatures or othercharacteristics), behavioral analysis, host intrusion protection, and soforth. More generally, the antivirus system 1710, which may include anynumber and combination of malware detection components, each of whichmay communicate with the endpoint defense driver 1750, e.g., to verifythe identity or status of processes and files as described in greaterdetail below.

The network management system 1720 may mediate network communicationsbetween processes executing in the user space 1704 and externalresources available through the network 1708. This may, for example,include monitoring network traffic to and from the endpoint, labelingnetwork traffic flows, and so forth. This may also or instead includecontrolling the firewall 1706, e.g., by configuring the firewall 1706according to actual or potential threats, detection of endpointcompromise, or the like, or receiving a request from the firewall 1706when a network traffic flow is unlabeled. In another aspect, the networkmanagement system 1720 may create a periodic heartbeat that securelycommunicates health or security state information to a remote monitoringfacility such as a threat management facility, e.g., through thefirewall 1706. The heartbeat, which may be encrypted or signed, may alsoor instead be communicated in response to a query from the remotemonitoring facility such as a general query about endpoint status or aspecific query for health information, scanning status, applicationinformation, certificate information, and so forth. Components of thenetwork management system 1720 such as the heartbeat service maycommunicate with the endpoint defense driver 1750 as necessary orhelpful to verify health status, access signatures or certificates,provide authenticated machine or application identifiers for networktraffic flows, and so forth.

The file protection system 1730 may generally operate to monitor filesand file usage on the endpoint, and to ensure that files are safe (e.g.,free of malware) and secure on the endpoint, as well as to controldecryption of and access to files through a file system extension or thelike. A variety of techniques may be used by the file protection system1730. In one aspect, this may include a scanner for local filereputation based on, e.g., local signature or hash caches, filemetadata, file header information, and so forth. This may also orinstead include a machine learning antivirus system using a modeltrained to identify malicious components within executables and otherfiles. The file protection system 1730 may also or instead include aglobal reputation service that obtains information from files andaccesses a remote resource such as the reputation service 1732 todetermine a corresponding reputation. A variety of other protectionsystems may also or instead be employed. For example, the fileprotection system 1730 may include a data collector that gathers streamsof event data, which may be communicated to a remote serviceperiodically or in response to a malware detection or other indicationof compromise for the endpoint. The file protection system 1730 may alsoinclude a root cause analysis system that analyzes event streams fromthe data collector to either detect malware by matching a sequence ofevents to a previously identified threat, or to prospectively developdetection tools for newly emerging threats. In general, components ofthe file protection system 1730 may communicate with the endpointdefense driver 1750 as necessary or helpful to monitor or control filecontent, file modifications, and so forth.

The remediation system 1740 may provide any suitable remediation toolsfor addressing malware or potential malware upon detection. This may,for example, include tools for quarantine, sandboxing, cleaning,vaccination, repair, uninstall, endpoint isolation, and so forth. Theremediation tools in the remediation system 1740 may usefullycommunicate with the endpoint defense driver 1750, e.g., to authenticateand authorize remediation tools, prevent file tampering, and so forth.

The endpoint defense driver 1750 may in general be a low-level driverinstalled in the kernel space 1702 early in an operating systeminstallation or boot process, e.g., prior to population of the userspace 1704 with user applications and the like. In this manner, theendpoint defense driver 1750 may be configured to instrument operationof the endpoint so that file operations and interprocess communicationsare passed through the kernel where the endpoint defense driver 1750 canenforce restrictions on file modifications, code injections and soforth. Certain related techniques are described, for example, in U.S.Pat. No. 8,950,007 issued on Feb. 3, 2015, the entire contents of whichare hereby incorporated by reference. The platform described hereinextends upon these techniques with additional security measures andinstrumentation techniques that can be usefully deployed from the kernelspace 1702 to enhance endpoint protection. For example, while fileoperations such as read, write, create, delete, rename, and so forth canbe readily monitored within the kernel space 1702 using file systemfilters, certain operating systems are configured to supportinterprocess communications that bypass the file system, such as datacopies, pipes, remote procedure calls, and so forth. In order to securethese communications and ensure that protected computing objects are notmodified, each process can be configured to communicate with otherprocesses using a system call that passes through the kernel space 1702,and in particular the endpoint defense driver 1750, in order to ensurethat the endpoint defense driver 1750 has an opportunity to regulateprocess activity in a manner consistent with a list of protected objectsmaintained in the protection cache 1754 as described herein.

The endpoint defense driver 1750 may maintain a number of caches toassist in monitoring the endpoint, such as a process cache 1752, aprotection cache 1754 (also referred to as a protected object cache ortamper protection cache), and a file cache 1756.

In general, the process cache 1752 may store information related to aprocess such as the application name, application family (e.g., a vendoror commonly used name for a suite of software including installers,libraries, supporting applications or processes, and so forth), anapplication path, and an application category (such as any of thecategories or types described herein). By loading the endpoint defensedriver 1750 early in a boot sequence or operating system installation,each new process can be detected and corresponding information can beloaded into the process cache 1752. This can provide a shadow table ofprocesses that mirrors information maintained in an operating systemprocess cache, while advantageously facilitating security-relatedenhancements to the process cache. For example, additional processmetadata can be included and tracked beyond what might otherwise beprovided by the operating system process table. Each new process can beinstrumented with a callback through the kernel space 1702 (and theendpoint defense driver 1750, specifically) so that rules onmodifications, network usage, security, and so forth can be enforced inthe secure kernel space 1702 based on, e.g., process informationmaintained in the process cache 1752 and the protection cache 1754described herein. As another advantage, the shadow table can persistprocess information even after a process is terminated (at which pointthe operating system process cache may remove the process identifier andrelated information). This persisted information can be useful, e.g.,for the detection or identification of malware, particularly where themalware employs a long and relatively complex chain of events andprocesses to obfuscate malicious activity.

While the description herein may emphasize tracking of process-levelmetadata, it will be appreciated that process data may usefully begathered, stored, transmitted, and otherwise used at a variety ofdifferent levels of granularity. Thus, for example, process data mayinclude information about a machine, machine name, machine address,network interface MAC address, partition, network, subnet or otherlogical or physical location where a process is executing, or any othercontext for a particular process. The process data may also or insteadinclude data at a more granular level than the particular process. Forexample, the process cache may usefully store information about one ormore threads in a process, or images or other data loaded into eachprocess. This information may, for example, be usefully provided to adata recorder or firewall where more fine-grained information aboutprocesses is necessary or helpful. By way of non-limiting example, someoperating systems will concurrently execute a number of differentprocesses having the same name (e.g., “svchost”). In order to monitor,detect, and remediate in this context, additional process informationmay be helpful.

The protection cache 1754 may support tamper protection tools. Inparticular, the endpoint defense driver 1750 may initially load a listof protected objects such as registry keys, services, applications,directories, and so forth. The endpoint defense driver 1750 mayproactively prevent any changes to these protected objects (whichinclude the protection cache 1754 itself), or may prevent any changesexcept by other protected objects identified in the protection cache1754. The protection cache 1754 may also include a digital signature foran initial file or cache of protected objects, and the public key forverifying the signature can be encoded into the binary for the endpointdefense driver 1750 or other kernel driver for verification of theinitial protected object list. This provides a chain of trust that canbe authenticated back to the source of the initial protected object listand the binary for the kernel driver. The owner of the private key,e.g., an administrator or the like at a threat management facility orother remote management resource, can propagate and persist changes tothe protected object list, but local changes are not readily affectedfrom the endpoint (unless the private key is somehow available to theendpoint).

The file cache 1756 may contain information about files on the endpoint,and may store any useful information including information aboutprotection status, modifications, local or global reputation, and soforth.

The endpoint defense driver 1750 can use these caches in a variety ofways to support secure operation of an endpoint protection system. Forexample, as noted above, by directing interprocess communications andfile system operations through the endpoint defense driver 1750,security and tamper prevention can be ensured on an object-by-objectbasis, e.g., for registry keys, files, processes, directories, and soforth. The endpoint defense driver 1750 can also set and retrieveinformation about new processes as they are launched in the user space1704.

Each time a new object is loaded into memory in the user space 1704, theendpoint defense driver 1750 can intercept that action and check thesource or target object against items in the process cache 1752,protection cache 1754, and/or file cache 1756. If the object is notrecognized, then the file or executable may be scanned, e.g., using anyof the local or global reputation tools, antivirus scanners, and soforth described herein. Thus, in one aspect, the endpoint defense driver1750 may communicate with other security components by requesting (andstoring) security and reputation information, or any other usefulinformation, in one of the caches. This information may also be used tocontrol handling of the object(s) by the security components on theendpoint. Thus, for example, if a file is not recognized, but it wassigned by a reputable vendor and has not been modified, then it can beassumed to be safe, and the endpoint defense driver 1750 can permitexecution or process-to-process interactions accordingly. Similarly, ifan executable is unrecognized and no signature or reputation informationis available, the endpoint defense driver 1750 may request that theexecutable be launched in a sandbox, or may send information about theabsence of reputation to the security components, which may, e.g., applyan enterprise policy or other rules or policies managed in the userspace 1704 to select a suitable action.

More generally, any security-related application or process executing inthe user space 1704 may usefully benefit from information available fromthe kernel through the endpoint defense driver 1750. And similarly, theendpoint defense driver 1750 may usefully receive information from, andprovide information to, any of the security components described above.In order to facilitate comprehensive, tamper-proof integrity to objectson the endpoint, the endpoint may be implemented so that some or all ofthe operating system functions such as file system operations orinterprocess communications are instrumented to pass through the kernelspace 1702, and more specifically through the endpoint defense driver1750, so that the endpoint defense driver 1750 can adequately protectthe integrity and operation of the security components executing in theuser space 1704 on the endpoint.

As a further advantage, a kernel-level driver can provide an additionallayer of information or insight useful in threat identification. Acombination of information available from the kernel, available from theendpoint, and available from an external threat management facility maybe used together to identify a threat, or to provide a strongerinference of the presence of a threat. Thus, for example, where a newapplication that is not protected (based on the protection cache in thekernel) installs without an uninstall routine (from registry informationor other endpoint information), and the new application is not globallyknown (e.g., by a remote threat management facility) and communicateswith a suspicious geography or domain (e.g., based on a firewall orgateway that couples the endpoint to an external network), thisinformation from various resources may be used collectively to determinea high likelihood that the new application is malicious, and remedialaction may be initiated even in the absence of a specific threatidentification.

In one aspect, a trust authority 1760 may be provided, e.g., to serve aroot for keys used to secure the protection cache 1754. Thus, forexample, the trust authority 1760 may maintain a suitable public/privatekey pair, and may use the private key to digitally sign the protectioncache 1754, or individual computer objects or groups of computer objectslisted in the protection cache 1754. In this manner, the protectioncache 1754 may be secured against tampering so that, when the endpointdefense driver 1750 seeks to verify a protected status of a computerobject such as a process, application, file, directory, registry key, orthe like that is identified in the protection cache 1754, the endpointdefense driver 1750 can use a corresponding public key, which may bepublished in an accessible location by the trust authority 1760, codedinto the binary for the endpoint defense driver 1750, or otherwise madeavailable for use in verifying a digital signature or otherwiseverifying the authenticity of the protection cache 1754 and/or theinformation therein. The trust authority 1760 may be maintained in anysuitable location that permits verification with reference to anauthority external to the operating system of the endpoint, or externalto the endpoint. Thus, for example, the trust authority 1760 may bemaintained on a gateway for an enterprise network, a threat managementfacility for an enterprise network, or at a remote, third-party trustauthority, root key authority, or the like that is accessible to theendpoint through a data network.

The endpoint may also usefully include a data recorder 1770. In general,the data recorder 1770 may monitor causal relationships among computingobjects on the endpoint and record sequences of events that causallyrelate such objects. These events and relationships may be stored,abstracted, filtered, or otherwise processed as appropriate for anintended use. In one aspect, the data recorder 1770 may usefully obtaininformation from the process cache 1752, protection cache 1754, and filecache 1756, or more generally from the endpoint defense driver 1750,that describes activities, events, relationships, and the like amongcomputing objects on the endpoint. Useful data recorders are described,by way of non-limiting examples, in U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/130,244, incorporated by reference herein in its entirety. It will beappreciated that, while illustrated as operating within the user space1704, the data recorder 1770 may also or instead reside on an externalservice such as a threat management facility, which may independentlyreceive a data stream from the endpoint defense driver 1750, a datarecorder agent executing on the endpoint, or any other endpointcomponent or combination of components.

FIG. 18 shows a method for securing interprocess communications using akernel-based endpoint protection driver. In general, interprocesscommunications may be secured using the architecture described herein bypassing interprocess communications through a secure, kernel-basedendpoint protection driver to ensure, e.g., that an unprotected orunknown process does not pass data to a protected process. While theforegoing description emphasizes interprocess communications between twoprocesses executing in the user space on the endpoint, it will beunderstood that the principles of the disclosed technique are not soconfined, and the following techniques may also be used in a variety ofadditional contexts, such as to protect communications among kernelspace processes and user space processes, as well as processes executingexternally from the endpoint, e.g., on other endpoints connected in acommunicating relationship through a data network.

As shown in step 1802, the method 1800 may include storing a tamperprotection cache such as the protection cache described above in amemory of an endpoint. The tamper protection cache may, for example, bestored in the kernel space so that the tamper protection cache is notgenerally exposed to the user space where user processes are executing.In general, the tamper protection cache may identify protected computerobjects such as processes, directories, registry keys, services,applications, network resources, and so forth, and may either implicitly(e.g., by listing in the cache) or explicitly (e.g., with metadata orthe like) specify a protected status or other information relevant touse or the corresponding object(s). As noted above, the tamperprotection cache may specifically identify protected processes or thelike for protection when executing in the user space

The tamper protection cache may be secured using a number of techniques.For example, the tamper protection cache may be encrypted, or may bedigitally signed, e.g., by encrypting a hash of the cache contents usinga private key of a key pair and storing the resulting signature directlyin the tamper protection cache. The corresponding public key of the keypair may be encoded into the binary of the endpoint protection driver,or may be published in a remote, publicly accessible location, and maybe used to verify the authenticity of the tamper protection cache. Inthis manner, the tamper protection cache may provide a root of trustexternal to the tamper protection cache, the kernel, the operatingsystem of the kernel, and/or the endpoint.

As shown in step 1804, the method 1800 may include loading an endpointprotection driver such as any of the protection drivers describedherein. This preferably occurs early in the boot process for an endpointso that the endpoint protection driver can observe processes as they areloaded into the user space, which usefully permits the construction of areliable process cache and enforcement of tamper protection rules fromthe tamper protection cache before user processes begin executing on theendpoint. Thus, in one aspect, the method may include loading theendpoint protection driver before launching processes in the user spaceof the endpoint. In general, this may occur before or after storing thetamper protection cache, provided that both the tamper protection cacheand the endpoint protection driver are available in the kernel duringexecution of processes in the user space.

As shown in step 1806, the method 1800 may include updating the tamperprotection cache. The tamper protection cache may be periodicallyupdated or modified using a variety of techniques. For example, areplacement cache may be downloaded and stored in place of the currenttamper protection cache. In another aspect, the tamper protection cachemay be modified, e.g., with the addition or removal of protectedobjects, and a new signature may be created for the modified cached. Inanother aspect, two or more separate tamper protection caches may beprovided in order to incrementally control additions to or removals fromthe list of protected computing objects. The list(s) of protectedobjects may also be hierarchically arranged in any number of ways, suchas by providing separate caches for each type of object (e.g., one cachefor registry keys, one cache for directories, etc.) or separate cachesfor different users (one for a guest, one for an endpoint administrator,one for an enterprise administrator, etc.) or different types of users.Whether stored as an integral cache or as a number of incrementallyaccumulated or hierarchically partitioned caches (or some combination ofthese), the cache(s) may be secured with reference to an external trustauthority such as by digitally signing the cache(s) (or morespecifically, hashes thereof) with an appropriate private key.

As shown in step 1808, the process may include storing a process cachesuch as any of the process caches described herein in the kernel spaceon the endpoint. The cache may generally include process properties forone or more processes executing on the endpoint including, whereappropriate, a protected status of the process(es) based uponcorresponding entries in the tamper protection cache, along with anyother potentially useful information such as a process identifier thatuniquely identifies the process on the endpoint, directory or other pathor source information, usage statistics, user information (e.g., system,machine, human, etc.), size, status, launch time, and so forth. Theprocess cache may also or instead include other source information for aprocess such as an application, an application family, an applicationpath, an application class, and so forth. In general, the endpointprotection driver may add, update, or remove processes or processinformation from the process cache as the status or usage of processeschanges over time on the endpoint.

As shown in step 1810, the method 1800 may include monitoring theprocess cache, for example with the endpoint protection driver in thekernel. In one aspect, processes executing on the endpoint and/or storedin the process cache may include one of the protected processesidentified in the tamper protection cache. In this case, monitoring mayinclude monitoring for potentially malicious activity. For example,monitoring may further include detecting a change to one of the processproperties, e.g., one of the protected processes, with the endpointprotection driver and evaluating the change for possible maliciousactivity. The endpoint protection driver may, where appropriate,automatically change the property to a previous value where it appearsthat the change (such as a change from a protected to an unprotectedstatus) was not initiated by an authorized or trusted user, or by aprotected process identified in the tamper protection cache.

In one aspect, the process cache provides a persistent record ofprocesses that are executing or that have executed on the endpoint. Thiscan usefully extend an operating system process cache by permittinghistorical inquiries into the process cache of the endpoint protectiondriver, e.g. for security or other forensic purposes, even after aprocess has been deleted from the operating system process cache and/orterminated in the user space. Thus, for example, upon detection ofmalware, a history of processes may usefully be investigated based on aquery from any suitably authorized source through the endpointprotection driver to the process cache. To facilitate this type ofextended investigation, the method 1800 may usefully include retainingprocess data for a process in the process cache in the kernel spaceafter the process is terminated in the user space. The method 1800 mayalso or instead include providing the process data for a process fromthe process cache to an external security resource in response to aquery from the external security resource. This latter step may bepredicated on the receipt or confirmation of suitable credentials orsignatures from the external security resource, e.g., in order to ensurea chain of trust to the external trust authority as appropriate.

As shown in step 1812, the method 1800 may include monitoring processesexecuting on the endpoint, such as processes in the user space of theendpoint, with an endpoint protection driver executing in the kernelspace.

As shown in step 1814, the method 1800 may include directinginterprocess communications through the endpoint protection driver inthe kernel. This may, for example, include directing an interprocesscommunication from a first process in the user space to a second processin the user space through the endpoint protection driver. As notedabove, this may also or instead include interprocess communicationsamong user space processes and kernel space processes, such as aninterprocess communication from a kernel space process to a user spaceprocess, from a user space process to a kernel space process, from akernel space process to a kernel space process, or any combination ofthese. Thus, for example, at least one of the processes may be executingin the user space of the memory on the endpoint. One of the processesmay also or instead be executing in the kernel space of the memory onthe endpoint.

As shown in step 1816, the method 1800 may include managing theinterprocess communications that are directed through the endpointprotection driver. This may include conditionally managing aninterprocess communication according to a protected status of each ofthe first process (providing the communication) and the second process(receiving the communication) in the tamper protection cache. Forexample, when the second process is identified as protected in thetamper protection cache, conditionally managing communications mayinclude conditionally permitting the first process to provide data tothe second process only when the first process is also one of theprotected processes identified in the tamper protection cache. Moregenerally, any type of conditional management in which an interprocesscommunication is conditionally allowed or prohibited may usefully beemployed.

As described above, the tamper protection cache may identify one or moreprotected computing objects selected from a group consisting of adirectory, a registry key, and a file. The tamper protection cache mayusefully be managed in a number of ways to support secure interprocesscommunications as contemplated herein.

For example, the tamper protection cache may be digitally signed using aprivate key of a key pair, and a public key of the key pair may beencoded into a binary representation of the endpoint protection driverstored in the kernel space so that the endpoint protection driver canverify the cache origin or contents as needed. The public key may alsoor instead be made available in another memory location on the endpointor a remote location supported by a suitable trust authority. The tamperprotection cache may also or instead be digitally signed with asignature containing a signed hash of the tamper protection cache. Inone aspect, the trust authority providing the key pair may include aremote threat management facility that manages keys for use by theendpoint protection driver and/or tamper protection cache.

In another aspect, the tamper protection cache may include two or moreindependent data stores identifying different protected objects, each ofthe two or more independent data stores separately controllable by atrust authority external to the operating system. In this manner,independent objects, related objects, or specific types or groups ofobjects may be managed together within a single sub-cache. The cache maybe hierarchically managed, e.g., as a number of different caches or witha number of different keys, to support independent management ofdifferent object types, functions, and so forth.

According to the foregoing, there is also contemplated herein a systemincluding an endpoint with an endpoint protection driver and a tamperprotection cache in the kernel space for use in securing, e.g.,interprocess communications and other functions of the endpoint. Thesystem may generally include an endpoint containing a memory, andoperating system executing on the endpoint, a tamper protection cachestored in the kernel space of the memory, and an endpoint protectiondriver executing in the kernel space of the memory.

The operating system may divide the memory into a kernel space foroperating system functions and a user space for execution of userprograms. The tamper protection cache may be digitally signed by a trustauthority external to the operating system, and may identify one or moreprotected processes (or more generally, computing objects) forprotection when executing in the user space. The endpoint protectiondriver may be configured to monitor execution of processes in the userspace and to detect an interprocess communication from a first processin the user space to a second process in the user space, the endpointprotection driver further configured to control the interprocesscommunication by, when the second process is a first one of theprotected processes identified in the tamper protection cache,conditionally permitting the first process to provide data to the secondprocess only when the first process is a second one of the protectedprocesses identified in the tamper protection cache.

FIG. 19 shows a method for controlling a firewall. This may includeusing any of the systems or methods described herein, such as thoseusing the kernel driver and caches described above, e.g., on an endpointwith an operating system that supports a kernel space and a user space.A firewall may generally be used to control network communication to andfrom an endpoint. For example, local network access may be permitted orrestricted, Internet access may be permitted or restricted, orcommunication with certain resources, applications, addresses, ports,and so forth may be permitted or restricted. In some cases,communication may be permitted with added or reduced security measurestaken, such as increased scrutiny of network streams or decryption ofencrypted communications or files. Bandwidth may be increased ordecreased generally or for certain devices, resources, applications,addresses, or ports. These and any other suitable firewall controltechniques may be used to manage network traffic for an endpoint. Thefollowing method 1900 provides further advantages by exposing processand application information from the kernel to a firewall along withnetwork traffic in order to facilitate finer-grained and more accurateimplementation of rules and application of enterprise network policies.

As shown in step 1902, the method 1900 may include storing a processcache such as any of the process caches described herein. The processcache may, for example, store process data for a process executing inthe user space of an operating system, including process data such as aname, a path, and a type for each process. While the followingdescription focuses on a single process, it will be understood that theprocess cache may usefully store information for each of a number ofprocesses, any or all of which may be monitored and used to manage afirewall as contemplated herein.

As shown in step 1904, the method 1900 may include monitoring networktraffic, such as by monitoring network traffic to and from the endpointfrom a kernel driver executing in the kernel space of the operatingsystem. This may include any suitable techniques for intercepting orotherwise registering hooks or the like for network traffic. Forexample, this may include using the Windows Filtering Platform, or anyother suitable network instrumentation to tie into packet processing anda filtering pipeline for the network stack. In this manner, a filterengine may be deployed to implement actions for network traffic on aper-application, per-service, per process or other basis.

As shown in step 1906, the method 1900 may include detecting a networkcommunication between a process (or one of a number of processes) and aremote resource with the kernel driver, such as by receiving anotification from any of the monitoring systems described above.

As shown in step 1908, the method 1900 may include generating a processidentifier for the process such as a unique identifier that uniquelyidentifies the process to the firewall. In general, a unique identifiermay be created for a process and stored, e.g., in the process cache orother location accessible to the kernel driver. This may include aprocess identifier provided by the operating system, or any otheridentifier that can be used, e.g., within the kernel or at the firewallto distinguish the process from other processes executing on theendpoint. The first time that process data is transmitted to thefirewall (or any other local or remote location or resource), theprocess identifier may accompany the communication and be used touniquely identify the process. In one aspect, this may include machineinformation that, together with the process identifier, provides aglobally unique identifier for the process. Thus, for example, bycombining a numeric process identifier with a MAC address, IP address,or other identifier for a machine and/or machine hardware, two differentprocesses may be distinguished from one another even where, for example,they receive the same process identifier from the operating systems ontwo different endpoints. For subsequent network communications detectedas described above, the kernel driver may send the process identifierinstead of the corresponding process data, and a recipient such as afirewall may use the process identifier as an index to store andretrieve related process data.

As shown in step 1910, the method 1900 may include retrieving processdata for the process from the process cache. In general, this mayinclude any information available in the process cache and useful formanaging a firewall as contemplated herein. Thus, for example, theprocess data may include a path for the process that identifies alocation in a file system of the endpoint for executable code of theprocess or otherwise provides location information for the process orsource code for the process. The process data may also or insteadinclude a type for the process such as any of the types describedherein. The type may be explicitly provided by the process or a local orremote tool, or the type may be implicitly determined based on, e.g.,process behavior, process location, communication protocols used by theprocess, and so forth. The process data may also or instead include anapplication class or other metadata that describes or categorizes theprocess. Any of the foregoing process data may be accessed with thekernel driver or any other suitable kernel process and used in themethod 1900 described herein.

In one aspect, the process data may also or instead include the processidentifier which may, for example, be used by a recipient to index otherprocess data. Thus, for example, an initial communication to a firewallmay include the process identifier and related process data, whilesubsequent communications to the firewall may simply include the processidentifier, which can be used by the firewall to locally retrieve anyrelated process data as necessary or helpful in applying firewall rulesor otherwise managing network communications.

As shown in step 1912, the method may include transmitting the processdata to a firewall for the endpoint. This may, for example, includetransmitting the name, the path, and the type for the process (or one ofa number of processes) to a firewall for the endpoint. In this context,the process data may also or instead include the process identifier,which may be used by the firewall (or other network resource) toidentify network traffic from the process. Thus, after the full processdata and process identifier have been transmitted, the method mayinclude transmitting the unique identifier to the firewall instead ofthe process data with one or more subsequent network communications fromthe process.

As shown in step 1914, the method 1900 may include identifying theprocess associated with the network communication at the firewall. Wherethe process data includes a name or other identifier, this informationmay be used to identify the process. Where the network communication isa subsequent network communication (e.g., after an initial communicationthat contains a process identifier), the process data may include orconsist of a process identifier that can be used at the firewall toretrieve any related, previously-transmitted process data for use inapplying firewall rules. In either case, suitable process informationmay be determined at the firewall based on the identity of the processand related process data for the firewall to apply an appropriatefirewall rule.

As shown in step 1916, the method 1900 may include applying a firewallrule to the network communication based on the process data. Where aprocess identifier has been previously transmitted along with otherprocess data for indexing at the firewall, the method 1900 may generallyinclude identifying the process at the firewall based upon the uniqueidentifier and applying a corresponding firewall rule for the process.In general, the firewall may include any suitable local or remotefirewall, and/or any suitable hardware or software firewall, as well ascombinations of the foregoing. For example, the firewall may include aremote firewall coupled to the endpoint through a data network. Thefirewall may also or instead include a local firewall executing on theendpoint. In another aspect, the firewall may include a remote firewallat a gateway, and transmitting the name, the path, and the type mayinclude transmitting a secure heartbeat to the remote firewall to encodethe process data in a verifiable and/or secure manner.

According to the foregoing, there is also disclosed herein a systemincluding an endpoint having a memory and an operating system thatorganizes the memory into a user space and a kernel space. The systemmay include a firewall disposed between the endpoint and a data network,such as a firewall configured to control traffic between the endpointand the data network. The system may include a process cache in thekernel space of the operating system. The process cache may generallystore process data for a process executing in the user space. The systemmay also include a kernel driver in the kernel space of the operatingsystem. The kernel driver may be configured to monitor network trafficto and from the endpoint, to detect a network communication between theprocess and a remote resource, to retrieve the process data for theprocess, and to transmit the process data to the firewall.

The process cache may store process data for each of a plurality ofprocesses executing in the user space. The process day may include apath for the process that identifies a location in a file system of theendpoint for executable code of the process. The process data may alsoor instead include a name for the process. The process data may also orinstead include an application class for the process.

FIG. 20 shows a method for secure management of processes executing onan endpoint. This may include using any of the systems or methodsdescribed herein, such as those using the kernel driver and cachesdescribed above. In general, by securing a tamper protection cache asdescribed herein, a variety of rules may be used to conditionallyauthorize subsequent changes to secured (and unsecured) processes orother computing objects.

As shown in step 2002, a method 2000 for managing properties of processon an endpoint may include storing a process cache in a kernel space ofan operating system on the endpoint, such as an of the process cachesdescribed herein. In general, the endpoint may have a memory thatincludes the kernel space and a user space, and the process cache maystore at least one property for a first process that is executing in theuser space.

As shown in step 2004, the method 2000 may include storing a tamperprotection cache in the kernel space, such as any of the tamperprotection caches (or simply a “protection cache”) described herein. Ingeneral, the tamper protection cache may identify one or more protectedcomputing objects on the endpoint. As described above, the tamperprotection cache may be secured by a trust authority external to theoperating system. The tamper protection cache may also or instead besecured with a digital signature from a remote trust authority.

As shown in step 2006, the method 2000 may include monitoring changes tothe process cache with a kernel driver. This may include instrumentingthe process cache in any suitable manner to detect changes thereto,e.g., by processes executing on the endpoint.

As shown in step 2008, the method 2000 may include detecting, with thekernel driver (or any other suitable computing resource), a requestedchange from a second process executing on the endpoint to the at leastone property of the first process. The requested change may be anychange to process properties, attributes, or the like. For example, therequested change may be a change to process information stored inregistry keys or the like. The requested change may be change to processprivileges, a process user, a process directory, or any otherattributes, properties, and so forth. In one aspect, the first processreceiving the requested change may be a software firewall executing onthe endpoint. This technique may advantageously be employed to controlmodifications to a firewall for an endpoint, and may proactively preventchanges or updates, except by protected processes with a verified originor suitable permissions from the external trust authority. Thus, even asystem or administrative user on the endpoint may usefully be preventedfrom changing certain processes or objects. At the same time, a remoteadministrative location with suitable credentials may control changes to(and more generally, access to) protected objects through the kerneldriver and tamper protection cache.

As shown in step 2010, the method 2000 may include conditionallyapproving the requested change from the kernel driver based on asecurity rule and the tamper protection cache. This contemplates a widevariety of possible authorization rules. In one aspect, protectedprocesses may be permitted to make changes to any other processes,protected or otherwise. Thus, for example, conditionally approving therequested change may include approving the requested change when thesecond process is identified as one of the protected objects in thetamper protection cache. In another aspect, the requesting process maybe checked whenever a change to a protected process is requested. Inthis scenario, conditionally approving the requested change may include,when the first process is identified as one of the protected computingobjects in the tamper protection cache, approving the requested changeonly when the second process is also identified as one of the protectedobjects in the tamper protection cache. In another aspect, unprotectedprocesses may change properties of other unprotected processes in theordinary manner. Thus, conditionally approving the requested change mayinclude approving or allowing the requested change when neither thefirst process nor the second process is identified as one of theprotected objects in the tamper protection cache.

Changes or change requests may also be implemented and approved in avariety of ways. For example, conditionally approving the requestedchange may include detecting an actual change to one or more properties,and then reversing the requested change after the requested change isentered into the process cache or other suitable location. Where objectproperties are stored in registry keys, the requested changes may bedirected to the registry. Thus, for example, the requested change mayinclude a change to a registry key associated with the first process. Asnoted above, the registry key may be identified as one of the protectedobjects in the tamper protection cache, and may be subject to any of thechange approval rules described above, or any other suitable conditionalrules for implementing a requested change to object properties.

Similarly, directory locations may be protected computing objects. Whena process executes from a directory location identified as one of theprotected objects in the tamper protection cache, the process may besubject to suitable conditional authorization rules. For example, whenthe process is requesting a change, the process may be treated as aprotected process and granted corresponding change capabilities.Conversely, when the process is receiving a request for a change, theprocess may be treated as a protected process and change requests may beapproved or rejected based on whether the requesting process has anequivalent protected status.

According to the foregoing, a system described herein includes anendpoint having a memory and an operating system that organizes thememory into a user space and a kernel space. The system may include aprocess cache such as any of the process caches described herein storedin the kernel space of the operating system, the process cache storingat least one property for a first process executing in the user space.The system may include a tamper protection cache such as any of theprotection caches described herein stored in the kernel space of theoperating system, the tamper protection cache identifying one or moreprotected computing objects on the endpoint. The system may also includea kernel driver in the kernel space of the operating system, such as anyof the kernel drivers described herein.

The kernel driver may be configured to monitor changes to the processcache, to detect a requested change by a second process executing on theendpoint to the at least one property of the first process, and toconditionally approve the requested change from the kernel driver basedon a security rule and the tamper protection cache, such as by using anyof the conditional rules described above. For example, the kernel drivermay be configured to undo an unapproved change by reversing therequested change after the requested change is entered into the processcache. The kernel driver may be configured to conditionally approve therequested change by approving the requested change only when the secondprocess is identified as one of the protected objects in the tamperprotection cache. The kernel driver may be configured to conditionallyapprove the requested change by approving the requested change whenneither the first process nor the second process is identified as one ofthe protected objects in the tamper protection cache. The kernel drivermay be configured to conditionally approve the requested change when thefirst process is identified as one of the protected computing objects inthe tamper protection cache by approving the requested change only whenthe second process is also identified as one of the protected objects inthe tamper protection cache.

FIG. 21 shows a method for securing a firewall configuration on anendpoint. In general, the configuration of the firewall on an endpoint,or for an endpoint, may be controlled and protected against maliciousreconfiguration by treating the firewall as a protected process (orother object) and applying suitable change rules such as those describedabove to prevent modifications by unprotected processes. This mayinclude using any of the systems or methods described herein, such asthose using the kernel driver and tamper protection cache describedabove, in combination with any suitable rules for conditionallyauthorizing or permitting changes to properties or other configurationinformation for a firewall.

As shown in step 2102, the method 2100 may include storing a processcache. For example, as described above this may include storing aprocess cache in a kernel space of an operating system on an endpointthat has a memory including the kernel space and a user space. Theprocess cache may store configuration information for a firewall such asat least one property for a software firewall process executing in theuser space on the endpoint. Any number of properties for the firewallmay usefully be controlled in this manner including lists of permittednetwork address, prohibited network addresses, permitted applications(and/or associated ports), prohibited applications (and/or associatedports), bandwidth restrictions, data usage quotas, and so forth. Moregenerally, any property for a firewall may usefully be controlled usingthe techniques described herein.

As shown in step 2104, the method 2100 may include storing a tamperprotection cache in the kernel space, such as any of the tamperprotection caches (or simply a “protection cache”) described herein. Ingeneral, the tamper protection cache may identify one or more protectedcomputing objects on the endpoint. In the context of a firewall, the oneof the protected computing objects may include a software firewallexecuting on the endpoint. In general, this configuration can preventunauthorized changes to the software firewall properties stored in, ortracked in, the process cache. In another aspect, the software firewallproperties may be stored directly in the tamper protection cache so thateach property is individually protected against tampering by unprotectedprocesses.

As described above, the tamper protection cache may be secured by atrust authority in various ways. For example, the tamper protectioncache may be secured by a trust authority external to the operatingsystem or a trust authority external to the endpoint. The trustauthority may include a remote trust authority maintained by a threatmanagement facility for an enterprise network that includes the endpointor a remote third-party trust authority. The tamper protection cache mayalso or instead be secured with a digital signature from a remote trustauthority.

As shown in step 2106, the method 2100 may include receiving a requestfor a change to a configuration of the software firewall process from asecond process. This may be detected, e.g., with a kernel driver such asthe endpoint protection driver described above, or any other suitableinstrumentation on the endpoint. In general, the form of the request maydepend on the type of firewall information and the manner in which therelevant firewall properties are stored. For example, the configurationmay be stored in the process cache or in the tamper protection cache, orin some combination of these or in some other location. For example, theconfiguration of the software firewall process may be stored in one ormore registry keys for the endpoint, which may be contained, forexample, in the one or more protected computing objects stored in thetamper protection cache.

The configuration may specify one or more firewall rules. For example,the configuration may identify permitted or prohibited networkaddresses, or the configuration may identify permitted or prohibitedapplications executing on the endpoint that are correspondinglypermitted to communicate through the firewall or prohibited fromcommunicating through the firewall. In one aspect, the change to theconfiguration may include a request to allow traffic from an applicationexecuting on the endpoint, such as when a trusted network application isinstalled or executed on the endpoint, or when a new network policy isdeployed within an enterprise network by a policy management module of athreat management facility. The change to the configuration may also orinstead include a request to prevent traffic from an applicationexecuting on the endpoint, or to prevent all traffic from the endpoint,e.g., when a compromise is detected on the endpoint by a local securityagent or a remote threat management facility.

Similarly, the second process that requests the configuration change inthe firewall may originate from various locations. For example, thesecond process may be a system process on an endpoint controlled by anoperating system, or a process used by a local security agent or thelike. In another aspect, the second process may be a user process, e.g.,for manual control of a firewall configuration, and correspondingchanges may be conditionally permitted or prohibited according towhether manual control of the corresponding feature is permitted, whichmay be managed by an endpoint protection driver in the kernel based on,e.g., the protected status of the user process and the firewall propertyor any other relevant information. The second process may also orinstead include a remote management tool, e.g., for threat management inan enterprise network. Thus, for example, the second process may be aremote process executing on a threat management facility for anenterprise network that includes the endpoint. In another aspect, thesecond process may evaluate an application requesting network accessthrough the software firewall process and responsively request thechange to permit the application to communicate through the firewall.The second process may also or instead coordinate firewall activityamong a number of network devices within an enterprise network. Forexample, the second process may implement a policy change for anenterprise network to permit network use by an application byconfiguring the software firewall process and a remote firewall on agateway for the enterprise network to allow traffic by the application.

As shown in step 2108, the method 2100 may include conditionallyauthorizing the firewall change request, e.g., to prevent alterations tothe firewall by unprotected or otherwise unauthorized processes. Forexample, conditionally authorizing the change request may includeconditionally authorizing the change from the kernel driver only whenthe one or more protected computing objects stored in the tamperprotection cache also includes the second process that is requesting thechange.

The request for the change may be authorized for any suitablycredentialed or protected process. Thus, for example, the request forthe change to the configuration of the software firewall process mayoriginate from a source external to the endpoint such as a remote threatmanagement facility or the like that is, e.g., configuring the firewallon the endpoint consistent with a network policy for an enterprise, orconsistent with a detected threat, policy violation, softwareinstallation, or other change in a security context for the endpointand/or the firewall. This general architecture can facilitate secure,remote management of an endpoint firewall from a threat managementfacility or other enterprise network security management infrastructure.Thus, for example, a firewall may be dynamically opened on the endpointby the remote resource when, e.g., a communications program such as avoice-over-IP or messaging program is launched. This may be based on anotification from the endpoint that the application has launched, or thedetection of corresponding network traffic at another network devicesuch as a gateway within the enterprise network. The firewall may beleft open while the application is engaging in network communications.However, if other suspicious activity is detected, such as within theapplication behavior, within the network traffic, or more generally onthe endpoint, then the firewall may be closed again for that applicationuntil more detailed analysis and/or remediation can take place. Thus, bysecuring the firewall properties using a tamper protection cache asdescribed herein, the firewall can be safely and securely managed on anongoing basis from either a local process or an external threatmanagement tool or resource.

In another aspect, a system for firewall management disclosed hereinincludes an endpoint having a memory and an operating system thatorganizes the memory into a user space for executing processes and akernel space for the operating system. The system may include a softwarefirewall process executing in the user space. The system may alsoinclude a process cache stored in the kernel space, the process cachestoring at least one property for the software firewall processexecuting in the user space. The system may also include a tamperprotection cache stored in the kernel space, the tamper protection cachesecured with reference to a trust authority external to the operatingsystem and identifying one or more protected computing objects on theendpoint, where the one or more protected computing objects includes thesoftware firewall process. The system may also include a kernel driverexecuting in the kernel space and configured to detect a request for achange to the at least one property of the software firewall processfrom a second process and to conditionally authorize the change onlywhen the one or more protected computing objects also includes thesecond process.

FIG. 22 shows a method for data recording. This may include using any ofthe systems or methods described herein, such as those using the kerneldriver and caches described above. The method 2200 may, for example, usea data recorder such as any of the data recorders described herein, anyof which may usefully receive an information stream for a kernel driveror other similar data source(s) on an endpoint.

As shown in step 2202, the method 2200 may include storing a processcache, e.g., as described above. As shown in step 2204, the method mayinclude storing a tamper protection cache, e.g., as described above.

As shown in step 2206, the method 2200 may include detecting an actionon an endpoint with a kernel driver. As generally discussed herein, thismay include detecting actions using any suitable instrumentation such ashooks, filters, system calls, and the like, or any other technique orcombination of techniques described herein.

In one aspect, the action may be a change to one of the computingobjects identified in the tamper protection cache, e.g., with a kerneldriver such as the endpoint protection driver. This permits a datarecorder to specifically monitor and record changes (or attemptedchanges, where a requested change is denied or reversed as describedabove) to protected objects in the tamper protection cache, which may beof particular interest for threat detection, policy compliance, and soforth.

As shown in step 2208, the method 2200 may include identifying a processassociated with the action, such as by identifying a first process of anumber of processes in the process cache that is associated with theaction. In this manner, the process name, process identifier, or otherinformation used to identify the process may be used to index and locateother process data for the process in the process cache.

As shown in step 2210, the method 2200 may include retrieving theprocess data for the first process from the process cache with thekernel driver. This may include any of the process data describedherein. By way of non-limiting examples, process data may include a pathfor a process, such as a path that identifies a location in a filesystem of the endpoint for executable code of the process, a path to adefault directory for the process, or any other path relevant toexecution of the process. In another aspect, the process data mayinclude a name for the process. The process data may also or insteadinclude an application class for the process, which may identify acategory, and application name, and application type, an applicationvendor, or any other useful information for uniquely or categoricallyidentifying an application. In another aspect, the process data mayinclude a reputation for the process. This may, for example, include areputation retrieved from a remote resource such as by using a signatureto retrieve reputation data from a threat management facility. This mayalso or instead include locally derived reputation information such as areputation based on a local process lookup, process behavior, and soforth.

As shown in step 2212, the method 2200 may include filtering the processdata. Filtering may occur at a variety of different levels. For example,filtering may be performed by the endpoint protection driver or otherkernel driver that sources a stream of process data, e.g., according toany local rules. Filtering may also or instead occur at the networklevel, e.g., as process data is transmitted from an endpoint to a remotedata recorder. Filtering may also or instead occur at the applicationlevel, e.g., at the point where a local or remote data recorder receivesprocess data for a series of actions.

Different types of filters may be used according to the intended use fora data stream. For example, where the process data is to be used forthreat detection, filtering may include filtering the process data basedon a relevance of the action and the first process to threat detection.Thus, for example, changes to registry keys, requests to modifyprotected computer objects, or other potentially harmful actions may betransmitted while other actions may be filtered and removed from thedata stream. Similarly, where the process data is to be used forfirewall configuration or the like, filtering may include filtering theprocess data based on a relevance of the action to firewall management.

As shown in step 2214, the method 2200 may include transmitting theprocess data to a data recorder. The data recorder may, for example, bea data recorder on a firewall, and the method may further includeapplying a network security rule at the firewall based on the processdata, e.g., to control network communications associated with the firstprocess or one or more other processes executing on the endpoint. Inthis manner, an endpoint firewall may usefully be controlled based on aset of firewall rules or properties stored in, or secured by, a tamperprotection cache and an endpoint protection driver as described herein.More generally, any process data stored in a process cache and/or tamperprotection cache may be usefully streamed to a data recorder for use insubsequent analysis, threat detection, endpoint management, and soforth.

While the data recorder may operate on a firewall, the data recorder mayalso or instead include a local data recorder on the endpoint, or aremote data recorder at a remote location such as a threat managementfacility and coupled to the endpoint through a data network.

Where the detected action is a change to a protected object, asdescribed above, transmitting may also or instead include transmittingthe change and an object identifier for one or more computing objects tothe data recorder. In this case, the transmitted information may also orinstead include a process identifier and/or process data, e.g., for aprocess that requested the change or for a process that had a propertyor other attributed affected by the change. Thus, for example, themethod 2200 may include identifying a process executing on the endpointand associated with the change, and transmitting information for theprocess to the data recorder.

As shown in step 2216, the method 2200 may include aggregating processdata for multiple endpoints. For example, this may include aggregating aplurality of actions and associated process data from a plurality ofendpoints at a threat management facility for an enterprise network thatincludes the plurality of endpoints. This aggregated data may be used ina variety of ways, such as for threat detection, forensic analysis,enterprise network management, endpoint management, firewall or gatewaymanagement, policy enforcement, and so forth. Where the action(s)include changes to computing objects identified as protected in a tamperprotection cache or the like, this may also or instead includeaggregating a plurality of changes and object identifiers from aplurality of endpoints at a threat management facility for an enterprisenetwork that includes the plurality of endpoints so that the aggregatedchange data can be used in, e.g., threat detection, forensic analysis,and so forth.

As shown in step 2218, the method 2200 may include applying a networksecurity rule at the firewall based on the process data to controlnetwork communications associated with the process. While dataaccumulated by a data recorder, either from an individual endpoint orfrom a collection of endpoints, may be simply logged for subsequentanalysis, the data may also or instead be used to apply a security rulebased on the process data. This general technique may advantageouslybenefit from the secure nature of, e.g., the tamper protection cache andthe use of a kernel driver to provide a low-level source of informationon the endpoint.

The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may berealized in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable fora particular application. The hardware may include a general-purposecomputer and/or dedicated computing device. This includes realization inone or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, embeddedmicrocontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or otherprogrammable devices or processing circuitry, along with internal and/orexternal memory. This may also, or instead, include one or moreapplication specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays,programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices thatmay be configured to process electronic signals. It will further beappreciated that a realization of the processes or devices describedabove may include computer-executable code created using a structuredprogramming language such as C, an object oriented programming languagesuch as C++, or any other high-level or low-level programming language(including assembly languages, hardware description languages, anddatabase programming languages and technologies) that may be stored,compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as well asheterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, orcombinations of different hardware and software. In another aspect, themethods may be embodied in systems that perform the steps thereof, andmay be distributed across devices in a number of ways. At the same time,processing may be distributed across devices such as the various systemsdescribed above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into adedicated, standalone device or other hardware. In another aspect, meansfor performing the steps associated with the processes described abovemay include any of the hardware and/or software described above. Allsuch permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scopeof the present disclosure.

Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program productscomprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs any and/or all ofthe steps thereof. The code may be stored in a non-transitory fashion ina computer memory, which may be a memory from which the program executes(such as random-access memory associated with a processor), or a storagedevice such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared or other device or combination ofdevices. In another aspect, any of the systems and methods describedabove may be embodied in any suitable transmission or propagation mediumcarrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs fromsame.

The elements described and depicted herein, including in flow charts andblock diagrams throughout the figures, imply logical boundaries betweenthe elements. However, according to software or hardware engineeringpractices, the depicted elements and the functions thereof may beimplemented on machines through computer executable media having aprocessor capable of executing program instructions stored thereon as amonolithic software structure, as standalone software modules, or asmodules that employ external routines, code, services, and so forth, orany combination of these, and all such implementations may be within thescope of the present disclosure. Examples of such machines may include,but may not be limited to, personal digital assistants, laptops,personal computers, mobile phones, other handheld computing devices,medical equipment, wired or wireless communication devices, transducers,chips, calculators, satellites, tablet PCs, electronic books, gadgets,electronic devices, devices having artificial intelligence, computingdevices, networking equipment, servers, routers and the like.Furthermore, the elements depicted in the flow chart and block diagramsor any other logical component may be implemented on a machine capableof executing program instructions. Thus, while the foregoing drawingsand descriptions set forth functional aspects of the disclosed systems,no particular arrangement of software for implementing these functionalaspects should be inferred from these descriptions unless explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Similarly, it may beappreciated that the various steps identified and described above may bevaried, and that the order of steps may be adapted to particularapplications of the techniques disclosed herein. All such variations andmodifications are intended to fall within the scope of this disclosure.As such, the depiction and/or description of an order for various stepsshould not be understood to require a particular order of execution forthose steps, unless required by a particular application, or explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Absent an explicitindication to the contrary, the disclosed steps may be modified,supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without departing from thescope of this disclosure. Numerous variations, additions, omissions, andother modifications will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in theart. In addition, the order or presentation of method steps in thedescription and drawings above is not intended to require this order ofperforming the recited steps unless a particular order is expresslyrequired or otherwise clear from the context.

The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended toinclude any suitable method of causing such method steps to beperformed, consistent with the patentability of the following claims,unless a different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear fromthe context. So, for example performing the step of X includes anysuitable method for causing another party such as a remote user, aremote processing resource (e.g., a server or cloud computer) or amachine to perform the step of X. Similarly, performing steps X, Y and Zmay include any method of directing or controlling any combination ofsuch other individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z toobtain the benefit of such steps. Thus, method steps of theimplementations described herein are intended to include any suitablemethod of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform thesteps, consistent with the patentability of the following claims, unlessa different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear from thecontext. Such parties or entities need not be under the direction orcontrol of any other party or entity, and need not be located within aparticular jurisdiction.

It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above areset forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations,additions, omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation ofmethod steps in the description and drawings above is not intended torequire this order of performing the recited steps unless a particularorder is expressly required or otherwise clear from the context. Thus,while particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various changes andmodifications in form and details may be made therein without departingfrom the spirit and scope of this disclosure and are intended to form apart of the invention as defined by the following claims, which are tobe interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for managing network flows for anenterprise network, the method comprising: receiving, at a firewall ofan enterprise network, a network message from a process executing on anendpoint; transmitting a request through a secure connection from thefirewall to a local security agent on the endpoint to retrieveidentifying information for an application associated with the processfrom a process cache in a kernel space of an operating system for theendpoint; receiving, from the local security agent in response to therequest, identifying information for the application including at leastan application type; and applying a security policy for the enterprisenetwork to the network message at the firewall according to the networkmessage and the application type.
 2. The method of claim 1 whereinapplying the security policy includes managing a network traffic flow atthe firewall based on the security policy.
 3. The method of claim 2wherein managing the network traffic flow includes associating thenetwork traffic flow with the application type.
 4. The method of claim 2managing the network traffic flow includes applying a security policy tothe network traffic flow according to the application type.
 5. Themethod of claim 1 wherein the firewall executes on the endpoint.
 6. Themethod of claim 1 wherein the firewall executes on a gateway for theenterprise network.
 7. The method of claim 1 wherein the firewallexecutes on a cloud-based security appliance for the enterprise network.8. The method of claim 1 wherein the identifying information includes anapplication name for the application.
 9. A computer program product formanaging network flows comprising computer executable code embodied on anon-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on afirewall, performs the steps of: receiving, at a firewall of anenterprise network, a network message from a process executing on anendpoint; transmitting a request from the firewall to a local securityagent on the endpoint to retrieve identifying information for anapplication associated with the process from a process cache in a kernelspace of an operating system for the endpoint; receiving, from the localsecurity agent in response to the request, identifying information forthe application; and applying a security policy for the enterprisenetwork to the network message at the firewall according to the networkmessage and an application type for the application.
 10. The computerprogram product of claim 9 wherein the identifying information includesthe application type.
 11. The computer program product of claim 9further comprising querying a threat management facility for theenterprise network to identify the application type based on theidentifying information.
 12. The computer program product of claim 9further comprising querying a data store of the firewall to identify theapplication type based on the identifying information.
 13. The computerprogram product of claim 9 wherein transmitting the request includestransmitting the request through a secure connection.
 14. The computerprogram product of claim 13 wherein the secure connection between thefirewall and the endpoint is on a channel separate from the networkmessage.
 15. The computer program product of claim 9 whereintransmitting the request includes conditionally transmitting the requestwhen the firewall cannot determine the application type for theapplication.
 16. The computer program product of claim 9 wherein thefirewall executes on the endpoint.
 17. The computer program product ofclaim 9 wherein the firewall executes on a gateway for the enterprisenetwork.
 18. The computer program product of claim 9 wherein thefirewall executes on a cloud-based security appliance for the enterprisenetwork.
 19. The computer program product of claim 9 further comprisingstoring an application type determined from the identifying informationat the firewall in association with at least one of a machine name, aMAC address, an IP address, or a socket for the network message.
 20. Thecomputer program product of claim 9 wherein the identifying informationincludes one or more of an application name, an application path, aclassification, or a verifiable assertion of source.